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There is, of course, no reason why two partiesshould retaina
permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote for or
againstthem. Competition in ideas and in governmentalpolicies
is at the core of our electoralprocess and ofthe FirstAmendment
freedoms.'

INTRODUCTION

The recently-enacted McCain-Feingold campaign finance law2
pushes to the fore the questions of whether and to what extent the
First Amendment allows government to regulate the electoral
activities of political parties. One of the new law's primary
components is its attempt to eliminate so-called "soft money"unlimited donations to national political parties that the Democrats
and Republicans have used to circumvent legal limits on campaign
contributions? One congressional opponent of the new law called it
"the death knell" for political parties' role in elections." Not
surprisingly, both major parties have attacked McCain-Feingold.
Most Republicans in Congress opposed the legislation, and some of
them are leading a constitutional challenge to the law. Democrats,
while largely supportive in Congress, encouraged the Federal
Election Commission to weaken the law's effects through rulemaking.5 While opinions differ about whether McCain-Feingold will
1. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
3. See id. § 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82-86 (amending § 323 of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431). "Soft money" refers to funds, not subject to federal limits on
contributions, that political parties use to finance the state portion of an electoral slate.
Parties have developed methods of using soft money to fund federal candidates, notably
through "issue advertisements"-also a subject of proscription in McCain-Feingold-which
advocate positions in federal campaigns without expressly advocating a particular candidate's
election. See generallyRichard Briffault, The PoliticalPartiesand CampaignFinanceReform,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 628-31 (2000).
4. Excerpts From House Debate on the Shays-Meehan Campaign Finance Bill, N.Y.
TimEs, Feb. 14, 2002, at A30 (quoting Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.)). Advocates of
McCain-Feingold do not dispute the characterization of the law as a check on the parties'
influence. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 3, at 655-59 (advocating regulations along the lines
of McCain-Feingold to control the parties' disproportionate influence on the electoral process).
5. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sponsors Assert Soft Money Ban May Be Diluted, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2002, at Al.
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prevent circumvention of contribution limits, the two major parties
strongly assert that the law will impede their functioning and
thereby disable democracy.
Whether the Supreme Court upholds the statute will depend in
large measure on theories about how the First Amendment limits
government regulation of political parties.6 The present Court,
across the terrain of First Amendment doctrine, treats the freedom
of expression and the attendant freedom of association as private,
negative rights intended to shield individual autonomy against
government regulation. The Court balances individuals' expressive
interests against the government's regulatory interest without
regard to broader societal implications of First Amendment
disputes. This approach has led the Court in recent years to show
great solicitude for the interests of the two major political parties.
In rulings that benefit those parties almost exclusively, the Court
has held that the First Amendment's protection of free association
bars states from making political parties accept nonpartisans as
primary voters7 and that the Free Speech Clause bars Congress
from restricting parties' expenditures in political campaigns unless
the spending is explicitly coordinated with the party's candidate.8 In
contrast, the Court has taken a narrow view of First Amendment
rights where minor political parties' distinct interests have been at
issue.' According to recent decisions, the Amendment *doesnot bar
states from forbidding minor parties to co-nominate major party

6. This Article discusses only the activities of political parties that relate directly to
nominating and electing candidates. Political parties have other important functions-notably
their roles in passing legislation, redistricting, and distributing patronage jobs-that I do not
address directly.
7. See Cal. Democratic Partyv. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (discussed infra Part III.A.1).
8. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado I),
533 U.S. 431 (2001); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n
(Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604 (1996) [hereinafter Colorado ] (discussed infra Part III.A.2).
9. By "major political parties," I mean the Republicans and Democrats, or any party or
parties that unseat the Democrats and/or the Republicans as one of the two dominant parties
in the United States. I use the term "minor political parties" as an umbrella to cover
alternative parties that survive multiple election cycles, such as the Green Party and the
Libertarian Party; parties that emerge as vehicles for an individual's candidacy, such as the
Reform Party; and independent candidacies, such as John Anderson's 1980 presidential bid.
These classifications reflect the present structure of United States politics, the major party
duopoly. The categories would require revision if that structure changed.
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candidates ° or excluding minor party candidates from televised
candidate debates."
The Court's autonomy-based theory of expressive freedom may
appear unremarkable, but the application of that theory to disputes
about regulations of political parties has done remarkable damage
to our electoral system. The Court's recent decisions have validated
a specific normative vision of partisan politics: that a stable, twoparty political system is essential to our democratic institutions,
and that the best way to achieve the myriad benefits the major
political parties provide is to maximize their autonomy. The major
parties' prerogative to participate freely in elections has trumped
any reason asserted for regulating them, such as enhancing popular
participation in elections or facilitating more robust political debate.
In contrast, governmental interests in political stability have
outweighed minor parties' expressive interests. As a result of the
Court's political engineering, people are more alienated from the
political process and less likely to participate in politics; elections
are less competitive and incumbent officeholders more secure; and
political debate contributes far less to the resolution of important
issues than our democratic culture requires.
This Article advocates a different First Amendment theory for
cases involving regulation of political parties' electoral activities. It
contends that the Court should view the First Amendment not as a
mere negative protection against government regulation but rather
as an affirmative constitutional commitment to foster a vigorous,
broadly participatory electoral discourse. Expressive freedom, on
this account, ensures that all members of the political community
will have access to the information they need in order to participate
thoughtfully in the political process. My alternative understanding
of the First Amendment would allow substantial regulation of the
major political parties' electoral activities while strengthening the
First Amendment's role in protecting minor parties. That state of
affairs would facilitate a vibrant participatory democracy, producing
a more engaged electorate, heightened electoral competition, and
more robust political debate.
10. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351(1997) (discussed infra Part

III.B.1).
11. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (discussed infra Part
III.B.2).
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The first two Parts of this Article build a theoretical framework
for analyzing disputes about regulations of political parties. Part I
examines the Court's familiar and entrenched approach to the First
Amendment: the private rights theory of expressive freedom. It
demonstrates that the private rights theory compels legal decisions
about political parties that comport with a particular perspective on
parties' role in our democracy, known by political scientists as the
responsibleparty government theory. This Article sheds new light on
both theories by demonstrating how the private rights theory serves
the ends of the responsible party government theory.
Part II advocates alternatives to both theories. The alternative
account of the First Amendment, which I call the public rights
theory, draws on a venerable tradition of legal scholarship focused
on the essential value of expressive freedom for the process of
collective self-determination. The alternative account of political
parties' role in our democratic system, which I call the dynamic
partypolitics theory, reflects skepticism about the two-party system
and envisions a political process marked by popular engagement,
robust electoral competition, and wide-ranging debate. Part II
demonstrates how judicial embrace of the public rights theory would
compel judicial decisions about parties' electoral activities that
would comport with the dynamic party politics theory.
The remainder of this Article employs the theoretical insights
of the first two Parts to take a fresh look at the recent cases and
related doctrinal issues. Part III uses the entrenched and alternative constitutional and political theories as filters for analyzing
and critiquing the Supreme Court's four recent decisions about
regulations of political parties' electoral activities. My analyses
demonstrate in concrete terms how the private rights theory of
expressive freedom serves the responsible party government theory
of political parties. My critiques show how the Court should have
decided these cases, explaining how and why judicial embrace of the
public rights theory would have resulted in decisions consistent with
the dynamic party politics theory. Finally, Part IV discusses some
other ways in which applying the public rights theory to regulations
of political parties' electoral activities would lead the Court to
change present law. It distinguishes between major and minor
political parties in identifying state action; reconsiders the aspect of
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Buckley v. Valeo"2 that allows regulation of political contributions

but not of expenditures, in light of the advantage that distinction
has conferred on the major parties; and contends that certain
subconstitutional features of our electoral system that perpetuate
the two-party system-notably states' ubiquitous reliance on singlemember congressional districts and plurality voting systems-are
within the proper scope of First Amendment concern.
I. THE DOMINANT THEORETICAL APPROACH TO REVIEWING
REGULATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

This Part develops a hypothesis that the Supreme Court's present
theoretical understanding of the First Amendment will lead it to
vindicate a particular theory about what constitutes a good political
system. Part L.A describes the Court's prevailing theoretical
approach to analyzing expressive freedom claims under the First
Amendment, the private rights theory. My discussion identifies five
defining elements of the private rights theory: (1) derivation from
pluralist political philosophy, (2) treatment of speech rights as
individuated, (3) a formal conception of liberty, (4) reliance on a
strong public-private distinction, and (5) employment of a balancing
methodology. Part I.B describes the prevailing theory of partisan
politics that supports the major party duopoly: the theory of
responsible party government. My discussion focuses on the three
principal ways in which responsible party government theorists
claim the duopoly benefits democracy: (1) forcing the formation of
broad-based pre-electoral coalitions, (2) discouraging factionalism
in politics and government, and (3) providing a voting cue to assist
underinformed voters.
The first two Sections of this Part deliberately segregate the
dominant theory of expressive freedom from the dominant theory of
partisan politics. The separation underscores the distinction
ordinarily presumed between judges' explication of the Constitution
and policymakers' engineering of political systems. Indeed, the
private rights theory and the responsible party government theory
have developed independently of one another. That fact makes the
analysis in Part I.C all the more surprising: Examination of the two
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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dominant theories together demonstrates that, when their spheres
of concern intersect, they operate in perfect harmony. The key
elements of the private rights theory consistently validate the
assumptions and goals of the responsible party government theory.
This synthesis provides the framework for my examination in Part
III of the Supreme Court's decisions about regulations of political
parties' electoral activities.
A. The PrivateRights Theory of Expressive Freedom
Commentators of diverse interpretive stripes have recognized the
unusual futility of attempts to capture the meaning and scope of the
First Amendment by reference to the text or original understanding
of the Constitution.1 3 Judicial protection of expressive freedom,
then, must rest on some theory of the First Amendment-some
articulable understanding of why the Amendment appears in the
Constitution and what it protects. 4 The Supreme Court, especially
over the past three decades, has made a resounding theoretical commitment: the Free Speech Clause protects the private, individual
right to free expression against invasion by the government.
The theory of expressive freedom as a private right is rooted in
the venerable idea of rights as negative, pre-political principles
that do no more than limit the power of government. John Locke
conceived of liberty as the natural state of human existence. 5 He
13. Especially significant in this regard is the resort to theory of the staunch originalist
Robert Bork. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Bork discusses historical materials on the ratification of the First
Amendment and concludes: "We are ... forced to construct our own theory of the constitutional
protection of speech. We cannot solve our problems simply by reference to the text or to its
history." Id. at 22; see also Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
ConstitutionalArgument: The Caseof PornographyRegulation,56 TENN. L. REV. 291,299 n.31
(1989) (arguing that the understandings of "the historical framers and ratifiers of 1787-89 ...
cannot provide much useful guidance to modem constitutional-legal doctrine respecting
freedom of speech"); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255,256 (1992) ("For
those who believe ... that the Constitution's meaning is fixed by the original understanding
of its ratifiers, the First Amendment is a particular embarrassment.").
14. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 371-72 (1997)
(contending thatjudicial integrity compels theoretical inquiry absent more concrete decisional
guides).
15. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 269 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)
[hereinafter LOCKE, TREATISES] (describing individuals' natural condition as "a State ofperfect
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think
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defined liberty as "the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear
any particular action, according to the determination or thought of
the mind

"
....

Locke posited that individuals formed governments

to ensure the enjoyment of their natural rights.17 Government, on
this account, was a police force that prevented freedom from
dissolving into anarchy. A government had only the limited powers
necessary to perform that function; thus, the very terms of its
existence barred it from abridging individual rights."8 William
Blackstone, echoing Locke's ideas about the natural derivation of
rights and the limited power of government, 9 emphasized that "the
law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellowcitizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty
of mankind. "2° From these accounts emerges a conception of rights
focused on individual autonomy, centrally concerned with the
danger of government tyranny, and subject to limitation based on
weightier public priorities.
The Supreme Court's foundational free speech decisions,
influenced by Locke and Blackstone, constructed the private rights
approach to the First Amendment. The early cases addressed
incitement and subversive advocacy, issues that led the Court to
weigh individuals' interests in freedom from government regulation
against the dangers the government claimed their expression posed
to civil order.21 The Court in these cases, most notably in the
influential opinions of Justice Holmes, defined the expressive rights
at issue in terms of the speakers' individual autonomy rather than
fit").
16. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 95 (Kenneth Winkler
ed., 1996) (1690).
17. See LOCKE, TREATISES, supra note 15, at 350 (explaining that the individual is willing
to part with freedom in order to preserve "the enjoyment of the property he has in Ithe state
of nature]").
18. See id. at 357 (describing legislative authority as "a Power, that hath no other end but
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to
impoverish the Subjects").
19. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 n.4 (3d ed.

1884) (describing natural rights and the role of government in preserving liberty).
20. Id. at 125.
21. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
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any value their expression might have held for collective decision
making. 22 Building on Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger"
formulation of the balance between expressive autonomy and the
government's regulatory prerogatives, the Court routinely subordinated the speakers' interests to national security concerns.2"
The fact that the particular speakers in question were marginalized
political dissidents mattered only to the extent it arguably rendered
them harmless to the government's interests. 24 The nascent private
rights theory gained rhetorical force from Justice Holmes' analogy
of expressive freedom to a marketplace of "free trade in ideas."'
First Amendment doctrine from the 1940s to the 1960s, and in
scattered later cases, occasionally departed from the private rights
theory. Numerous free speech decisions turned on the Court's
recognition of a broad public interest in receiving information, as
distinct from a private speaker's interest in expression. 6 Cases
22. Even Justice Holmes' famous formulation of expressive freedom as directed at the
search for truth emphasized autonomy rather than collective decision making. Justice Holmes
called on individuals to realize "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and ... truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf
ALEXANDER MEIRLEJOHN, POLrTIcAL FREEDOM 73-75 (1948) (criticizing Holmes' formulation).
23. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 ("The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
24. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (opposing the Court's affirmance
of a conviction on the ground that the speaker's antiwar advocacy was merely "the
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man"). The notable exception to the
private rights orientation of these early decisions was Justice Brandeis' concurrence in
Whitney, which laid the foundation for Alexander Meiklejohn's theory that the First
Amendment comprehensively protects political expression. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80; see
infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
25. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to the "marketplace of ideas"); David Cole, First
Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Fairein CampaignFinance,9 YALE L. & POLy REV.
236, 239-42 (1991) (discussing the history of the market metaphor for expressive freedom).
26. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (striking down a prison's
restrictions on prisoners' ability to send mail not because of prisoners' interest in expression
but because of recipients' interest in receiving information); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969) (emphasizing the public's First Amendment interest in receiving
unbiased information in upholding federal broadcast regulation); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (striking down a prohibition on private possession of pornography based on
the First Amendment interest in receiving information); Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (striking
down a federal restriction on receipt of political information from abroad based on First
Amendment right to receive mail); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,505 (1946) (declaring that
"the preservation of a free society is ... dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to
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arising out of the Civil Rights struggle27 and labor conflicts28 led the
Court to affirm the expressive freedom of socially important mass
movements and their followers. Some of those decisions set aside
private damage awards on First Amendment grounds, reflecting
the Court's understanding that private actions drive some
restrictions on free speech.2 9 The Court placed special emphasis on
the expressive freedom of political dissidents.3 0 Scattered cases
suggested that the government could play an active role in
preventing private interference with free expression."'
receive such literature as he himself might desire").
27. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing convictions of civil rights
protesters for breach of the peace); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (striking
down a libel award against a newspaper and civil rights leaders based on an advertisement
criticizing police brutality against protesters); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(upholding the First Amendment right of civil rights groups to solicit clients for litigation);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the First Amendment protected a civil
rights organization from a state's demand for the organization's membership list). The Court
retained some interest in the First Amendment's protection of civil rights activism even into
the 1980s. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (setting aside, on First
Amendment grounds, a damage award based on a civil rights organizer's incendiary rhetoric).
28. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (striking down on First Amendment and
due process grounds an ordinance that restricted assembly and overturning convictions of
labor picketers); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(holding on First Amendment grounds that a state could not apply trespass law to enjoin
union picketing on private property); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that
the First Amendment protected dissemination of information concerning a labor dispute). But
see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Logan Valley Plaza and rejecting a
First Amendment role in protecting expression on private property).
29. See Claiborne Hardware,458 U.S. 886; Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308; Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254.
30. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning on First Amendment
grounds the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)
(striking down a loyalty oath requirement for public employees); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning on First Amendment grounds convictions of Communist Party
members).
31. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (rejecting, based in
part on the public's interest in an electoral process that accurately represented public views,
a First Amendment challenge to Michigan's prohibition on expenditures of corporate profits
in political campaigns); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding against a First
Amendment challenge the FCC's interpretation and application of a statute that authorizes
revocation of broadcast licenses for failures to provide political candidates access to airwaves);
Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 375-86 (upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine," which required
broadcasters to give persons attacked on the air free response time, based on the public's
interest in the airwaves). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds a state's restriction on corporate campaign
contributions and expenditures); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down
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Over the past three decades, however, the private rights theory
has become entrenched as the dominant mode of analysis in First
Amendment cases. 2 Most of the Court's major innovations in free
speech doctrine during that period-development of the modern
public forum doctrine in such cases as Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund, Inc.,3 with an attendant emphasis on
content-neutrality; 34 protection of political campaign expenditures,
beginning with Buckley v. Valeo;35 and protection of commercial
advertising, beginning with Virginia State Board bf Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.3 -reflect a primary
concern with identifying and protecting private expression against
governmental regulatory excesses.
on First Amendment grounds a state's analogous provision to the fairness doctrine as applied
to a newspaper). The Court faintly echoed its earlier acknowledgements of the government's
role in protecting free expression when it upheld an FCC regulation that requires cable
television systems to carry local broadcast channels, based on a finding that the regulation
is content-neutral. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994) ("The First Amendment's command
that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government from
taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical
pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas.").
32. See Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-CenteredReading of the FirstAmendment,
93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1999) ("The currently prevailing reading celebrates individual
autonomy, viewing the First Amendment as a check on government interference with certain
highly favored categories of individual behavior....") (footnote omitted); Frederick Schauer &
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalismand the FirstAmendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803,
1809-14 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of individualist conceptions of First Amendment
rights).
33. 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (upholding the exclusion of a civil rights organization from a
federal employee fundraising drive on the ground that the drive was a nonpublic forum); see
also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding a
contract provision that allowed only an incumbent union, not a putative rival union, access
to school teachers' mailboxes on the ground that mailboxes were nonpublic fora). The public
forum doctrine has deep roots traceable to a decision that protected the expressive freedom
of labor organizers. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (striking down a municipal
ordinance that unduly restricted speakers' access to streets and parks).
34. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (rejecting a
challenge to the "decency and respect" requirement for federal arts funding based on the
absence of any salient viewpoint-based or content-based discrimination).
35. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (announcing substantial First Amendment restrictions on campaign
finance regulations). For a discussion of campaign finance issues under the First Amendment,
see infra Parts III.A.2 and IV.B.
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (announcing qualified First Amendment protection for commercial
price advertising); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980) ("The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation.").
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Methodologically, the private rights theory requires an initial
determination of whether and how seriously a government
regulation burdens an individual's expressive freedom. 7 The Court
then balances the burden on expression against the regulatory
interest the government asserts for the challenged action.38 The
Court calibrates the balance based on the nature of the regulation:
discrimination based on content or viewpoint is subject to strict
scrutiny, while a content-neutral regulation receives deferential
review.39 An illustrative case is Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of New York State Crime Victims Board,40 which struck down a state
statute that diverted profits from books written by accused or
convicted criminals about their crimes to a victims' compensation
fund." ' Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, focused on the
state's abridgement of individual speakers' autonomy: "A statute is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes
a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech." 2 She invoked the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, stating
that "the government's ability to impose content-based burdens on
speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive
certain ideas ... from the marketplace.""3 Applying the strict scrutiny
formulation of the First Amendment balancing test, the Court
credited the state with compelling interests in compensating crime
victims and in preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes, but it found the statute not narrowly tailored to accomplish
those interests."
This brief examination of the private rights theory's origins and
methodology reveals several interrelated elements that characterize
the theory:

37. See, e.g., Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 749-65.
38. See, e.g., id. at 766 (weighing the state interest in regulating advertising against the
freedom of expression).
39. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994) (explaining the relationship between
the nature of government abridgement of expressive freedom and calibration of the balancing
test).

40. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.; see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (repealed 1992).
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 116.
See id. at 118-23.
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First,the private rights theory derives from apluralistphilosophy
of politics and government. Under the pluralist vision, individuals
organize into private interest groups to compete for the distribution
of social and political goods by the government.45 Interest groups act
as mediating institutions that prevent conflicts among selfinterested individuals from rending the social fabric." Interest
group competition ensures that power will be "dispersed and
exercised not solely by governmental officials but also by private
individuals and groups within the society."47 The private rights
theory draws from pluralism a focus on private autonomy, a
suspicion of excessive governmental authority, and a faith in market
distributions to guarantee formal liberty.4" In particular, the private
rights theory's refusal to impose a constitutional guarantee of
access to expressive opportunities for a multiplicity of views
reflects pluralism's "assumption ... that all views and interests are
represented" in the competition among interest groups. 9 The other
elements of the private rights theory all follow from its pluralist
roots.
Second, in keeping with the pluralist model of competition for
social goods, rights under the private rights theory are individuated.
As the Court has stated, "[alt the heart of the First Amendment lies
the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence." ° The theory views expressive freedom as a private
45. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 49 (3d

ed. 2001).
46. See id.
47. V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 9 (1958).
48. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 49 (stating that "[olur pluralist system is a

marketplace of ideas"). Jack Balkin identifies pluralism, at its historic roots, with some of the
progressive concerns that will be shown to undergird the public rights theory of expressive
freedom. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:Legal Realist Approaches to the
FirstAmendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 391-92. He views progressives' subsequent embrace
of republicanism as, in part, a reaction to the appropriation of pluralist conceptions of liberty
and neutrality by defenders of the economic status quo. See id. at 395 n.44. For a discussion
of the public rights theory's correspondence with republicanism, see infra notes 173-78 and
accompanying text.
49. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 50. For a seminal critique of pluralist confidence
in the market's representation of diverse interests, see ELMER SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIsS VIEW OF DEMOCRACY INAMERICA (1960).
50. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); see also Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment
Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 233 (1992) ("Autonomy is the
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commodity, analogous to a property right. Indeed, over the past
two decades in cases such as Simon & Schuster, the Court has
vigorously extended the First Amendment to restrict government
from imposing financial disincentives to speech. 5 At the same time,
the Court has treated private property as a powerful shield against
expression-rejecting, for example, a First Amendment challenge to
a municipal ordinance that prohibited residential picketing.52 The
Court emphasized the speaker's private interest in expression over
the audience's interest in access to information.5"
Third, the individuated character of expressive freedom entails
a formal conception of liberty. The First Amendment protects all
individuals against the threat of government interference with
expressive freedom, but it does not entitle anyone to any particular
measure of expressive opportunity. 54 Accordingly, the contemporary
foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of expression.").
51. See also United States v. Natl Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)
(striking down a federal restriction on government employees' receipt of honoraria for
speaking); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down contentbased application of a sales tax to magazines); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn.
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (striking down content-based application of a sales
and use tax to newspapers).
52. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
53. Even the area where the modern Court has most strongly emphasized the interest in
receiving information, commercial speech, notably involves an interest in private economic
decision making rather than a collective public interest. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996) (plurality opinion) (discussing "public reli[ance] on
'commercial speech' for vital information about the market"); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) ("IT]he particular consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.").
54. An exception to this tendency has appeared in a few cases where the Court, speaking
through Justice Stevens, has emphasized the availability of a particular medium of expression
for speakers of limited financial means as a strong reason to protect the medium. See Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("[The Internet] provides relatively unlimited, low-cost
capacity for communication of all kinds."); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994)
("Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially
for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical
substitute."). But see Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S 789, 812
(1984) (Stevens, J.). In Vincent, however, Justice Stevens stated:
The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise
the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the
posting of signs on public property is prohibited. To the extent that the posting
of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, there
is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through
other means.
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Court focuses relentlessly on ensuring content neutrality in
government regulations, rather than equalizing power differentials
among speakers."5 Indeed, the Court has held that the First
Amendment bars government from expanding weaker speakers'
expressive opportunities at stronger speakers' expense.5 6 A powerful
corporation such as the Coors Brewing Company 7 or an influential
mainstream organization like the Boy Scouts of America" may
prevail on a First Amendment claim as easily as an individual or
dissident group. Even individual and public institutional speakers
have won some important First Amendment cases due in part to
corporate support. For example, although the American Civil
Liberties Union and the American Library Association were the
55.
If the First Amendment protects rights intrinsic to essential attributes of
individual personhood, autonomy, or dignity, such as the right to self-expression,
it is easy to see how one might conclude that First Amendment "rights" should
not depend in significant ways on the particular contexts in which they are
asserted.
Schauer & Pildes, supra note 32, at 1809; see also William T. Mayton, "Buying-up Speech':
Active Government and the Terms of the Firstand FourteenthAmendments, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 373, 415-17 (1994) (discussing conditional benefits cases as exemplars of the
Court's negative rights approach to expressive freedom).
56. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("The concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... "). In another important area of First
Amendment law, Free Exercise, the Court has refused to consider special problems faced by
minority religious groups. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(acknowledging, as to the Court's holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel
accommodation of religious exercise, "that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in").
Similarly, the Court's equal protection doctrine dealing with racial discrimination has barred
efforts to correct entrenched differences in societal power based on race. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal racebased affirmative action program and striking down the program because it disadvantaged
whites); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a state's redistricting
plan and striking down the plan based on the state's purpose of increasing representation of
African Americans).
57. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (overturning on First
Amendment grounds restrictions on price advertising); see also O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (extending to independent contractors the First
Amendment protection accorded public employee speech); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (reversing on First Amendment grounds a tort judgment against a magazine).
58. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (affirming a national
membership organization's First Amendment right to nonassociation); see also Hurleyv. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (affirming a large civic parade
organizing committee's First Amendment right to nonassociation).
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nominal lead plaintiffs in the consolidated cases that produced
the Court's landmark decision restricting censorship on the
Internet, corporate giant America Online played a leading role in
the plaintiff coalition.59 If anything, the private rights theory
places special emphasis on the interests of more powerful First
Amendment claimants, respecting the quantity of information they
can contribute to the marketplace of ideas while still treating them
as individuals. 6° The present Court's strongest initiative to raise
speech protection above past levels has come in the area of
commercial advertising, where most claimants are corporations with
significant social and political power.61
Fourth, the private rights theory's pluralist premises generate
another characteristic feature of formal legal analysis: a strong
public-privatedistinction.62 Every First Amendment dispute pits a

private individual with an interest in speaking against a government regulator with an interest in suppressing that individual's
speech.6" This formulation leaves no room for ambivalence about the
59. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 84 (1997) (striking down federal proscriptions on
"indecent" online speech). Likewise, where corporations lose First Amendment cases, rival
corporate interests may play pivotal roles. In Turner II, the Court's most prominent recent
rejection of a First Amendment claim brought by private industry, broadcasting corporations
fought alongside the government to defend the FCC's requirement that cable television
systems carry local broadcast stations. Turner I, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) (accepting the premise that commercial pornography harms women but
striking down an anti-pornography ordinance under the First Amendment because such harm
.simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech").
61. The Court did not understand the First Amendment to protect commercial advertising
at all until its decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court subjected truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech to a species of intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, under which the government
must show that a regulation of such speech "directly advances [a substantial] government
interest" and "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id. at 566. The
present Court appears likely to expand protection for commercial speech beyond the Central
Hudson boundaries. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)
(plurality opinion) ("[WVhen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands.").
62. Frank Michelman has argued persuasively that maintenance of a strong publicprivate distinction requires the pluralist assumptions that I have identified at the roots of the
private rights theory of expressive freedom. See Michelman, supra note 13, at 314-15.
63. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 658-59 ("[Tihe associational interest in freedom of
expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State's interest on the other.");
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private or public nature of an entity involved in an expressive
freedom dispute. The Court therefore insists on defining public or
quasi-public entities engaged in expression either as speakers or
as regulators."' In one case, a unanimous Court analyzed a gaylesbian-bisexual group's demand to march in a parade organized by
a civic organization, which needed (and had) government permits to
operate, as an infringement on the organization's First Amendment
rights, because the group had invoked a state antidiscrimination
law to press its demand.' A lodestar of the private rights theory is
the conviction that government poses a presumptive threat to First
Amendment rights,66 which renders the idea that the government
may, let alone must, regulate in the name of expressive freedom
inherently suspect.6 7 Because the government's position in a First
Amendment dispute necessarily is that of regulator and putative

Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 (1984) (rejecting an
argument that a speech restriction on public property was unjustified in light of the failure
to extend the restriction to private property); Fried, supra note 50, at 234-37 (defending the
view that the First Amendment governs only state action); William E. Lee, The Supreme
Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 344 ("[P]olicymakers and
the Court should recognize that free speech and the accompanying right to receive are
abridged only by government, not by private censorship.").
64. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-35 (1995)
(characterizing a public university that imposed viewpoint-based restrictions on eligibility for
student activity funds as a regulator rather than a speaker); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
193-94 (1991) (characterizing a federal agency that imposed viewpoint-based restrictions on
funding as a speaker rather than a regulator); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
394-95 & n.24 (1984) (treating federally subsidized broadcasters, including public broadcast
stations, as private speakers rather than governmental entities). See generally MARK G.
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA (1983).
65. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995).
66. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 623, 641 (1994) (discussing the dangers that government
poses to expressive freedom); see also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781,
786 (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?] (stating that conventional First Amendment
doctrine "createls] a very strong presumption against state interference with speech").
67. The Court, under the private rights approach, has allowed the government discretion
in subsidizing speech. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(upholding a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits lobbying organizations
from receiving tax-deductible contributions); cf Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1423-24 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure]
(criticizing the Court's logic of allowing a state to control speech by subsidy but not by
regulation). Likewise, the Court has permitted the government to enhance expressive
opportunities by creating public fora. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

1958

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

infringer of private rights, a case cannot logically present competing
free speech claims.6"
Fifth, the private rights theory measures private expressive
autonomy against government regulatory interests using a
balancingmethodology, which provides for restriction of viewpoints
perceived as radical or threatening to the social order. A balancing
analysis gives the Court substantial discretion to cast expressive
interests as trivial in the face of weighty, nonspeech regulatory
objectives.6 9 The Court can accomplish this result either by
treating a regulation as minimally intrusive, a technique that has
characterized decisions upholding regulations of the time, place,
and manner of speech in nonpublic fora as applied to political
dissidents,7 ° or by treating expression that threatens the social
68. The Court's strong disinclination to view free speech cases as presenting competing
First Amendment claims resembles its approach under the Religion Clauses. The Court
occasionally struggles to analyze the effects the Establishment Clause might have on a free
exercise accommodation claim, or vice versa. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 26-29 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (exploring the possibility of a conflict between
mandates of Free Exercise Clause and prohibitions of Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). Usually,
however, the Court simply ignores the tension. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1967-68 (2001) (discussing the tension between the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses in accommodation cases).
69. See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRrIQUE 237, 260 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (discussing uses of First Amendment
balancing tests, notably the "clear-and-present-danger" test, "to justify repression and
punishment of dissent").
70. See Nati Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 581 (1998) (upholding a
regulation that requires consideration of "decency and respect" in federal arts funding because
the regulation "imposes no categorical requirement" on applicants); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a municipal requirement, applied to political
protestors, that concerts in a city park must use city-provided sound equipment and
technicians); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding
application of a federal regulation that banned camping in certain national parks to protestors
against homelessness who slept in tents in Lafayette Square Park and the Capitol Mall);
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding a city
ordinance, applied to supporters of a political candidate, that banned posting signs on public
property); see also C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1206 n.62 (1994) (book review) [hereinafter Baker, Of Course] ("[All laws affect the
availability of expressive options. When the restriction of expressive options is not the
governmentally desired aspect of the means or the end, it is incidental and does not violate
the constitutional mandate.").
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order as having low value, as in decisions limiting protection for
sexually explicit speech. 7 ' Thus, under the private rights theory, an
idea may effectively be too radical, or a speaker too marginal, to
warrant First Amendment protection. Conversely, protection of
dissenting speech may be prudent in the private rights balance to
the extent that allowing dissenters "to let off steam"7 2 diverts them
from upending the established order.7 3
In Part III, I will demonstrate how the private rights theory has
provided the analytic framework for all of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions about regulations of political parties' electoral
activities. For now, I set the First Amendment aside and turn to a
description of the political theory that Part III will show those
decisions embody.
B. The Responsible Party Government Theory of the Electoral
Process
Political parties serve as mediating institutions that facilitate
people's political activity. Determining what kind of partisan
competition a political system will allow-how many parties, how
large and diverse, and how autonomous-makes a critical difference
in organizing a democratic society. In V.0. Key's familiar formulation, a political party actually consists of three different
entities: (1) the "party in the electorate," meaning the voters who
identify as party members; (2) the "party in government," meaning
the elected officials and political appointees who belong to the party;
and (3) the "party organization," meaning the party's institutional
leadership.74 These entities' interactions define the party's identity
71. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding
that "nude dancing ... is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so"); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S.
50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war
to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of
our choice."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (allowing for wholesale classification
of "works which depict or describe sexual conduct" and "appeal to the prurient interest in sex"
as "obscenity" unprotected by the First Amendment).
72. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 885 (1963).
73. See, e.g., id. at 884-86 (discussing the First Amendment's capacity to preserve the
balance between social stability and change).
74. See KEY, supra note 47, at 163-65.

1960

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

and the nature of its electoral activities. As Albert Hirschman has
explained, party members in the electorate possess two primary
mechanisms for influencing the positions the party organization
adopts: "voice," or active participation in intraparty debates; and
"exit," the threat of leaving the party fold if it fails to heed their
wishes.7" A theory of parties' role in the electoral process entails a
normative determination of the values the process should advance
and a descriptive account of what sort of partisan arrangement,
given parties' complex internal dynamics, best serves to advance
those preferred values.
For most of our nation's history, two large political parties have
dominated electoral competition. The principal theoretical defense
of this major party duopoly derives from what political scientists
have called the responsible party government theory.76 The theory
posits that a sustained two-party order maintains political
stability-the theory's defining value-thereby ensuring the health
of our democratic system.77 The legal precondition for maintaining
duopolistic stability is a substantial measure of party autonomy,
formally extended to all political parties but mainly useful for
protecting the two major parties from regulatory initiatives that
might weaken them.7" Responsible party government theorists
argue that a major party duopoly promotes stability, in what might
otherwise become an anarchic democratic system, by reducing
conflict in the electoral process and, consequently, the processes of

75. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4-5 (1970).

76. The concept of responsible party government encompasses a wide range of proposals
aimed at strengthening the role of parties in government. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rosenblum,
Political Partiesas Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813, 827-31 (2000) (discussing
broad concerns of responsible party government theorists). This Article is concerned with the
aspect of the theory that advocates maintenance of the two-party system.
77. See, e.g., LARRY J. SABATO & BRUCE LARSON, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING
POLITICAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 5 (2001) ("As mechanisms for organizing and
containing political change, the parties are a potent force for stability.").
78. See Bruce E. Cain, PartyAutonomy and Two-Party ElectoralCompetition, 149 U. PA.
L. REv. 793, 802 (2001) (arguing for a legal regime that limits party autonomy only so far as
necessary to "prevent racial discrimination and maintain the orderly management of the
ballot"); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 750,795,804-05 & n.206 (2001) (advancing an argument for substantial party
autonomy and claiming that "hostility to the two-party system" motivates opponents of party
autonomy).

20031

REGULATING POLITICAL PARTIES

1961

government. The duopoly, according to the theory, stabilizes the
democratic system in three principal ways.
First, a two-party system stabilizes the electoral process by
compelling preelectoral coalition building. Because only two parties
are competitive, each must appeal to varied groups of voters in
order to win elections. "The party creates a community of interest
that bonds disparate groups together over time-eliminating the
necessity of creating a coalition anew for every campaign or every
issue. 7 As the two parties compete for support, they subsume a
broad range of opinions prior to any legislative debate. "[Tihe party,
in its endeavors to win the public to its side, however unscrupulous
it may be in its modes of appeal, is making the democratic system
workable. It is the agency by which public opinion is translated into
public policy."' Both major parties have strong incentives to disdain
bold initiatives in favor of incremental policies that will avoid
alienating centrist voters. As Elmer Schattschneider explains: "To
make extreme concessions to one interest at the expense of the
others is likely to be fatal to the alignment of interests that make up
the constituency of a major party. The [coalition building] process
moderates the course of party action ...... ' Thus, the major parties
encourage "the tendency ... to avoid extreme policies."82 In addition
to curbing extremism, the parties' preelectoral construction of
broad-based coalitions counteracts majoritarian pressures by giving
79. SABATO & LARSON, supra note 77, at 4; see also Persily, supra note 78, at 807-08

(describing the major parties' function of building coalitions of diverse constituencies as "the
defining characteristic of party associations and thus of parties' associational right");
Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties:A Reassessment of
Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 793 (2000) (describing "a normative
preference for a party system that can aggregate and account for the intensity of group
preferences in the most politically, economically, and ethnically diverse country in the world")
(footnote omitted).
80. AusTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSEBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT 14 (1954); see

also Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 795 (explaining that "the American two-party system
frontloads the coalition formation process").
81. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 85 (1959).

82. Id.; see also SABATO & LARSON, supra note 77, at 5 ("The party tames its own extreme
elements by pulling them toward an ideological center in order to attract a majority of votes
on election day."). Preelectoral coalition building additionally helps to rein in extremism, on
the responsible party government account, by "reconciling losers to the ultimate outcome."
Michael A. Fitts, Back to the Future:The EnduringDilemmas Revealed in the Supreme Court's
Treatment of PoliticalParties,in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 95,
97 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000) [hereinafter Fitts, Back to the Future].
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political minority3 groups a forum in which to bargain with the
8
party's majority.
Second, and closely related, major party duopoly discourages
factionalismin government. 4 In two leading duopoly advocates' bold
terms: "Factionalism in the form of multipartyism at the legislative
level is incongruous with the American separation-of-powers system
and system of legislative representation.""5 The responsible party
government theory maintains that without two strong parties, the
people's representatives would be fragmented and would have
strong incentives to focus on local issues and cater to powerful
interest groups in order to distinguish themselves for the next
election. However, "because parties must attract diffuse majority
support for controlling the Presidency and Congress, they serve
to 'generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the
many individually powerless against the relatively few who are
individually-or organizationally-powerful.'" Thus, parties serve
to refocus members' attention toward national issues, away from
strictly local or minority concerns. Likewise, two strong, autonomous parties prevent one another from turning governmental
power into partisan advantage.8 8
Third, the sustained dominance of two strong parties, each with
a well known set of generally shared beliefs, assists harried or
83. Nathaniel Persily and Bruce Cain's defense of the duopoly places great emphasis on
the notion that large, broad-based parties provide the most normatively attractive vehicles
for minority participation in the electoral process. See Cain, supra note 78, at 796 (stressing
"the function and value of protecting minority voices (such as activists and party supporters
with noncentrist positions) within the major parties"); Persily, supra note 78, at 811 (claiming
that " [p]arties give a voice to interest groups ... who are ideologically or otherwise distant from
the median voter") (citation omitted).
84. For the classic expression of concern about factions, see THE FEDERALIST No. 51
(James Madison).
85. Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 804 (footnote omitted).
86. See Michael L. Stokes, When Freedoms Conflict: Party Discipline and the First
Amendment, 11 J.L. & POL. 751, 758 (1995) (citing Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A
PoliticalParty Perspectiveon Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1567, 1609 (1988)).
87. Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1604 (1988) (citing WALTER DEAN
BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 133 (1970)); see
also Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 787 (linking skepticism about party autonomy with "the
more atomistic and fractionalizing forces in the American political system").
88. See Persily, supra note 78, at 796 (arguing that "Uludicial protection for party
autonomy is indispensable in counteracting ...
self-dealing by incumbents").
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disinterested voters in making electoral choices by providing a
voting cue.8 9 A major, "brand name" political party's position on an
issue serves as a substitute for voters that lack the time or ability
to understand the positions of individual candidates.' Party
identification provides "continuity in the wake of changing issues
and personalities, anchoring the electorate as the storms that are
churned by new political people and policies swirl around."9 ' Thus,
a major party duopoly makes elections "competitive, substantive,
focused, and comprehensible to the average voter."9 2 The governmental extension of the voting cue is the belief that major party
duopoly allows voters to hold officials collectively responsible for
government actions:
The individual congressman has very little power over what
Congress does or does not do, and he can hardly be held
responsible for anything save how he votes.... The fact is, the
party-government writers argue, that power in Congress is so
fragmented and the whole legislative process so complex and
confusing that the bewildered voter usually has great difficulty
in deciding whether his representative should be blamed or
rewarded."3
An elected official's affiliation with a large party, known to represent a defined set of positions, gives voters a way to gauge where
the official stands without having to monitor his or her every
action.94
All three means by which responsible party government theorists
argue that major party duopoly preserves political stability imply a
89. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A
Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1741, 1762 (1993) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Skeptical
Inquiry] (describing the voting cue as "[tihe core of the theory of responsible party
government").
90. See SASATO & LARSON, supra note 77, at 12 ("One could argue that the platform is
valuable, if only as a clear presentation of a party's basic philosophy and a forum for activist
opinion and public education."); Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 787 (arguing that "parties
provide voters with an important heuristic that organizes and lessens the expense of
information about candidates and policies") (footnote omitted).
91. SABATO & LARSON, supra note 77, at 5.

92. Id. at 8(suggesting that 'It]hese criteria probably could not be met inAmerica without
the parties").
93. RANNEY, supra note 80, at 15.
94. See Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 787.

1964

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

common corollary: for minor parties to influence the electoral
process in any substantial way is undesirable. 95 Preelectoral
coalition building, by definition, reflects a choice to air strong
political differences at the stage of party formation, rather than
allowing those differences to invade the electoral and policymaking
processes. 96 Minor parties in government might aggravate concerns
about factionalism, as a multiplicity of voices would ensure that
more diverse and disparate interest groups would contribute to
policy debates.9 7 Finally, the prominence in politics and government
of more parties with a broader range of positions would undermine
the utility of the voting cue, which is premised on the belief that
voters cannot or will not process too much political information.98
So far this Part has introduced the Court's accepted theory of
expressive freedom-the private rights theory-and the primary
theoretical defense of the political status quo-the responsible party
government theory. The next Section explains why we should
expect judicial adherence to the private rights theory to generate
legal decisions that advance the goals of the responsible party
government theory.

95. Professors Persily and Cain lightly acknowledge the utility of "leaving theoretically
possible the practically impossible scenario of a defecting interest group or minor party
replacing one of the established parties" for keeping the major parties responsive. Id. at 797;
see also Persily, supra note 78, at 803 (stating that "[tihe functions of minor parties in the
American two-party system are to offer ideas, demonstrate which and how many voters
support them, and with luck, to become absorbed by the major parties") (footnote omitted).
However, their proposal that ballot access be limited to parties that have demonstrated at
least "the capacity to cause one of the incumbent parties to lose an election," Persily & Cain,
supranote 79, at 807, shows that the role they imagine for minor parties is theoretical indeed.
96. As Austin Ranney states:
[Plarty government would enable the people to choose effectively a general
program, a general direction for government to take, as embodied in a set of
leaders committed to that program. It might limit the people's theoretical ...
freedom of choice among the almost infinite number of possible specific
measures; but it would give them the effective choice between alternative general
programs.
RANNEY, supra note 80, at 13; see also Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 791 ("Encouraging
groups to form new parties when they do not get their way only lessens compromise and
coalition-building in the electoral stage and postpones it to the legislative stage.").
97. See Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 797-98.
98. Cf Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry, supra note 89, at 1761-62 (explaining how the
voting cue is an effective tool for the typical voter).
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C. Symbiosis Between the PrivateRights Theory and the
Responsible Party Government Theory
As the case discussions in Part III will illustrate, the Supreme
Court's application of the First Amendment to cases involving
electoral regulations has effectively endorsed the major party
duopoly.9 9 The Court's private rights theory of expressive freedom
advances the goals of the responsible party government theory in
numerous ways."° The relationship becomes apparent in the
abstract if we reexamine the three means by which the responsible
party government theory claims the major party duopoly ensures
political stability-preelectoral coalition building, discouraging
factions by limiting voices in government, and the voting cue-in
light of the private rights theory.
1. PoliticalStability Through PreelectoralCoalitionBuilding
The private rights theory advances the responsible party
government goal of maintaining political stability through the major
parties' preelectoral coalition building in two ways. First, the
private rights theory, with its pluralist underpinnings, protects
exactly those expressive interests essential to the responsible party
government vision of self-interested political conflict, and it ignores
exactly those interests that might undermine such a vision.' 0 '
99. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366-67 (1997)
(holding that a state's interest in maintaining political stability allows it to enact regulations
that favor the two major parties); see also Richard L. Hasen, Entrenchingthe Duopoly: Why
the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans
From Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 331 (hereinafter Hasen, Entrenching)
(emphasizing the Timmons Court's favoritism toward the two-party system); Terry Smith, A
Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the EndangeredTwo-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE
L.J. 1, 10 (1998) [hereinafter Smith, Black Party] (contending that "through its First
Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has given constitutional
sanctity to the American two-party system").
100. Daniel Lowenstein has argued that successful'litigation under "[tlhe conventional
First Amendment framework" (by which he means something like the private rights model,
see supra Part I.A) ultimately undermines the goals of the responsible party government
theory by enhancing the autonomy of party organizations. See Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry,
supra note 89, at 1791-92. Party organizations, in Lowenstein's view, tend to be undemocratic,
and they accordingly undermine the democratic bridge the responsible party government
theory posits between the party in government and the party in the electorate. See id. at 1764.
101. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (explaining how a pluralist philosophy
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Responsible party government theorists set forth an explicitly
pluralist vision of political parties, in which the major parties serve
as mediating institutions that channel interest group competition
and prevent conflicts from shredding the social fabric or producing
majoritarian tyranny.' °2 On this account, the major parties need
substantial autonomy from regulation. 10 3 Once the private rights
theory's rigid public-private distinction' 4 identifies political parties
as private entities, the theory's essential concern with private
autonomy perfectly grounds the major parties' claims for relief from
regulation. Because the private rights theory treats expressive
rights as individuated rather than commonly held0 5 and denies the
possibility of clashing First Amendment interests, 1°6 recognition of
the parties' autonomy right precludes any consideration of a popular
right to greater electoral debate, competition, or openness than
the major parties provide.'0 7 The private rights First Amendment
animates the private rights theory of expressive freedom).
102. Professors Persily and Cain, the leading advocates in recent legal literature of the
major party duopoly, frame the central constitutional question of party regulation as: "What
constitutional rules will ensure that the party system serves to aggregate and to represent
interest groups?" Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 797. They sympathetically outline a
pluralist theory of party politics that envisions parties as broad, decentralized coalitions of
ideologically diverse interest groups. Id. at 791-96. In a subsequent article, Persily sets forth
pluralist underpinnings for his defense of a strong two-party system. See Persily, supra note
78, at 807-11 & n.212 (linking pluralism with substantial party autonomy). On the other
hand, a different understanding of pluralism can lead to different prescriptions. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic
Process,50 STAN. L. REV. 643,649 (1998) [hereinafter Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups] (avowing
"a pluralist commitment to the electoral arena as a robust marketplace for airing the
divergent and conflicting impulses that comprise American politics" while criticizing the
duopoly).
103. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government theory's support for party autonomy).
104. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing the strong public-private
distinction under the private rights theory).
105. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the individuated character
of rights under the private rights theory).
106. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility of clashing
First Amendment claims under a strong public-private distinction).
107. Professor Persily's thoughtful effort to craft a First Amendment defense of party
autonomy illustrates this effect. Although Persily astutely deconstructs the major parties'
claims of private status, he proceeds to argue that courts should treat the parties as private
anyway. See Persily, supra note 78, at 790. Once Persily makes that move, he focuses
unrelentingly on "political parties' First Amendment rights to define the contours of their
organization." Id. at 755. Because Persily bases his analysis on an autonomy-centered account
of the First Amendment, he fails to consider that the people might have expressive interests
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protects only the self-interested expression of individuals, which
forms the content of the pluralist electoral interaction posited by
responsible party government theorists.
Second, on the responsible party government account, minor
parties exploit undesirable breakdowns in preelectoral coalition
building. Thus, minor parties' presence in elections foments faction
and threatens political stability, which augurs for electoral rules
that discourage or impede minor parties' participation. That course
appears to present a constitutional problem: Because minor parties
express their members' political views, protecting them might seem
to be a logical, even essential function of the First Amendment. The
private rights theory of expressive freedom, with its individuated
conception of expressive interests and formal understanding of
rights,"0 8 provides a solution. Under the private rights theory's pluralist assumptions, major and minor parties alike are "individuals"
with expressive interests. The fact that minor parties have less
power to advance their interests in the political marketplace makes
no difference in how the Court evaluates their First Amendment
interests. Minor parties' First Amendment claims carry only the
force of their small constituencies' self interest. Conversely, the
responsible party government theory's preference for centrist
politics... comports with the private rights theory's lack of special
concern for protecting radical ideas."0
My linkage of pluralist political assumptions with advocacy of
a two-party system diverges from the conventional view of the
relationship between political theories and preferred party
arrangements. James Gardner, for example, argues that pluralists
are likely to prefer a multiparty system with proportional
representation, because such a system provides better than a twoparty system for resolution of interest group conflicts in the
legislature."' Two factors account for the differences in our
that contradict and supersede the major parties' autonomy interest.
108. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing the formal conception of
rights under the private rights theory).
109. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government theory's support for large parties that blunt radical positions).
110. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's
balancing methodology).
111. See James A. Gardner, CanParty PoliticsBe Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667,69192,694-95 (2000). Gardner also draws something like the converse conclusion, that "populists"
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conclusions. First, Gardner's analysis takes no account of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court's primary doctrinal vehicle for
evaluating substantive political arrangements. In my view, a
pluralist political philosophy animates the Court's private rights
theory of the First Amendment, which in turn supports the
assumptions of the responsible party government theory. Second,
Gardner bases his conclusion that pluralism welcomes legislative
conflict on the assumption that pluralists are highly optimistic
about the political efficacy of interest group conflicts." 2 He shifts
the focus from pluralism to utilitarianism, with its normative
commitment to optimizing social utility through self-interested
behavior."' Gardner's conclusion seems reasonable given his
assumption of an optimistic pluralism, but prominent responsible
party government advocates' avowal of a pessimistic pluralism
renders that assumption problematic. My conclusion that pluralism
leads to a preference for preelectoral coalition building depends on
the assumption that pluralists prize large, disaggregated parties as
a check against the dangers of unrestrained interest group conflict
and majoritarian tyranny." 4
2. DiscouragingFactionsby Limiting Voices in Government
The private rights theory of expressive freedom also supports the
responsible party government theory's emphasis on antifactionalism
in two ways. First, the private rights theory's rigid public-private
distinction is essential for maintaining the two major political
parties' dominance in government. In the cases with which this
Article is concerned, involving regulations of parties' electoral
activities, the Court has treated political parties as private
speakers. Because government regulation of private speakers
will prefer a two-party arrangement. See infra notes 285-93 and accompanying text (defending
a connection between populist-republicans and multiparty competition).
112. Gardner, supra note 111, at 692-94 (discussing the implications of John Stuart Mill's
ideas about democratic institutions for a pluralist partisan structure).
113. See id. at 691 ("According to pluralism, the purpose of politics is to maximize overall
utility, and the best way to do so is through free negotiation among all interested parties.")
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 680 (describing an optimistic utilitarian account of "a
political life of competitive struggle") (footnote omitted).
114. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government theory's preference for preelectoral coalition building).
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generally clashes with the private rights theory, this treatment
ensures the two major parties a great deal of political autonomy.
That autonomy, in turn, aids the major parties in maintaining their
governmental dominance by insulating from challenge any actions
taken in government (short of criminal violations) that benefit the
major parties' competitive prospects.115 The law in other circumstances restricts the legal autonomy of entities with governmental
power,' but the public-private distinction allows the major parties
not only to have their power but to use it as well. The public-private
distinction likewise nullifies any claim that the major parties'
electoral activities might infringe First Amendment rights, because
the distinction denies that private entities have the capacity to
infringe those rights.
Second, the private rights theory's balancing methodology allows
courts to elevate the interest in governmental stability to a level
that trumps minor parties' competing free speech claims. Once the
Court accepts the responsible party government premise that a
strong major party duopoly is necessary to stabilize government, no
mere individuated interest in expression is likely to overcome such
an imposing regulatory interest. In order to preserve stability, the
Court can manipulate its portrayals of the regulation's intrusiveness and the speech interest's importance.' This coalescence of
private expressive rights and the major party duopoly places minor
parties between a rock and a hard place: they play no part in
responsible party government's stable power structure, but they
cannot articulate any expressive interest forceful enough to relieve
them from that structure's consequences."1

115. Cf. Michael J. Karman, MajoritarianJudicialReview. The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 499, 552 (1997) (stating that legislative prohibitions of seditious libel
"arguably reflect legislators' entrenchment motive to secure their hold on office by insulating
themselves from criticism") (footnote omitted).
116. See, e.g., Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (stating that every
person who subjects any citizen to the deprivation of any constitutional right shall be liable
to the party injured); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal officials may be liable for damages based on violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
117. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing the capacity of the private
rights theory's balancing methodology for manipulation).
118. See infra Part III.B (discussing unsuccessful First Amendment challenges brought by
minor parties against electoral regulations).
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3. The Voting Cue
Finally, the private rights theory of expressive freedom justifies
the responsible party government notion of a bipolar voting cue.
The private rights theory assigns no special significance to
political speech, because it treats people's expressive interests as
individuated rather than social-allowing, for example, the
conclusion that commercial price advertising is as important as
political information in the scheme of free expression. 9 That
approach gives no reason to expect that people should be especially
well informed about electoral politics, and indeed pluralism
presupposes that most voters are not informed.120 Enter the voting
cue, whose value depends on the idea that voters are too busy or
too ill-informed (or both) to make electoral decisions without
substantial cognitive assistance. According to the responsible party
government theory, a political system that involved either more or
less distinct voting cues than the "Democrat" and "Republican"
brand names would undermine the utility and integrity of
elections. 2 ' The private rights theory lends legitimacy to that
responsible party government claim.
This Part has advanced a hypothesis that the Supreme Court's
theory of expressive freedom, the private rights theory, will lead the
Court to validate the major party duopoly. My analysis in Part III
will prove that hypothesis in the context of legal challenges to
regulations of political parties. Thus, anyone who shares the
responsible party government commitment to stability above all
should feel very comfortable with the present Court's unflinching
reliance on the private rights theory. The next Part, however, calls
responsible party government priorities into question. It contends
that, where political regulations are at issue, we should prefer that
the Court adopt a different theory of expressive freedom, and it
shows how such a theory would serve superior political values.

119. See supra note 53.
120. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-And Be
Thankful for Small Favors,in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra
note 82, at 245, 248 [hereinafter Lowenstein, No Theory] (stating that "pluralists do not rely
on voters to be highly knowledgeable about public issues and candidates for office").
121. See generally RANNEY, supra note 80, at 12-13.
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I. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO REVIEWING
REGULATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

To the extent the First Amendment plays an essential role in
nurturing democratic culture, the private rights theory offers a
shallow account of expressive freedom. The Supreme Court decides
disputes about electoral politics under a First Amendment that
does no more than protect individuals' established capacities for
expression from direct governmental invasion. The theory is
indifferent about the workings and needs of the political system.
Under the pluralist political vision from which the private rights
theory emerges, the First Amendment need do no more, because the
political process simply replicates individual conflicts, distributing
political goods among self-interested groups. As long as each group
can speak up for itself, politics does not require any particular
quantum or quality of public debate. In contrast, if society uses the
electoral process to pursue the common good and to stimulate vital
discourse about issues that affect the general welfare, then
adjudication of challenges to political regulations requires a
different vision of the First Amendment, focused on ensuring the
richest possible electoral debate.' 22
This Part, like Part I, hypothesizes that a particular theoretical
approach to the First Amendment will yield judicial decisions
that reflect a particular political theory. Whereas Part I examined
the Court's accepted theory of expressive freedom and a political
theory that Part III will show to characterize the Court's actual
decisions, this Part describes, and advocates, alternatives. As in
Part I, I introduce constitutional and political theories separately,
to underscore their nominal independence, and I then demonstrate their powerful affinities. Part II.A describes a theory of
expressive freedom rooted in the public's interest in collective selfdetermination rather than the individual's interest in expressive
autonomy: the public rights theory. My discussion identifies five key
elements, parallel to the five elements of the private rights theory
122. My normative thesis is that the public rights theory of expressive freedom is better
suited than the private rights theory to adjudicating cases about electoral regulations,
particularly regulations of political parties' electoral activities. The case for favoring the
public rights theory in other First Amendment contexts extends beyond the scope of this
Article.
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described in Part I.A, that characterize this alternative theory: (1)
derivation from republican political philosophy, (2) treatment of
speech rights as collective, (3) a substantive conception of liberty, (4)
recognition of a convergence between the public and private, and (5)
employment of a categorical methodology. Part II.B derives from
academic criticisms of the major party duopoly a theoretical case for
a different vision of political parties' role in our system, which I call
the dynamic party politics theory. The discussion focuses on that
theory's three aspirations for the health of our democratic system:
(1) ensuring an inclusive electoral process, (2) preventing entrenchment of elected officials, and (3) facilitating wide-ranging electoral
debate. Part I.C demonstrates how the key elements of the public
rights theory promote the aspirations of the dynamic party politics
theory. This synthesis provides the framework for my critique in
Part III of the Court's recent decisions about regulations of political
parties' electoral activities.
A. The PublicRights Theory of Expressive Freedom
The seeds of the public rights theory of expressive freedom have
been planted in the law reviews, if only rarely in the United States
Reports, beginning with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn.'"
Professor Meiklejohn's account of the Free Speech Clause proceeds
from a paradox: the First Amendment is phrased in absolute
language-"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of

speech ...
"11 2-and yet no one believes the government is or should
be absolutely barred from any restriction on conduct that takes the
form of spoken or written words.' 25 Thus, Meiklejohn reasons, the
"speech" as to which the First Amendment contemplates absolute
protection must be some subset of all spoken and written
expression.' 26 The logical subset, he contends, is speech related to
123. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22.
124. U.S. CONST.amend. I.
125. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 19-21; see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 412

(echoing the argument that First Amendment prohibition cannot be read literally). For an
argument that the text and history of the First and Fourteenth Amendments support a
characterization of constitutional expressive freedom as a public benefit rather than an
individual right, see Mayton, supra note 55, at 386-405.
126. MEncLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 24-28.
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politics, or to what he calls "the program of self-government,"127
because the Constitution is a charter of government and because of
the indispensable role speech must play in a democratic system. 128
Meiklejohn's emphasis on the primacy of political speech has
strongly influenced First Amendment doctrine, 129 but his deeper
analysis of expressive freedom opposes the entrenched view of the
First Amendment. Meiklejohn rejects the idea of expressive freedom
as a private right:
The First Amendment was not written primarily for the
protection of those intellectual aristocrats who pursue
knowledge solely for the fun of the game, whose search for truth
expresses nothing more than a private intellectual curiosity or
an equally private delight and pride in mental achievement. It
was written to clear the way for thinking which serves the
general welfare." 0
Meiklejohn consigns speech unrelated to the general welfare to the
limited protection of the Due Process Clause."'3 He initially defined
the privileged category of speech to include only "public discussion
127. Id. at 79-80. For an alternative argument that posits the structure of the First
Amendment as evidence of the amendment's central focus on democratic self-government, see
Neuborne, supra note 32, at 1069-70.
128. Although Meiklejohn's ideas might appear rooted in political liberalism or even
radicalism, they were echoed in part by Judge Bork, who favored limiting First Amendment
protection to political speech because he saw that limitation as the only way to prevent judges
from usurping the power of the political branches. See Bork, supra note 13, at 20-35.
129. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). Indeed, arguments about
the importance of political speech can serve both sides in certain First Amendment
controversies, including controversies about regulations of political parties' electoral activities.
For one example, see infra notes 484-86 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
Meiklejohn-derived arguments on both sides of disputes about the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulations).
130. MEIKLEJOHN, supranote 22, at 42; see also id. at 79-83 (distinguishing between public
and private expressive interests). For an alternative route to the conclusion that the First
Amendment protects speech by virtue of its public value, based on the economic insight that
information, especially political information, is a public good undervalued by the market, see
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: PublicChoice and the FirstAmendment, 105
HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991).

131. See MEIKLJOHN, supra note 22, at 36-37. This is appropriate because "private rights,
including the right of 'private' speech, are liable to such abridgements as the general welfare
may require." Id. at 80.
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and public decision of matters of public policy."' Later, however, he
broadened the definition to encompass "all [the] vast array of idea
and fact, of science and fiction, of poetry and prose, of belief and
doubt, of appreciation and purpose, of information and argument,
[that] the voter may find ready to help him in making up his
mind."1"
Meiklejohn offers as a paradigm of free expression under the First
Amendment "the traditional American town meeting."13' At such a
meeting, he explains, freedom of expression is essential not for the
3l 5
sake of the speaker, but for the sake of the assembled listeners.
"The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions.... The
welfare of.the community requires that those who decide issues
132. Id. at 42.
133. Id. at 117. The challenge ofdefining "political speech" and distinguishing that category
from other sorts of speech remains one of the most difficult features of Meiklejohn's theory,
and some critics have questioned the efficacy of the line drawing the theory requires. See
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1982) (criticizing
Meiklejohn's boundaries); Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation:
Away From a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-39 (1983)
(criticizing the exclusion of commercial speech from the protected "political" category). Those
skeptics, however, must answer the converse criticism: That advocating protection of much
or all speech creates a serious risk that courts will water the protection down in certain
contexts to the detriment of expressive freedom generally. "[A)s the protected categories [of
speech] have expanded, there has been justifiable anxiety that the core values of the First
Amendment might be diluted in order to accommodate an ever widening circle of
applications." Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 110-11 (1992) (footnote
omitted); see also Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1194-95 (1988) (discussing the danger of "doctrinal
dilution" posed by extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech). Continuing
examination of the line-drawing problem will be essential for many facets of the public rights
theory, such as determining whether and to what extent derogatory speech based on race, sex,
and/or sexual orientation contributes to or impedes the process of collective selfdetermination. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 13, at 313 ("Which is worse-to leave
pornographers subject to the vicissitudes of silencing by the lawmaking activities of political
majorities, or to leave women subject to the vicissitudes of silencing by the private publishing
activities ofpornographers?"). In the immediate context of political parties' electoral activities,
criticism of the public rights theory as uncertain or underinclusive can be set aside, because
electoral activities have undeniable salience for democratic self-government.
134. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 24.
135. One important consequence of Meiklejohn's emphasis on the interest in receiving
information was his refusal to limit expressive freedom to United States citizens.
"[Uinhindered expression must be open to non-citizens, to resident aliens, to writers and
speakers of other nations, to anyone, past or present, who has something to say which may
have significance for a citizen who is thinking of the welfare of this nation." Id. at 119.
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shall understand them."136 Meiklejohn's prime directive is that the
public must have access to the greatest possible breadth and
quantity of information in order to facilitate self-government:
No one can deny that the winning of the truth is important for
the purposes of self-government. But that is not our deepest
need. Far more essential, if men are to be their own rulers, is the
demand that whatever truth may become available shall be
placed at the disposal of all the citizens of the community."3 7
Accordingly, restrictions on redundant speech, or on speech that
does not actually express any idea, are permissible. "What is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said."'
In contrast, Meiklejohn adamantly forecloses any restriction on
speech based on the idea it expressed. "No plan of action shall be
outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair, unAmerican. No speaker may be declared 'out of order' because we
disagree with what he intends to say."'39 Meiklejohn rejects the
136. Id. at 26.
137. Id. at 74-75. Meiklejohn's emphasis on the people's paramount interest in receiving

information reaches back to John Stuart Mill, who wrote that"the only way in which a human
being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be
said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be
looked at by every character of mind." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21 (David Spitz ed.,
1975) (1859).
138. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 26. Robert Post argues that Meiklejohn's allowance
for restrictions on redundant or irrelevant speech imposes an unacceptable procedural
constraint on the collective decision-making process. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
The problem Post sees with what he calls Meiklejohn's "framework of managerial authority,"
id. at 1120, is that the process of collective self-determination necessarily entails dispute
about how the process itself is constituted. Thus, by subjectively preferring a specific
procedural model, Meiklejohn "violates th[el necessary indeterminacy of public discourse" as
surely as if he had imposed a particular substantive ideology on the community. Id. at 1117.
Post identifies an important problem in Meiklejohn's account, but the problem is intractable
enough that it ensnares Post himself. His reliance on "the private status of speakers," id. at
1128, to optimize the freedom of public discourse ultimately rests on a broad generalization
about the inevitable, unique tyranny of the state. See id. at 1136 (warning against
"[sitructures of control" established by government intervention in the private marketplace
of ideas). That generalization depends on historical, logical, and ideological assumptions that
are themselves contingent and debatable. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text
(discussing dangers private action can pose to expressive freedom).
139. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 27; see also MILL, supra note 137, at 18 ("If all
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idea that speech should be proscribable when it presents a
"clear and present danger" of unlawful action.140 Instead, echoing
Justice Brandeis' famous concurrence in Whitney v. California,4 '
Meiklejohn accepts the possibility of riot and revolution as the price
of a truly free process of self-government. He accepts restrictions on
ideas only "[in an emergency ... [where] the processes of public
discussion have broken down.""' Even in such circumstances, he
maintains, any restrictions must apply to speech "not by one party
alone, but by all parties alike.""
Later scholars, most notably Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein, have
elaborated and deepened Meiklejohn's analysis of the First
Amendment. Professor Fiss has added to Meiklejohn's conception of
expressive freedom a thorough defense of government action to
protect open public debate.4" Fiss embraces the idea that expressive
freedom should promote "collective self-determination," 45 but he
complains that elements of the entrenched approach to expressive
freedom," and even theorists who recognize the centrality of
collective self-determination, 47 undermine public discourse by
promoting the autonomy of speakers above all other values.
That fixation on autonomy, Fiss contends, is an understandable
inheritance from the era when "the street corner speaker"

mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,

mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind.").
140. See MEn JOHN, supra note 22, at 29-50 (discussing and critiquing Justice Holmes'
articulation of the 'clear and present danger" principle).
141. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
142. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 49.
143. Id.
144. Professor Fiss' advocacy of governmental involvement expands on ideas suggested by
Thomas Emerson, who viewed robust public debate as one among several viable justifications
for expressive freedom. See Emerson, supra note 72, at 953-55 (discussing affirmative
measures government might take to advance First Amendment values).
145. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1407.
146. Fiss targets what he calls the "traditional" approach to expressive freedom, an

approach that aims for individual autonomy, seeks above all to prevent content-based
regulation, and sees the government as the enemy of free speech. See id. at 1408-10.
147. Fiss places Meiklejohn in a tradition that mistakenly advocates autonomy as the
instrument for achieving robust public debate. See id. at 1409-10. Meiklejohn did not

emphasize the value of government intervention to protect speech. Even so, his "town
meeting" model and his emphasis on the listener's First Amendment interest over the
speaker's belie Fiss' classification. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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dominated free speech controversies,'" but it renders free speech
jurisprudence ineffectual, even counterproductive, in a world where
4 9 Preserving
concerns shift "from the street corner to, say, CBS.""
autonomy simply requires preventing government interference with
private speakers. Preserving the conditions for effective selfgovernment, in contrast, requires consideration of the actual effects
ofboth government and private action on public discourse. 5 oPrivate
actions, as surely as government actions, may impoverish rather
than enrich public debate.' 5 ' Conversely, just as the New Deal
demonstrated the necessity of government intervention in economic
markets, the present deficiencies of public discourse demonstrate
that the government has an active, essential role to play in the
"marketplace of ideas." 52
Fiss' New Deal analogy prefigures his prescription for government intervention to protect collective self-determination. By
allowing the economic market to dictate the terms of public debate,
the autonomy principle replicates market inequalities in the
expressive arena."a' "The market-even one that operates smoothly
and efficiently-does not assure that all relevant views will be
heard, but only those that are advocated by the rich" or others with
access to capital.' 5 Private action undermines public debate both
by privileging the perspectives of "select groups" and by allowing
148. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1408; see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 406
(explaining the importance of the technology of speech once First Amendment controversies

move beyond "the paradigmatic situation of the speaker on the soapbox"); Kairys, supra note
69, at 261 (claiming that "the law and society have frozen the scope and nature of our speech
rights at levels appropriate to the 1930s").
149. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1410.
150. Id. at 1411.
151. Id. at 1414; see also Cole, supra note 25, at 245 ("Both private concentrations of wealth
and government authority can be abused to undermine free and equitable access to the
political process."); Michelman, supra note 13, at 313-14 (concluding that "[w]e simply cannot
say, a priori, that either avenue of social action-state or market-is categorically safer than
the other" for protecting expressive freedom).
152. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 66, at 781-83 (contrasting the New Deal, in which
"Isitate power ...
became the principal instrument for achieving a true and substantive
equality," with First Amendment doctrine).
153. Fiss makes clear that this concern is not unique to market capitalism. "The fear I have
about the distortion of public debate under a regime of autonomy is not in any way tied to
capitalism. It arises whenever social power is distributed unequally." Fiss, Social Structure,
supra note 67, at 1412; cf Cole, supra note 25, at 271-76 (inquiring whether "democratic
capitalism" is a contradiction in terms).
154. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1412-13.
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profit incentives to crowd out "the democratic needs of the
electorate.""'5 When private action has these effects, Fiss contends,
the government has not merely a prerogative, but a duty to
"supplement" the market's direction of the flow of ideas.'56 Fiss
neither condemns the market nor romanticizes the government, but
he posits that the government responds to different incentives than
the market, making it a potentially valuable check on a purely
market-driven drift in debate.5 7 Fiss acknowledges two dangers
inherent in government regulation of speech: that the government
may act in its own interest rather than the public's,'58 and that it
may do more harm than good where it intervenes in a battle
between competing First Amendment priorities.'59 In response, he
reiterates the courts' responsibility for watching the watchmen."o
Professor Sunstein casts his "effort to root freedom of speech in a
conception of popular sovereignty" in civic republican terms.'6 ' He
forthrightly anchors his revisionist view of the First Amendment in
a normative distaste for the primacy of corporate interests in

155. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 66, at 787-88.
156. Id. at 788 ("The state is to act as the much-needed countervailing power, to counteract
the skew of public debate attributable to the market and thus preserve the essential
conditions of democracy."). The government may perform its supplementary function either
through regulation or through subsidy, a sort of negative regulation. See Owen M. Fiss, State
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2097 (1991) [hereinafter Fiss, State
Activism] (contending, in the context of arts censorship, that "the effect of a denial of a grant
is roughly equivalent to that of a criminal prosecution"); see also Balkin, supranote 48, at 412
(suggesting a First Amendment mandate for "governmental investment in the modern
technological equivalents of traditional public forums-for example, radio and television").
157. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 66, at 789 ("[S]imply by virtue of their position
government employees are subject to a different set of constraints than those who run the
media.").
158. See id. at 790-93 (discussing danger of "circularity").
159. See Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1418-19. Fiss distinguishes cases that
involve competing First Amendment rights from cases in which the government compromises
"an ordinary value," such as property rights, to advance expressive freedom. In the latter sort
of case, Fiss has less concern about the costs of government regulation. Id.; see also Emerson,
supra note 72, at 949 (distinguishing between constitutionally problematic regulations of
"expression" to protect First Amendment interests and less problematic regulations of
"action").
160. See Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1420-21. Fiss notes that "courts will not
make these judgments [about the effects of government intervention in public debate] in a
vacuum, but will be subject to intense scrutiny of the critical community that attends to
matters judicial .... " Fiss, State Activism, supra note 156, at 2102.
161. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 257.
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modern First Amendment doctrine. 162 The basis for Sunstein's
analysis is his understanding that the Constitution created a
deliberative democracy, "a system that combines a degree of popular
accountability with a belief in deliberation among representatives and the citizenry at large."'63 In line with this view of
democracy, Sunstein suggests two alternative paths to refocusing
First Amendment protection. His more modest prescription,
drawing heavily on Meiklejohn's insights, is for a "two-tier First
Amendment," in which courts would subject restrictions on political
speech to the strictest constitutional scrutiny while applying a
species of intermediate scrutiny to nonpolitical, "lower value"
speech."6 This approach would have the benefit of firmly protecting
the speech as to which the government is most likely to be biased
and to which regulation is most likely to do serious harm. 5
Sunstein's bolder proposal sketches "a New Deal for speech" that
would apply legal realist precepts to the First Amendment, resulting
in a milder variation on Fiss' call for aggressive government
intervention to ensure expressive freedom." Sunstein observes
that government action so strongly influences the shape of the
"private" marketplace of ideas, by affecting which speakers have the
resources and opportunities to express themselves and be heard,
that arguments about whether the government should regulate
speech are incoherent.6 7 He asserts the existence of a distinct
162. See id. at 258 (describing corporations' success with free speech claims as "something
important and strange [that) has happened to the First Amendment").

163. Id. at 313.
164. See id. at 301-12. Sunstein refines Meiklejohn's theory of the First Amendment in
several significant ways. First, he defines "political speech" broadly as any expression that is

"both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue." Id. at
304. Second, he grants even "lower value" speech some First Amendment protection, in
contrast to Meiklejohn's relegation of nonpolitical speech to mere procedural due process
protection, because of his belief that "{nlo speech can be regulated on the basis of whim or
whimsy." Id. at 309. Finally, Sunstein admits all art and literature to the class of fully
protected speech, on the theory that "they are frequently political--combined with the severe
difficulty of evaluating their political quality on an ad hoc basis .... " Id. at 312.

165. See id. at 305-06.
166. See id. at 263-66. Dean Balkin's earlier critique of contemporary First Amendment
doctrine proceeds along similar legal realist lines. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 379-83; cf.
Sunstein, supranote 13, at 263 n.21 (describing position as similar to Balkin and less extreme
than Fiss).
167. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 267-68. Dean Balkin makes a similar point, urging

reconceptualization of the "public forum" problem as merely a subset of cases in which private
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private sphere, 168 but he contends that courts too often fail to see the
state action behind private exercises of power.' 69 The Court should
enforce the First Amendment in cases where private denials of
access, predicated on state-protected property interests, undermine
public discourse. 7 ' For example, Sunstein would not reject on stateaction grounds a challenge to a private shopping mall owner's
prohibition of expressive activity, because only the government's
conferral of a legal right to exclude allows the owner to impose the
prohibition.' The real issue, for Sunstein, is whether any action
enabled by government advances or diminishes the effort by which
he defines expressive freedom: "an effort to ensure that people
are not prevented from speaking, especially on issues of public
importance."' 7 2
Out of these and related scholarly explorations of expressive
freedom emerges a powerful critique of the private rights theory and
the material for a theoretical alternative. What I call the public
rights theory of expressive freedom is characterized by several
interrelated elements that directly oppose the elements of the
private rights theory discussed above.
First, the public rights theory derives from a republican
philosophy of politics and government, focused on deliberation and
the public interest, as opposed to the pluralist philosophy that
animates the private rights theory. 173 The Free Speech Clause, on
the public rights account, must enable a political discourse aimed at
reaching a collective determination of wise policy.174 "[p]olitics is not
rights, enjoyed by virtue of legally enforceable rules, interfere with rights of access to the
means of expression. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 398-404.
168. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 267 ("[T]here should be enthusiastic agreement ... that
the First Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that private conduct raises
no constitutional question."). For this reason, Sunstein does not claim that his theory requires

a new doctrine of "affirmative rights"; rather, he calls for a broader conception of the negative
constraints the First Amendment bars the government from imposing. See id. at 273.
169. See id. at 270; see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 401 (discussing the relationship
between government and private roles in denying access to means of communication).
170. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 270-72.
171. See id. at 271-72.
172. Id. at 271. This explicit normative commitment to democratic self-government as the

defining value of the First Amendment is what distinguishes Sunstein's prescription from
Balkin's similar analysis and places Sunstein squarely in the "public rights" tradition.
173. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing pluralist underpinnings of
private rights theory).
174. See MEIxLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 81 (describing the object of political debate as "not
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a process in which desires and interests remain frozen";17 5 rather,
people need to hear one another out in order to make informed,
public-spirited decisions. This deliberative vision stands in sharp
contrast to the pluralist vision of conflict among private interest
groups as the inevitable mode of political decision making.176 Under
the public rights theory, "the public interest cannot be merely the
totality of the private interests. It is, of necessity, an organization
of them, a selection and arrangement, based upon judgment of
relative values and mutual implications."' 7 7 Because the public
rights theory emphasizes deliberation, it deplores the model
of expressive freedom as a "marketplace of ideas."' The other
another different interest superimposed upon our individual desires and intentions [but one]
compounded out of them'); Farber, supra note 130, at 583 (identifying the "public good"
conception of the First Amendment as "communitarian and republican rather than libertarian
and individualistic"); Michelman, supra note 13, at 293 (situating a discussion of limits on
First Amendment protection for pornography in the context of "deliberative politics");
Sunstein, supra note 13, at 313 ("ITIhe system is intended to ensure discussion and debate
among people who are differently situated, in a process through which reflection will
encourage the emergence of general truths."); J. Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution:
Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1018-20 (1976) (contending that the First Amendment
embodies a deliberative vision of politics and criticizing the pluralist vision); see also David
M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEx. L. REV. 951, 1027-29 (1996)
(likening public rights critics of conventional First Amendment doctrine to communitarian
critics of individual rights jurisprudence).
175. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 313.
176. See id. (assailing the argument that the purpose of our democratic system is "to
furnish the basis for struggle among self-interested private groups" as "anathema to American
constitutionalism"). The public rights theory reflects optimism about democratic culture, but
given the frequent divide between actual human behavior and the deliberative ideal, a
prudent account of the theory must view the First Amendment as embodying and facilitating
an aspiration for political interaction. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert:
Theorizing PoliticalPersonality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1995)
[hereinafter Ortiz, Engaged] (warning against judicial presumption of citizen engagement in
the political process and contending that judicial review of political regulations should aim
to encourage engagement).
177. MEIKLLJOHN, supra note 22, at 81.
178. See id. at 73-74 (criticizing Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" conception of
expressive freedom); Baker, Of Course, supra note 70, at 1183-84 (criticizing the marketplace
of ideas theory on the ground that "truths are socially constructed and power, not logic,
largely determines their content"); Horwitz, supranote 133, at 110-11 (criticizing the modem
Court's equation of First Amendment protection with Lochner-era substantive due process
protection for rights of contract); Rabban, supranote 174, at 1037 (acknowledging in the First
Amendment context that "the formal protection of abstract individual rights, when wrenched
from social context, frequently yields results that reinforce inequality while preventing
desirable social change"); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 314 ("Aggregative or marketplace
notions disregard the extent to which political outcomes are supposed to depend on discussion
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elements of the public rights theory all follow from its republican
roots.
Second, in keeping with the republican focus on the public
interest, expressive freedom under the public rights theory is
collective, rather than individuated."i 9 The essence of the public
rights First Amendment is a primary purpose of advancing democratic self-government. That purpose makes the public's interest in
receiving information paramount, eclipsing any individual speaker's
interest in expressing herself. "Keeping ideas and information from
the public, not the unfair treatment of the speaker, is the gist of the
constitutional wrong ....""o Whereas the present Court gives little
consideration to expressive interests the people might share
collectively, such as the interest in access to a diverse range of
ideas, 8 ' the public rights theory deemphasizes individual autonomy
2
as a basis for expressive freedom.1

and debate, and on the reasons offered for and against the various alternatives."). But see
Cole, supra note 25, at 241 (attempting to defend the marketplace metaphor on the ground
that it "depicts free speech as both an individual and a collective right").
179. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's
individuated conception of First Amendment rights).
180. Fiss, State Activism, supra note 156, at 2100; see also MEIKLLJOHN, supra note 22, at
74-75 (contending that the First Amendment is concerned primarily with the public's access
to ideas rather than the individual's expressive autonomy); Mayton, supra note 55, at 390-92
(arguing as a textual matter that the First Amendment protects collective interest in access
to ideas). But see Lee, supranote 63, at 317 (associating the right to receive information with
individual autonomy).
181. Occasional exceptions to this tendency still appear. See, e.g., United States v. Natl
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 467 (1995) (characterizing as "heavy" the
government's burden in defending "Congress' wholesale deterrent to a broad category of
expression by a massive number of potential speakers").
182. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 88 (decrying "the claims of an individualism which,
when it becomes excessive, refuses to acknowledge the validity of political obligations");
Farber, supra note 130, at 580 (noting the importance of nonfinancially motivated expression
for political culture); Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1422-24 (criticizing judicial
emphasis on autonomy); Sunstein, supranote 13, at 277 ("[Tihe interest in legally protected
private autonomy from government is not always connected with the interest in democratic
self-governance."); see also Neuborne, supra note 32, at 1058 ("Viewed solely as a means of
disabling government, a purely 'autonomy-centered' First Amendment can be affirmatively
hostile to democracy by insulating private activity from regulation despite its deleterious
effect on democracy."). But see Redish, supra note 133, at 601 (arguing that "political
democracy is merely a means to-or, in another sense, a logical outgrowth of-the much
broader value of individual self-realization").
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Third, the collective nature of expressive freedom entails a
substantive conception of liberty rather than a formal conception." a
The First Amendment does not only protect individuals from
government denials of their expressive freedom; rather, it empowers
courts to facilitate the public debate required for self-government.'
This difference arises because the public rights theory views the
political process as a popular enterprise that requires maximum
participation and engagement of the people. "[Tihe principle of the
freedom of speech is derived, not from some supposed 'Natural
Right,' but from the necessities of self-government by universal
suffrage ..
The meaning of the First Amendment is bound up
with the principle of "one person, one vote" that we extol as
essential to our democratic system. 86 Just as the Constitution
dictates universal suffrage, it directs universal access to electoral
discourse.'87 Thus, simply ensuring that government regulations
remain neutral as between individual speakers, as the private
183. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's
formal view of rights).
184. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 411 (advocating a substantive rather than formal
conception of expressive freedom); Cole, supra note 25, at 241 (associating "the republican
conception of the town meeting" with "not merely an abstract or formal 'right' to speak, but
a more substantive guarantee that ordinary people will in fact have a real opportunity to
participate in the exchange") (footnote omitted); Kairys, supra note 69, at 264-65 (contending
that expressive freedom in the dominant discourse "has been falsely redefined as a set of
preexisting natural rights whose essence and history are legal rather than political");
Sunstein, supra note 13, at 274 (contending that "the First Amendment, even as currently
conceived, is no mere negative right").
185. MEIKLLJOHN, supra note 22, at 79; see also Neuborne, supra note 32, at 1057
(characterizing the First Amendment as "the primary structural guarantor of a vibrant
democracy"); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 314 ("The belief that politics lies at the core of the
(First Amendment is an outgrowth of the more general structural commitment to deliberative
democracy."); see also Schauer & Pildes, supra note 32, at 1814 (characterizing rights as a
"means of realizing various common goods, rather than being protections for individualist
interests against collective judgments about those common goods").
186. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1961); see also Cole, supra note 25, at 243-44
(discussing how the "one person, one vote" principle reinforces "the norm of equality implicit
in the First Amendment's mandate"); Sunstein, supranote 13, at 314 ("The First Amendment
... is part and parcel of the constitutional commitment to citizenship."). David Kairys,
criticizing the dominant approach to the First Amendment, argues that, "while freedom of
speech is essential to any free and democratic society, so is the ability to participate
meaningfully in the formulation of social policies and priorities." Kairys, supra note 69, at
265. From the standpoint of the public rights theory, those two values are inseparable.
187. MEIKIEJOHN, supra note 22, at 116 ("Our First Amendment freedom ... is an
arrangement made by women and men who vote freely and, by voting, govern the nation.").
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rights theory aims to do, will not suffice to enforce First Amendment
guarantees.'8 8 Rather, the First Amendment compels "an inquiry
into the effect, in the bright world around us, of a condition
respecting speech." 89 The public rights theory deplores the present
Court's refusal to enforce especially vigorous First Amendment
protection for marginalized speakers and political dissidents'9' and
the accompanying emphasis on First Amendment protection for
corporations and other powerful speakers.'' A public rights
conception of the First Amendment would recognize the distinctive
urgency of ensuring that weaker, politically vulnerable members of
188. See Cole, supra note 25, at 273-74 (criticizing the formal conception of First
Amendment rights); Horwitz, supra note 133, at 112-16 (identifying the present Court's
increasing reliance on the abstract principle of content neutrality as a factor in unmooring
free speech protection from social reality); see also Alon Harel, Free Speech Revisionism:
Doctrinal and Philosophical Challenges, 74 B.U. L. REV. 687, 702 (1994) (book review)
(arguing that a focus on content basis "can in fact be damaging" because it "allows mechanical
resolution of cases and consequent lack of attention to important conflicts between societal
values and interests"); Mayton, supra note 55, at 379-86 (criticizing the Court's formalistic
resolution of cases in which government conditions benefits on renunciation of expressive
rights and advocating a substantive analysis based on the collective interest in access to
information).
189. Mayton, supra note 55, at 415.
190. See MARKA. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM 215 (1991) (criticizing "[c]ontemporary defenders of free speech" for "failfing]
in a world where the major threat to meaningful debate on matters of public importance is
not that many are prevented from speaking but that many do not have the resources
necessary to be heard"); Horwitz, supra note 133, at 113 (contending that the present Court's
First Amendment doctrine "ignores what had originally been the central practical goal of
modern First Amendment history: the use of free speech doctrine to 'level the playing field'
in order to provide economically or socially weak political dissidents with a chance to engage
in political debate"); Kairys, supra note 69, at 261 (complaining that contemporary free speech
doctrine "does not provide people of ordinary means entr6e to society's dialogue on the issues
of the day"); Rabban, supra note 174, at 953 (describing the concern "that the First
Amendment, instead of protecting unpopular dissenters from a repressive state, is now being
invoked by the politically powerful to prevent regulation"); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 296
("[M] any content-neutral laws have content-differential effects ...because they operate against
a backdrop that is not prepolitical or just.") (footnote omitted).
191. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 384 ("Business interests and other conservative groups
are finding that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and more
easily be rephrased in the language of the first amendment...."); Fiss, Social Structure,supra

note 67, at 1406-08 (deploring the Court's preference in free speech cases for interests of
capital over the public interest in robust debate); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 258 (criticizing
the focus on First Amendment rights of corporations); see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1387 (1984) (charging that the First Amendment "has replaced
the due process clause as the primary guarantor of the privileged" and serves that function
"more perniciously than the due process clause ever did").
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society could participate equally in the process of collective selfdetermination. 192 Thus, in contrast to the present Court,'9 3 the
public rights theory sympathizes with claims that the Constitution
confers some measure of access to the means of expression. 9 "
Fourth,complementing its substantive conception of liberty, the
public rights theory recognizes a convergence of public and private
and thus rejects the rigid public-private distinction of the private
rights theory.9 " The convergence reflects, in part, the understanding that the public and private spheres are often conceptually
difficult to distinguish.'" The main rationale, however, is functional:
because the public rights theory is concerned with the substantive
vitality of public discourse, courts should evaluate asserted threats
to and protections of expressive freedom based on their actual
192. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 381 ("[T]he right of political participation is no less
affected by differences in economic power than is the right of economic participation."); Jeffrey
M. Blum, The Divisible FirstAmendment: A CriticalFunctionalistApproach to Freedom of
Speech andElectoralCampaignSpending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (1983) (contending that the
Court should provide absolute protection only to those expressive activities available without
regard to class); Rabban, supra note 174, at 1037 ("[Tlhe 'freedom of speech' of a wealthy
political candidate is significantly different from the 'freedom of speech' of an unpopular
political speaker criticizing government policy.").
193. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 398 & n.53 (discussing Court decisions that have rejected
claims for an affirmative right of access to private property for expressive purposes); Kairys,
supra note 69, at 264 (criticizing the Court's rejection under the First Amendment of
government attempts to ensure access to means of expression).
194. See Balkin, supranote 48, at 401 ("Effective communication, or rather its substantive
possibility, is an unavoidable component of the liberty of speech, just as effective bargaining,
or its substantive possibility, is an essential component of economic liberty."); Sunstein, supra
note 13, at 292-93 (advocating access rights in some circumstances). Professor Baker, who
shares the public rights theorists' concern with social power disparities, is more wary of access
rights. "Unequal distributions [of speech opportunities] are not per se violations of the
disadvantaged group's rights. A robust polity must allow for collective choices that have such
effects, as well as choices to equalize allocations." Baker, Of Course, supra note 70, at 1203.
The difference reflects Baker's defining dispute with the public rights theory: his
understanding of the First Amendment as a guarantor of individual autonomy. See id. at 1197
("Freedom of speech may be a fundamental right because respect for people's autonomy
requires that people be free to engage in certain types of actions, to make certain choices.").
195. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's
reliance on a strong public-private distinction).
196. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 404 (calling for "collapsing the distinction between public
and private power in specific contexts"); Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1414
(characterizing broadcaster CBS as "a composite of the public and private" and positing that
"Itloday the social world is largely constituted by entities that partake of both the public and
the private"); Kairys, supra note 69, at 265 (critiquing the relationship between the "ideology
of free speech" and the public-private distinction).
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effects on the system of free expression. 97 The theory retains a
concern about government tyranny, 198 but it also welcomes
government action to ensure substantive expressive freedom in
appropriate circumstances" and may even require such action. 200
The overriding importance of public debate means that the government should intervene to advance debate not in spite of the need for
government neutrality but because of it. 201 In addition, the public

rights theory's blurring of the public-private divide creates the

197. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 66, at 786 ("[Alction is judged by its impact on
public debate, a social state of affairs, rather than by whether it constrains or otherwise
interferes with the autonomy of some individual or institution."); Mayton, supra note 55, at
417-18 (discussing the disutility of public-private distinction in cases where the government
crowds out private opportunities for expression); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 276 (advocating
a focus on "the need to promote democratic self-government' rather than on abstract
autonomy values).
198. Even Professor Fiss, the leading advocate of government intervention to protect open
public debate, acknowledges that "the state might act wrongfully" and that "[w]e must always
stand on guard against this danger." Fiss, Why the State?, supranote 66, at 787; see also Cole,
supra note 25, at 270 ("There are indeed legitimate reasons to be wary of empowering the
government to ensure a 'air' debate.").
199. See Farber, supra note 130, at 568 (suggesting that First Amendment doctrine has
overemphasized avoiding restrictions on speech and that failure of the market to produce
sufficient information should lead government to promote speech actively); Fiss, Social
Structure, supra note 67, at 1416 ("We should learn to recognize the state not only as an
enemy, but also as a friend of speech; like any social actor, it has the potential to act in both
capacities ...."); Michelman, supra note 13, at 313 ("[Rlegulatory law [can] be a good antidote
or alternative to monopolistic or egoistic oppression in a market.") (footnote omitted);
Sunstein, supra note 13, at 267 ("[I1n some circumstances, what seems to be government
regulation of speech actually might promote free speech, and should not be treated as an
abridgement at all."); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 82-83 (suggesting the positive
value of government actions to protect expressive freedom).
200. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 398-404 (contending that government's provision of
access to means of expression, including redistribution of private expressive opportunities,
is necessary for expressive freedom); Cole, supranote 25, at 277 (positing a First Amendment
mandate that "would require government to ensure that the political marketplace not be
overrun by concentrations of wealth"); Fiss, State Activism, supra note 156, at 2101
(contending that the Court should review government allocative decisions, including denials
of subsidies, based on their effects on public discourse).
201. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 397 ("[Tlhe groups who most need inexpensive or free
access (usually the groups most on the outs) are the ones who end up bearing the brunt of
content-neutral regulations.") (footnote omitted); Cole, supra note 25, at 274 (contending that
"a policy of absolute government 'neutrality' ... not only fails to achieve equality but
perpetuates and exacerbates the underlying reality of inequality") (footnote omitted); Fiss,
State Activism, supra note 156, at 2100 ("ITihe state's obligation of neutrality requires that
it make certain that the public debate is as rich and varied as possible.").
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possibility of competing claims to expressive rights. °2 In some
instances when an individual brings a First Amendment claim
based on autonomy, the government may successfully respond that
broader, public First Amendment interests in access to information
outweigh the autonomy concern.2 °s
Fifth, the public rights theory, in the first instance, sorts out
conflicts between collective speech interests and competing
regulatory priorities through a categorical methodology, based on
the near-absolute protection of political speech. 20 ' Where speech
essential to self-government is concerned, courts may not take the
private rights approach of balancing speech interests against
competing government regulatory interests. 20 5 Expression has not
just relative value when measured against other government
regulatory priorities but absolute value for the flourishing of

collective self-determination. 2° Unpopular, radical, even dangerous
ideas need and deserve the most rigorous constitutional protection.0 7 Thus, the public rights theory rejects the present Court's
willingness to silence political dissidents in the name of nonspeech

202. See Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 67, at 1419 (discussing cases in which "the first
amendment appears on both sides of the equation"); Michelman, supra note 13, at 304 ("[11f
we did have general rules granting protection against both public and private repression, then
neither such rule could be held to govern strongly any case in which the two rules collided.");
Neuborne, supra note 32, at 1064 ("[Iln a complex First Amendment universe, cases emerge
where it is hard to know who is entitled to wear the mantle of First Amendment autonomy.").
203. See cases cited supra note 29.
204. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing Meildejohn's distinction
of political speech from other categories of expression).
205. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's
balancing methodology).
206. See infra note 516 (discussing the difference, in the public rights analysis, between
competing speech claims and claims that some nonspeech interest should outweigh expressive
freedom).
207. Tihe citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under their own
institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said in
favor of those institutions, everything that can be said against them." MEIKLJOHN, supra
note 22, at 77; see also Sunstein, supra note 13, at 313 ("A distinctive feature of American
republicanism is hospitality to heterogeneity, rather than fear of it."); cf Balkin, supra note
48, at 379 ("The long term effect of the unequal distribution of power and property is an
unequal exposure of particular ideas, and the stifling and co-opting of more radical and
imaginative ideas about politics and society."). But see Bork, supra note 13, at 29-31
(advocating, in context of a First Amendment theory that emphasizes protection of political
speech, restrictions on advocacy of overthrowing government).
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regulatory objectives. 208 No interest short of the interest in
preserving political discourse itself could justify a regulation that
compromised the open character of that discourse, including a
claimed interest in "political stability."
In the Sections that follow, I will contend that the judiciary's
embrace of the public rights theory of expressive freedom in cases
involving electoral regulations is essential to advancing the values
of democratic participation, electoral competition, and robust
political debate.2" Two lines of scholarly commentary, however,
have questioned the basic utility of rights language in this area.
First, some First Amendment scholars have dismissed the idea
I label "public rights" as a misnomer, arguing that the sort of
free speech theory I describe here "cannot be translated into the
language of rights" because it posits a duty on the part of the state
to provide public goods, rather than an individual's claim of
right. 1 ° Such discomfort with the idea of communal rights resonates with contemporary standing doctrine, which rejects claims of
shared rights by classifying them as legally invalid "generalized
grievances."2 1 ' My allegiance to rights language in this setting
208. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 396-98 (criticizing the Court's "time, place, manner"
decisions as representing the failure of formal equality principles to eliminate content-based
regulations of speech); Kairys, supra note 69, at 263 (criticizing decisions upholding contentbased regulations of speech that can be justified based on nonrestrictive purposes).
209. Some First Amendment theorists have adopted a simulacrum of the public rights
theory in the electoral context even as they reject the theory's broader premises. See C. Edwin
Baker, CampaignExpenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1998)
[hereinafter Baker, Expenditures] (identifying elections as occupying a special,
governmentally created sphere and thus properly subject to regulations Baker would find
impermissible if imposed on speech in other settings); Neuborne, supra note 32, at 1059
(advocating an approach under which "the First Amendment is viewed not only as a protector
of individual autonomy, but also as the structural guarantor of a fair democratic process");
Schauer & Pildes, supra note 32, at 1834-36 (advocating treatment of electoral speech as
distinct from other types of speech and thus properly subject to different sorts of regulation);
see also Post, supra note 138, at 1132-33 ("Without denying in principle that [campaign
finance regulations] maybe necessary or desirable, I would emphasize that a democratic state
can tolerate them only in the most unusual and limited of circumstances.").
210. Harel, supra note 188, at 709-10; see also Mayton, supra note 55, at 405 (criticizing
the use of "rights" language to describe commonly held interest in access to information).
211. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (holding that "a
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government--claiming only harm
to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy").
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reflects, in part, my belief that standing doctrine is unduly
restrictive, as well as my sense that any conception of constitutional
expressive freedom must speak in the language of rights to remain
grounded in the constitutional text.212 Most important is that the
theory articulated here does positpublic rights: legal claims, held by
individuals, that we should understand the Constitution to ingrain
for communal rather than individuated reasons.

Second, several commentators on the law of politics have argued
that a functional analysis is better suited than any rights-based
analysis to assessing regulations of the democratic process. 213 My
advocacy of a collective notion of First Amendment rights reflects
sympathy with some functionalists' conclusion that an individuated
conception of rights provides an insufficient basis for judicial
oversight of democratic institutions,2 1 4 and my normative concerns
more closely resemble those of many functionalists than those
of most conventional First Amendment analysts.2 1 5 In my view,
212. But see Mayton, supra note 55, at 386-405 (contending that the text of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments establishes, in part, something other than a "right" to expressive
freedom).
213. See Cain, supra note 78, at 806-07 (distinguishing functional arguments for
substantial political party autonomy from First Amendment arguments); Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593 (2002) (recounting and
criticizing the Court's equal protection-based approach to reviewing claims of political
gerrymandering); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by 'Election Law" Alone, 32
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (1999) (advocating "a robust, functional, historically-aware
understanding of democracy" as a basis for reviewing political practices); Klarman, supra note
115, at 499 (arguing that judicial review aimed at preventing political entrenchment can be
justified only by "democratic theory," not by the constitutional text); Persily, supra note 78,
at 823 (asserting, as to analysis of political party regulations, "the need for a shift in focus
away from questions of state action and expression and toward functional arguments");
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606 (1999)
[hereinafter Pildes, Theory] ("[T]he content of the rights that ought to be recognized is best
understood as derivative of the appropriate structural conception of democratic politics.").
214. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, PrivatePartiesWith Public Purposes:PoliticalParties,
Associational Freedoms, and PartisanCompetition, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 274, 282-93 (2001)
[hereinafter Issacharoff, Parties] (criticizing autonomy-based claims of First Amendment
rights of association as bases for assessing the constitutionality of political party regulations).
215. See, e.g., id. at 308 (characterizing the object of functional analysis as "the parties'
ability to play a role that is crucial to republican government"). Professor Issacharoff, writing
alone and with Professor Pildes, has noted in passing the resonance of the functional approach
he advocates with the First Amendment. See id. at 292-93 ("IT]he history of First Amendment
law does not yield a categorical right against regulation, but rather a highly nuanced
protection of the structures of democratic participation."); Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups,
supra note 102, at 673 (suggesting the Court could implement a procompetitive functional
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however, the language of First Amendment rights is essential in
this context. The fact that the Court's holdings about regulations of
political parties (and the alternative holdings I propose below) trace
a coherent political theory, even as they reason in terms of rights,2 1
indicates that, from the Court's standpoint, the First Amendment
provides a useful and consistent framework for organizing functional insights about democratic politics. From the standpoint of the
people and their elected representatives, the First Amendment
provides a textually legitimate source of authority for judicial
oversight of party regulations.21 7 Rights terminology engages
ancillary normative debates-about, for example, priorities among
competing values, the legislative-judicial division of powers, and the
appropriate pace of constitutional change-that functional insights
alone do not address. Finally, the First Amendment properly focuses
the judicial inquiry on the interests of the electorate, avoiding the
218
abstraction and elitism into which functional analysis can slip.
My critique in Part III of the Court's recent decisions about
regulations of political parties' electoral activities will confirm the
descriptive hypothesis that adopting the public rights theory of
expressive freedom would dramatically change the outcomes of
vision "when interpreting the various constitutional provisions that protect self-government,

such as the First Amendment"). Ultimately, however, Issacharoff disclaims reliance on any
constitutional text. See Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 3 10-11; Issacharoff & Pildes,
Lockups, supra note 102, at 715-16.
216. See supra Part I.C (contending that the private rights theory of expressive freedom
will produce results consistent with the responsible party government theory of the electoral
process); infra Part II.C (contending that the public rights theory of expressive freedom will
produce results consistent with the dynamic party politics theory of the electoral process).
217. See Richard L. Hasen, The 'PoliticalMarket"Metaphorand Election Law: A Comment
on IssacharoffandPildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 726-28 (1998) [hereinafter Hasen, Comment]
(contending that rights discourse is necessary to adjudication of challenges involving election
regulations because a purely functionalist approach lacks any normative standard). Professor
Issacharoff concedes the absence of a textual justification for functional analysis of many

electoral problems, leading him to question the courts' institutional competence to resolve
questions of electoral regulation absent evidence of anticompetitive motive. See Issacharoff,
Parties,supra note 214, at 311-12 (discussing possible approaches to functional analysis of
political parties under the Constitution and concluding as a practical matter that "the
functional argument proves to be difficult to sustain"). For an example of how a public rights

First Amendment analysis obviates this concern, see infra Part IV.C (setting forth a public
rights First Amendment analysis of laws that have negative consequences for the political
process).
218. See infra notes 354-59 and accompanying text (criticizing functionalist arguments
against blanket primary elections).
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cases involving regulations of political parties. My normative
thesis-that we should prefer the public rights theory in this area,
because the outcomes it would produce are better than the outcomes
under the private rights theory-depends on the appeal of the
political values that would characterize the alternative outcomes.
Accordingly, I will now set forth an alternative political theory, one
whose dynamic vision of political parties' role in electoral politics I
believe comports with our best sense of what electoral politics
should contribute to democratic culture far more than does the
responsible party government theory.
B. The Dynamic Party PoliticsTheory of the ElectoralProcess
The theory of responsible party government reflects a pessimistic
and elitist view of politics. That theory insists that we need rigid
structures to dampen and constrain our political energy, lest we
degenerate into factional sniping or majoritarian inertia. The major
party duopoly serves as a Janus-faced political crash helmet. The
two parties spare us from fighting too long, or too vigorously, about
who should lead us and what policies we should pursue. They keep
our government orderly, unified, and predictable. Their identities
serve as bold political labels that save us from having to think too
much about politics.2 19 The trouble with this vision is that its
fixation on stability exacts a heavy price in political vitality.
Members of the political community, especially but not exclusively
those who are uncomfortable in the major party coalitions, have
little reason to participate in the political process. The process
mutes our boldest ideas, ensuring that electoral debates reflect only
the sliver of the political spectrum from slightly left of center to
slightly right of center. Political discourse sustains a steady,

219. Professors Persily and Cain illustrate this pessimism and elitism in the course of
critiquing the "political markets" approach of Professors Issacharoff and Pildes. See
Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102. Persily and Cain criticize that approach for
"placling] its entire faith in the electorate" and reject it as "a strongly populist approach that
leaves little room for leadership, guidance, and assistance from the politically active." Persily
& Cain, supra note 79, at 791. Even when Persily and Cain astutely decry the inattention of
the political markets approach to deliberation, see id. ("The Political Markets paradigm
merely allows for the articulation of and response to consumer preferences."), they only care

about "deliberation and the transmission of information within party networks." Id.
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moderate pitch, but it lacks the creative energy to outgrow old
orthodoxies and rise to new challenges.
In recent years, the legal literature has revealed an increasing
level of concern about the judiciary's embrace of the responsible
party government theory. A diverse group of academic commentators has questioned the major party duopoly's representative
character and effectiveness and, accordingly, the Court's role in
sustaining the duopoly. The skeptics attack the duopoly on two
levels. One group advances a normative argument that entrenched
duopoly harms democratic values by suppressing political competition. A second group advances a descriptive argument that
emphasizes empirical weaknesses in the responsible party government theory's claims for the benefits of duopoly. After briefly
summarizing the skeptics' attacks, I will derive from their two lines
of criticism a theory to counter the responsible party government
defense of the duopoly. In order to differentiate its animating
values of political vitality and openness from the responsible
party government obsession with governmental stability, I call this
alternative the theory of "dynamic party politics."
1. Normative Skepticism: The Duopoly's Anticompetitive Effects
In the leading normative critique of the major party duopoly in
recent legal scholarship, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes
criticize practices of the duopoly, and judicial support for those
practices, by analogy to anticompetitive strategies in corporate
law.220 Issacharoff and Pildes call on policymakers and the Court to
enforce a normative standard of competition for American
democracy, policing "background rules" that determine the
competitive possibilities of the political process. 22 ' They discuss
recent corporate law scholarship that has encouraged courts to
destabilize the structures, called "lockups," that entrenched
managers create and perpetuate to prevent challenges to their
authority.2 2 2 In the same way, Issacharoff and Pildes contend, courts
should step outside the boundaries of conventional constitutional
220. See Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102,
221. See id. at 648.
222. See id. at 647 (explaining concept of "lockups" in corporate law).
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analysis and inquire whether challenged election laws reflect
attempts by entrenched political forces to protect their power.223
Such "partisan lockups" are easiest to identify when a single
political party controls a jurisdiction,2 24 but they may also result
from the two major parties' collective efforts to bar minor parties
from the political stage.228 Issacharoff and Pildes urge courts to
strike down partisan lockups because such structures allow political
226
leaders to insulate themselves from electoral accountability.
Daniel Ortiz employs a similar analysis to examine the problems
the major party duopoly poses for political responsiveness and
participatory democracy.22 7 In a democratic society, Ortiz notes,
collective action problems ensure that individuals lack incentives to
participate in politics. 228 Political parties help the process by acting
as agents for the voters in dealing with their representatives.2 2 9
223. See id. at 680-81 (urging a functional analysis of background electoral rules); see also
Klarman, supra note 115, at 509-28 (discussing various features of election law as potentially
appropriate objects ofjudicial review to prevent political entrenchment).
224. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 660-65 (analyzing the "lockup"
aspect of exclusions of African-American voters in the White Primary Cases); id. at 670-74
(discussing the Court's rejection of a challenge to Democrat-dominated Hawaii's ban on writein voting in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)).
225. Issacharoffand Pildes' principal example ofa duopolistic lockup is the ban on fusion
candidacies upheld in Timmons v. Twin CitiesAreaNew Party,520 U.S. 351 (1997) (discussed
infra Part III.B.1). See Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 681-86.
226. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 646 (describing as "one of the
central goals of democratic politics" that "the policy outcomes of the political process be
responsive to the interests and views of citizens"). In a subsequent essay concerned only in
part with political parties, Professor Pildes assesses recent Supreme Court decisions relating
to regulations of electoral politics as attacks on a tradition of"democratic experimentalism."
Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 704 (2001) [hereinafter
Pildes, Democracy]. That tradition, as Pildes describes it, reflects the vitality of our
democratic institutions, and it trusts those institutions' self-corrective capacities to repair any
damage done by experiments that run off the tracks. See id. at 714. The present Court, in
rejecting or deprioritizing democratic experiments, has emphasized the dangers they pose to
political stability. Pildes argues that the Court's concern rests on an anachronistic, midtwentieth century cultural assumption that regulation to stem political instability-and, in
particular, political competition and fragmentation-is necessary to prevent political
extremism. See id. at 716-18.
227. Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Autonomy: How the Two-Party System Harms the
Major Parties,100 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2000) [hereinafter Ortiz, Duopoly].
228. As Ortiz explains, "[slince the chance that their vote will make a difference is
extremely small, [individuals] will not expend much effort to vote, let alone obtain information
on which to cast the vote properly from their own perspective." Id. at 757 (footnote omitted).
229. See id. ("[The political parties exist as second-order agents to help the voters better
produce the kinds of policy goods they desire.") (footnote omitted).
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Unfortunately, this agency model faces two problems. The first is
intrinsic to the model: parties may act in their own interest rather
than in voters' interests.2 3 The second problem is that parties do
more than act as agents: they "produce product" for the political
marketplace, in the form of candidates and policies.23 ' This model
of democracy-as-consumption is truly democratic, however, only if
competition is present in the political marketplace, because only
voters' ability to reject parties that fail to serve their interests
maintains voters' control over the system. 2 The major party
23 3
duopoly, Ortiz contends, severely limits this control mechanism.
Moreover, the excessive power of the two major parties creates a
strong impetus to regulate them, potentially undermining whatever
benefits they provide.2 34 Ortiz' observations lead him to advocate a
political system that accommodates more and stronger parties. 235
2. Descriptive Skepticism: The Duopoly's Dubious Benefits
Richard Hasen, writing in response to the Court's decision in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,2" has launched the
leading legal academic attack on the empirical premises of the
responsible party government theory. 237 Hasen contends that
the eclipse since the 1960s of the parties in the electorate by
the party organizations, 2 3' renders the duopoly's benefits
230. See id. at 759-60. This argument is developed in Samuel Issacharoff& Daniel R. Ortiz,
Governing Through Intermediaries,85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).

231. Ortiz, Duopoly, supra note 227, at 760 ("[Political parties] recruit candidates, provide
them opportunities for advancement, make decisions about which ones to push and how hard,
raise funds for their races, and help present them on the market. They, in short, produce
product-both policy and character-and market it to voters.") (footnotes omitted).
232. See id. at 763.
233. See id. at 765-66 ("In the two-party world in which we live, democracy-as-consumption
leads not to improved democratic institutional arrangements, but to diminished democratic
accountability and responsiveness.").
234. See id. at 774 ("Imn a two-party system, we dare not give political parties the
autonomy they need to make our politics work best.").
235. See id. ("Right now we have a strong two-party system without strong parties. Let us
hope that someday we will have the courage to have the opposite.").
236. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
237. See Hasen, Entrenching,supra note 99.

238. See id. at 351 ("In recent years party organizations have shown remarkable
resurgence. But the party-in-the-electorate has all but collapsed.") (footnote omitted); Richard
2
L. Hasen, Do the Partiesor the People Own the ElectoralProcess , 149 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 832
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apocryphal. 2 9 First, he asks, what is "stability" supposed to mean?
If it means maintenance of a strong party system, the argument is
obviously circular. If it means voter confidence in government,
present evidence suggests an abject failure. If it means stability of
policy, evidence suggests parliamentary systems with proportional
representation do a better job of maintaining it. 240 As to the
duopoly's supposed antifactionalism, Hasen contends that, as major
party candidates have eclipsed their party organizations in
importance, the parties have become vehicles for special interest
influence, an especially pernicious strain of factionalism. 2 1 Finally,
Hasen argues that the growing independence of candidates has
diminished the informational utility of party labels and thus of the
voting cue. Voter behavior, particularly increased ticket splitting,
confirms this effect.242 Taken on its own terms, Hasen concludes,
judicial support for the major party duopoly is constitutionally
untenable 2 ' and thus indefensible.2 "
Joel Rogers, also writing in response to Timmons, similarly
attacks the major party duopoly by casting doubt on its asserted
(2001) [hereinafter Hasen, Parties] (dismissing as "myth" the idea "that the party-in-theelectorate still exists and that party registration remains a significant associative act"). For
an explanation of the distinct electoral, organizational, and governmental facets of the major
parties, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
239. See Hasen, Entrenching,supra note 99, at 342 ("T he responsible party government
scholars, have argued that the two-party system promotes political stability, combats
factionalism, and provides a valuable voting cue ... however, these scholars have not proven
that the two-party system, especially the modern system since the advent of capital-intensive,
candidate-centered campaigns, actually has these effects."); see also Hasen, Comment, supra
note 217, at 727 (reiterating the failure of the responsible party government theory on its own
terms as a basis for his critique of judicial support for the duopoly). For a discussion of the
benefits of duopoly claimed by the responsible party government theory, see supra Part I.B.
240. See Hasen, Entrenching,supra note 99, at 356-57.
241. See id. at 358-60.
242. See id. at 360-61. Hasen also notes the obvious tension between the idea of the voting
cue and the idea that the duopoly enhances stability by making politics more centrist and less
ideological. See id. at 350.
243. Hasen sees a First Amendment dimension to the Court's protection of the duopoly, but
his focus is limited to the associational rights of the unsuccessful minor party plaintiffs in
Timmons. See id. at 338-39. Hasen does not consider the deeper First Amendment concerns
explored in this Article.
244. Hasen also contends that, even if judicial protection of the two major parties is
desirable, it is unnecessary, because structural features of the political system-notably
single-member districts and plurality voting-virtually ensure the major parties' continued
dominance. See id. at 362-71. For a discussion of the implications of the private rights theory
of expressive freedom for those structural features, see infra Part IV.C.
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value for maintaining governmental stability.2 45 Rogers defines
stability as "a government that, irrespective of ebbs and flows in
partisan composition, enjoys sufficient basic institutional support
to govern continuously and effectively within the frame of its
originating constitutional mandate, and a government whose basic
operation in that frame enjoys a ballast of ongoing voter confidence
and support."2" He contends, citing contemporary political malaise
and governmental ineffectuality, that the duopoly has not achieved
either of these purposes.2 47 Rogers also echoes the normative
critique of the duopoly, charging the major parties with two central
shortcomings: failure to develop and implement coherent programs, and insufficient representation of partisan and ideological
minorities. 2 He maintains that a system with a greater number of
strong parties, accompanied by a shift to proportional representation, would increase voter turnout and create greater political
responsiveness without lapsing into excessive factionalism.24 9
3. From Skepticism About the Duopoly to an Alternative Theory
of PoliticalParties'Role in the DemocraticProcess
The duopoly skeptics share with their responsible party government opponents a commitment to effective government and a
conviction that political parties must play a leading role in the
electorate's selection of that government. The two camps differ
fundamentally about what values a political structure should
emphasize in ensuring political parties will perform their role well.
In contrast to the responsible party government theory's emphasis
on stability, the central value that emerges from legal academic
critiques of the major party duopoly, with their focus on a robust
political discourse and vigorous electoral competition, is dynamism.
Thus, I call my alternative to the theory of responsible party
government the theory ofdynamicpartypolitics.The dynamic party
245. See Joel Rogers, Two-Party Systems: Pull the Plug, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 743 (2000).
246. Id. at 753.
247. See id. at 762 (discussing the federal government's failure to make progress in
important policy areas as a cause of voter alienation).
248. See id. at 762-63 (discussing the two-party system's tendency to focus candidates on
the median voter, which precludes debate on important issues).
249. See id. at 765 (advocating"the introduction of a viable third or fourth party" and "some
species of proportional representation ...
in larger, multi-member districts").
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politics theory posits a broadly participatory, multiparty democratic
system. The constant potential for change in such a system feeds the
spirit of democratic participation, brings political representatives
closer to their constituents, and spurs policy innovation. Just as
responsible party government theorists claim three ways in which
250
duopoly serves the cause of political, and governmental stability,
the dynamic party politics theory is built on three corresponding
aspirations.
First, the dynamic party politics theory envisions an inclusive
electoral process. Accordingly, the theory requires political parties
to help stimulate participation in democratic processes and, to that
end, provide for the representation of minority viewpoints in
electoral competition.2"' The normative duopoly skeptics and others
portray the duopoly as a "race to the center," in which politically
"extreme" viewpoints lose all relevance.5 2 The descriptive skeptics
similarly suggest that the "stabilizing" benefits of preelectoral
coalition building are apocryphal, and that forcing voters to rally
around one of two flags simply produces stagnant politics that
precludes meaningful political change. Masses of people--disaffected minorities but also many in the political center-come to
feel alienated from the political process, and democratic culture
stultifies. 5 3
250. See supra Part I.B.
251. See Douglas J. Amy, Entrenchingthe Two-PartySystem: The Supreme Court'sFusion
Decision, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 82, at 142,
158 (contending that multiparty systems exceed the duopoly in protecting minority interests
because they allow for election of some minority candidates who can press for minority
priorities in government); Andrew C. Geddis, Campaign Finance Reform After McCain.
Feingold: The More Speech-More Competition Solution, 16 J.L. & POL. 571, 578 (2000)
(arguing that increased electoral competition creates "greater incentives for voter
participation in the democratic process"); Klarman, supra note 115, at 501 (discussing
normative benefits of maximizing democratic participation).
252. See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 152 (1974)
(explaining the utility of third parties in providing a counterbalance to the two major parties'
tendencies to move toward the center on every issue); Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and
Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1548-49 (1999) ("One
result of a two-party system combined with single-member electoral districts is a convergence
of the parties with respect to their positions on issues."); Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra
note 102, at 675 (explaining the competitive incentives for parties in a duopoly to gravitate
toward the political center); Rogers, supra note 245, at 762-63 (contending that, because twoparty elections typically require a majority of votes for victory, candidates are discouraged
from adopting controversial stands on issues).
253. See Hasen, Entrenching, supra note 99, at 343-44 (discussing social inefficiencies
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The dynamic party politics theory shares the responsible party
government theory's normative commitment to a political process
that allows for participation by minority groups.8 4 But in contrast
to the responsible party government view that preelectoral coalition
building affords the best opportunity for minority participation, the
dynamic party politics theory posits that minority groups can more
meaningfully participate in the electoral process if the political
system allows for diverse electoral competition and leaves consensus
and coalition building to government. 5 Thus, for example, the
electoral system should afford African Americans a realistic option
of choosing and supporting their own candidates, rather than
forcing them to languish in the broad coalition of the Democratic
Party.25 6 Where the responsible party government theory empowers
party elites to ensure that minorities have a voice in the electoral
process,2 5 the dynamic party politics theory would empower
minorities, and all members of the political community, to speak for
themselves.5 8
caused by the lack of a competitive political market); Rogers, supra note 245, at 762 ("Where
the elusive 'median voter' winds up [under duopoly] is confused and angry.").
254. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government view that broad electoral coalitions offer the best opportunity for minorities to
influence policy outcomes).
255. See, e.g., Amy, supra note 251, at 156 (distinguishing between preferences for
preelectoral and legislative coalition building and suggesting that multiparty electoral
competition with legislative coalition building may achieve greater political stability than
preelectoral coalition building in a duopoly).
256. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 31 (1994) (discussing "[the Democrats' policy of benign neglect
toward African Americans" and questioning "the sincerity of the Republican Party's nascent
and token outreach"); Smith, Black Party,supra note 99, at 60-61 (discussing the structural
limits on African-American voters' leverage to use the threat of exit to change the Democratic
Party's positions).
257. See Persily, supra note 78, at 807 (stating that "party organizations themselves
involve, by necessity, hierarchy and oligarchy in order to accomplish their tasks of mobilizing
voters, winning elections, and executing policy"); Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 831 (noting
that responsible party government "would bolster the official/professional side of parties" and
is committed "not to intra-party democracy but to 'the elite cadre of political activists')
(quoting James L. Sundquist, Party Decay and the Capacity to Govern, in THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE OFGOVERNANCE 42,66 (Joel L. Fleishman ed.,
1982)).
258. Daniel Ortiz properly cautions against romanticizing popular engagement in the
democratic process. In particular, he notes that advocates of campaign finance reform often
undermine their position by failing to acknowledge the importance of voter inertia in
exacerbating the influence of money on politics. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox
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Second, the dynamic party politics theory aims to prevent
entrenchment of elected officials in government. Accordingly, the
theory requires political parties to provide mechanisms for voters
to replace their elected representatives and thus hold them
accountable for their actions in government. The descriptive
skeptics of the duopoly suggest that two-party dominance simply
shifts the locus of factionalism by simplifying small, organized
interest groups' path to political influence. The normative skeptics
advance the complementary claim that a noncompetitive electoral
process degrades the lines of political accountability by protecting
elected officials from challenges to their power.25 9
Again, both the responsible party government theory and the
dynamic party politics theory seek a government focused on serving
the people's interests rather than catering to interest groups.2" But
in contrast to the responsible party government theory's emphasis
on preventing factions by limiting the voices present in government,
the dynamic party politics theory sees voters as standing in the best
position to ensure that elected officials make responsive, publicspirited decisions.2 6'
Third, the dynamic party politics theory requires wide-ranging
electoral debate. Accordingly, the theory emphasizes political parties' role in fostering and enriching debate. According to critiques of
the major party duopoly, elections are deficient in both the quantity
and quality of ideas offered to voters. As to quantity, fewer parties
of Campaign FinanceReform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1998); Ortiz, Engaged, supra note 176.
The dynamic party politics emphasis on increased democratic participation rests on the
insight that the duopoly encourages political inertia. Although free rider problems make some
measure of voter apathy inevitable, the dynamic party politics theory posits that weakening
the duopoly will sufficiently increase the value of political participation to inspire increased
popular engagement.
259. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 650 (positing that political
parties attempt to capture structures that govern political process as a means of perpetuating
power); Ortiz, Duopoly, supra note 227, at 772 (emphasizing diversity of participation as a
way of enhancing parties' responsiveness to voters); see also Hasen, Entrenching,supra note
99, at 344 ("Without third parties to challenge the positions of the two major parties and their

candidates, the major parties are likely to become (some would say, remain) complacent and
unresponsive to social pressures and movements.').
260. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government view that duopoly helps to ensure political accountability).
261. See, e.g., Amy, supra note 251, at 159 (arguing that increased electoral competition
makes for more representative government to the extent "majority coalitions ... represent a

much larger proportion of the voters and a much broader cross-section of public opinion").
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contribute fewer ideas to electoral discourse. As to quality, the
normative skeptics maintain that the absence of competition
degrades the depth and diversity of the major parties' political
discourse, and the descriptive skeptics point out that the convergence of the major parties blurs their purportedly distinct
identities.262 In addition, forcing politically marginal ideas out of the
process seriously undermines prospects for policy innovation by
excluding the ideas that depart most emphatically from the status
quo.
Like the responsible party government theory, the dynamic party
politics theory wants voters informed and recognizes the central
informational role of political parties.263 Whereas the responsible
party government theory prescribes a two-party voting cue,
however, the dynamic party politics theory encourages political
dynamism through a freewheeling exchange of ideas. The dynamic
party politics theory posits that voters can and will process more
and finer political information than the duopoly provides and that
thorough, energetic electoral debate will engage members of the
political community and generate policy innovations.
A corollary to the three aspirations of the dynamic party politics
theory is that minor political parties can and must make substantial
contributions in the electoral process. The major parties in a
duopoly have a strong, collective incentive to exclude minor parties
from political participation,2 ' and the responsible party government
262. See Hasen, Entrenching, supra note 99, at 343 (discussing "informational losses
associated with restrictions on third parties"); Rogers, supra note 245, at 763 (maintaining

that imperative under duopoly to pursue median voter leads candidates to produce "highly
personalized policy profiles ... without much regard for party line"); see also Geddis, supranote
251, at 595 (arguing generally that increased electoral competition "helpls] to improve the

quality of public discourse"). Professors Persily and Cain, in contrast, emphasize that "party
identification remains the most valuable predictor of what a voter will do in the polling
booth." See Persily & Cain, supranote 79, at 787 & n.48 (citing studies). The trouble with that
observation is that it indicates nothing about the relative value of the two-party voting cue
as opposed to the more varied information that would be available to voters in a more
dynamic electoral environment. The fact that self-identified Republicans tend strongly to vote

for Republican candidates reveals nothing more than the rigid boundaries of duopolistic
electoral deliberation.
263. See Ortiz, Duopoly, supra note 227, at 758 (discussing the sound informational

premise underlying the idea of the voting cue).
264. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 683 (contending that the two
major parties share an incentive to prevent minor party competition); Klarman, supra note
109, at 521 & n.135 (discussing the bipartisan preference for strong ballot access restrictions).
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theory vindicates that exclusion. 265 In contrast, minor parties
directly serve all three of the dynamic party politics theory's key
aspirations. First, minor parties strongly facilitate an inclusive
electoral process. They encourage democratic participation by
2
providing outlets for the civic energies of political minorities. '
Moreover, the active presence of minor parties in the electoral
process increases the number and variety of political actors with
incentives to discover and mine new or underdeveloped veins of
political support, thereby expanding the electorate.2 7 Second, minor
parties aid in preventing governmental entrenchment. They serve
as instruments of accountability by giving voters an opportunity to
express disapproval of the major parties by means of exit.2 6 Third,
265. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government theory's disdain for minor parties). One point on which the responsible party
government and dynamic party politics theories agree is that courts should intervene to
prevent either major party from using its governmental dominance in a given jurisdiction to
undermine the other major party's competitive position. Cf Persily, supra note 78, at 796
(stating that '[dlemocracy entails, at a minimum, that those who control government not be
able to use their power to freeze the political status quo" but limiting this concern to "the
party out-of-power").
266. See Amy, supra note 251, at 157 (describing the tendency of multiparty electoral
systems to yield significantly greater voter turnout than the United States achieves and
stating that increased turnout occurs because "it is much easier for voters [in a multiparty
system] to find a candidate or party that actually reflects their particular political views");
Geddis, supra note 251, at 610 (suggesting that minor party competition "can bring new
participants into the election process, and help to reinvigorate a tired and jaded body politic")
(footnote omitted); Rogers, supranote 245, at 766 (arguing that a multiparty system is more
responsive to the electorate because smaller, better defined parties speak to more specific
constituencies); Smith, Black Party, supra note 99, at 57-59 (discussing the historical and
ongoing appeal of minor parties for African-American voters).
267. This 'more the merrier" dynamic provides the best answer to responsible party
government advocates who argue that autonomy for the two major parties offers the best hope
for increasing political participation because of the major parties' interest in broadening their
bases and bringing out voters. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 78,at 797-99 (emphasizing the role
of major party organizations in encouraging electoral participation); see also infra notes 39499 and accompanying text (summarizing and refuting an argument that increasing regulation
of the major parties' campaign expenditures would depress voter turnout).
268. See Paul S. Herrnson, Two-Party Dominance and Minor Party Forays in American
Politics,in MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 21, 39 (Paul S. Herrnson & John C. Green eds.,
1997) (explaining that minor parties "serve as vehicles for voters to express their discontent
with the two major parties"); STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA:
CITIZEN RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 5-6 (1984) (describing minor parties as
"expressions of discontent with the major parties and their candidates"); Richard Winger,
InstitutionalObstacles to a Multiparty System, in MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA, supra,
at 159 (contending that minor parties "giv[el voice to ideological minorities and foster[)
communication between them and the major parties"); Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 832-33
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minor parties devote much greater degrees of their institutional
energies than do the major parties to expanding and enriching
electoral debate: they critique the prevailing political order, propose
new policies, and often push the major parties in new directions.26 9
Even where minor parties have no serious chance of electoral
victory, they often present sufficiently forceful ideas to shift policy
debates and influence the stances of the major parties. ° An
especially important example is minor parties' contribution between
the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries to combating
entrenched racism.27 '
So far this Part has introduced an alternative understanding of
expressive freedom-the public rights theory-and a political vision
that rejects major party duopoly as the primary guarantor of a
healthy political order-the dynamic party politics theory. The next
Section explains why adherence to the public rights theory should
("The very existence of ballot alternatives provides an outlet for voters to express
dissatisfaction."). For an explanation of "voice" and "exit" as means by which voters can
influence positions of political parties, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
269. See J. DAvID GILLESPIE, POLITICS AT THE PERIPHERY: THIRD PARTIES IN Two-PARTY
AMERICA 24 (1993) ("Their greatest social utility lies in what third parties contribute to our
relatively free marketplace of ideas."); Robert Harmel, The Impact of New Partieson Party
Systems: Lessons for America from European Multiparty Systems, in MULTIPARTY POLITICS
INAMERICA, supra note 268, at 53-54 (noting that most new political parties, in the United
States and elsewhere, form with the primary aim and expectation of promoting policy
positions, rather than contending seriously for office); ROSENSTONE ETAL., supra note 268, at
8 ("{t]he power of third parties lies in their capacity to affect the content and range of political
discourse

.... ").

Of course, diversity of parties is not sufficient to produce a dynamic political

climate. See Hasen, Comment, supra note 217, at 729-30 (warning against the assumption
that a multiparty system alone would guarantee robust political competition). The pivotal role
of parties in our political system, however, establishes that partisan diversity is necessary for
dynamic politics.
270. See JOHN F. BIBBY & L. SANDY MAISEL, Two PARTIES-OR MORE? THE AMERICAN

PARTY SYSTEM 48-49 (1998) (discussing examples of important minor party contributions to
policy debates and noting the role of minor parties as harbingers of bipartisan realignments);
Herrnson, supra note 268, at 39 (discussing minor parties' distinctive contributions to our
political system); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 268, at 8 (listing policy innovations
attributable to minor parties). Indeed, minor parties' ability to influence debate may even be
a function of their inability to compete effectively for electoral victories. See James G. Pope,
Fusion, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, and the Future of Third Parties in the
United States, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 473, 490-91 (1998) (arguing that minor party fusion
candidacies reflect strategic choices in favor of influence over major parties rather than
competitiveness against them).
271. See Smith, Black Party, supra note 99, at 63-64 (discussing the history of minor
parties' participation in racial justice movements).
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result in legal decisions that advance the goals of the dynamic party
politics theory.
C. Symbiosis Between the Public Rights Theory and the Dynamic
PartyPolitics Theory
This Article has demonstrated how the private rights theory of
expressive freedom, to which the present Supreme Court is strongly
committed, advances the goals of the responsible party government
theory. 27 2 A parallel relationship holds for the alternative theories
advocated in this Part. If the Court were to adopt the public rights
theory of expressive freedom, it would inevitably advance the goals
of the dynamic party politics theory of the electoral process.
Following the above analysis of the dominant theories, I now
examine the three central ways the dynamic party politics theory
encourages political dynamism-creating an inclusive electoral
process, preventing entrenchment of elected officials, and fostering
wide-ranging electoral debate-in light of the public rights theory.
1. Inclusive ElectoralProcess
The public rights theory of expressive freedom would advance the
dynamic party politics goal of broad participation in electoral
politics in two ways. First, the public rights theory's republican
precepts, 273 and its attendant conception of expressive freedom as a
substantive, rather than formal, liberty,274 would lead the Court to
protect exactly the sort of expressive interests essential to the
dynamic party politics vision of a broad-based, deliberative electoral
process. The substantive view of liberty creates an imperative to
maximize electoral participation, with special emphasis on involving
weak and marginalized groups, because broad participation in
electoral debate is the precondition for informed self-government.
272. See supra Part I.C.
273. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing the republican
underpinnings of the public rights theory).
274. See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive conception
of rights under the public rights theory).

275. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the public rights theory's
emphasis on broad electoral participation).
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The public rights theory's openness to government participation in
the protection of expressive freedom would allow the government to
regulate the electoral process in ways that facilitate participation. 6
For instance, if a particular system of conducting primary elections
could be shown to stimulate electoral participation, the substantive
liberty principle would provide a First Amendment basis for a state
to justify imposing the system.
Second, the public rights theory's substantive conception of liberty
and its defining view of expressive freedom as communal would
stimulate electoral participation by thwarting the major parties'
efforts to prevent minor parties from competing effectively in
elections. 277 A court applying the public rights First Amendment
would judge disputes in which, for example, minor parties sought
relief from onerous ballot access requirements, based not on the
parties' autonomy interests but rather on their contributions to the
electoral process. Because minor parties bring substantial value to
the process, 278 a public rights First Amendment would afford them
substantial success in protecting their competitive positions.
Stronger minor parties would provide more meaningful outlets for
minority political sentiments and would do more to expand the
electorate, thereby advancing the dynamic party politics goal of
broadening political participation.
2. PreventingEntrenchment of Elected Officials
The public rights theory would promote the dynamic party
politics theory's goal of utilizing multiparty competition to prevent
governmental entrenchment in two ways. First, the public rights
theory's recognition of a convergence between the public and private
spheres279 would eliminate the major parties' effective immunity
both from regulations that burden them and from legal challenges
276. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing the allowance for
government regulation to advance expressive freedom under the public rights theory's

recognition of a public-private convergence).
277. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text (discussing the major parties' tendency
to stifle minor party competitors).
278. See supranotes 266-71 and accompanying text (discussing minor parties' value to the
electoral process).

279. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (discussing the public-private
convergence under the public rights theory).
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to the electoral activities through which they leverage political
power into competitive advantages. As discussed above, the private
rights theory's rigid public-private distinction draws a favorable
line for the major parties: elected officials may wield governmental power, while the party organizations that support them
claim First Amendment protection against government regulation
and simultaneously undercut opponents' expressive interests with
the full prerogatives of private citizens.28 ° The public rights theory,
in contrast, would compel courts to assess the major parties' legal
status with full cognizance of their governmental power28 ' and of the
election laws that help maintain their political dominance.282 Thus,
for example, the court would not have to treat major party campaign
finance practices, made possible only by the major parties' government power, as private activity.
Second, the public rights theory's underlying republican conception of politics and government favors the dynamic party politics
preference for allowing vigorous electoral competition and leaving
consensus to government, as opposed to the responsible party
government prescription of preelectoral coalition building. As
discussed above, the private rights theory of expressive freedom,
with its pluralist underpinnings, validates the responsible party
government fear that overly robust electoral competition will allow
warring interest groups to rend the social fabric or will produce
majoritarian tyranny.2 8 In contrast, republican political theory
places great faith in the people's ability to engage in constructive
political deliberation and in the ability of legislators with diverse
political commitments to reach consensus through deliberation.284
Because of these republican precepts, a public rights First
Amendment would lead the Court to advance the dynamic party
280. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the private rights theory's

treatment of major parties as private entities).
281. For a more extensive discussion of the public rights theory's implications for state
action determinations, see infra Part V.A.
282. For a discussion of the electoral structures that facilitate the major party duopoly and
the public rights theory's implications for judicial review of those structures, see infra Part

IV.C.
283. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing the responsible party
government theory's preference for preelectoral coalition building).
284. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing the republican
underpinnings of the public rights theory).

2006

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

politics vision of open electoral competition by, among other things,
performing a searching review of electoral district arrangements
that consistently prevent minor party competition.
My association of a republican theory of expressive freedom with
multiparty politics, like my converse association of pluralism with
duopoly, 2" departs from prior thinking. Professor Gardner posits
that populists, whom he identifies as historical heirs to the founding
generation's republican worldview,286 are likely to embrace the
responsible party government ideal because large, ideologically
diverse parties serve as vehicles for preelectoral deliberation.28 7 As
in the matter of Gardner's treatment of pluralism, two factors
account for my contrary conclusions. First, and even more important
here than in his consideration of pluralism, Gardner's analysis
bypasses the First Amendment. Thus, he can connect populism with
duopoly by observing that "[o]n populist assumptions ... nothing is
gained by letting fringe groups that are by definition wrong on the
merits present platforms and candidacies that pursue incorrect
positions and thus waste everyone's time and resources."2 "' Filtering
republican precepts through the First Amendment, however,
precludes that sort of substantive dismissal of dissenting viewpoints. Professor Meiklejohn proclaimed an absolute bar on
viewpoint-based discrimination in politics debate precisely because
he saw the First Amendment as embodying a judgment that selfgovernment required open debate.28 9 The contentious politics
guaranteed by the public rights First Amendment is essential for
discovering "the public interest," which defines populist-republican
aspirations.
In addition, Gardner's conclusion rests on a questionable
story about populist-republican politics. In Gardner's account,
285. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (defending the connection between
pluralism and a preference for duopoly).
286. See Gardner, supra note 111, at 676. Gardner's identification of populism rather than
republicanism as the contemporary counterpoint to interest group pluralism appears to stem
from the historical grounding of his analysis. Although he distinguishes the two philosophies,

he identifies both as holding "that the purpose of politics is to identify and achieve the
common good of society." Id. at 672.
287. See id. at 676-79. Gardner characterizes the responsible party government model as

"usually, though perhaps not inevitably, associated with the two-party system.* Id. at 679.
288. Id. at 690.

289. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn's argument
against viewpoint-based discrimination).
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spontaneous, grassroots politics are the natural aspiration of
populism, but citizens' failure or refusal to engage with the political
process makes such spontaneity impossible. Thus, populists rely on
preelectoral debates within large, diverse parties to settle policy and
candidate choices.2" Gardner acknowledges that populism's native
mistrust of party elites threatens this reliance, but he concludes
that populists can defuse the tension through popular reforms
of internal party governance.29 ' Gardner makes two errors here:
he binds populism to unduly pessimistic assumptions about the
political process, just as he bound pluralism to unduly optimistic
assumptions; 292 and his salve for the elitism of large party
organizations-popular control-runs aground on the very citizen
disengagement problem that, according to Gardner, makes populists
resort to large parties. 93 If, instead, we expect some substantial
measure of public engagement, and we believe small parties will do
better than large ones at speaking and listening to voters, then
republicanism-populism leads to a preference for a multiparty
system.
3. Wide-Ranging Electoral Debate
Finally, every key aspect of the public rights theory of expressive
freedom would advance the dynamic party politics mandate of
wide-ranging electoral debate. The public rights theory, unlike the
private rights theory, recognizes the central place of the electoral
process in political discourse. 294 With its strong emphasis on the
290. See Gardner, supra note 111, at 683-84.
291. See id. at 684-85.
292. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. For a nuanced discussion of the
public's oscillation between political engagement and apathy, see Ortiz, Engaged,supra note

176, at 29 ("In truth, it is likely that most of us are, to various extents of each, both civic slob
and civic smarty.") (footnote omitted).
293. Gardner acknowledges this problem, conceding that "any requirement of popular

inclusion must after all comport with whatever limitations on popular participation lead
voters to turn to political parties in the first place." Gardner, supra note 111, at 689. His
solution-an indirect process of"mass democratic retrospective approval" in which "the policy
development legwork would be performed by a small number of party employees,"-merely
replicates the conundrum again. Id.

294. As one civil society theorist has stated: '[Cjampaigns are the principal setting for
popular political discussion overall. Elections structure participation, create an audience, and

provide a temporal focus for association on policies, agendas, and ideals." Rosenblum, supra
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people's access to information, the public rights First Amendment
protects the broadest possible range of expression in order to create
the intellectual preconditions for its defining goal of effective selfgovernment. 2 s The public rights theory's categorical methodology
would thoroughly protect the injection' into political debate of
nonorthodox ideas, up to and including seditious libel. Likewise,
the public rights theory would facilitate the electoral participation
of minor parties because-in addition to the reasons already
noted-minor parties' stock-in-trade is presenting alternatives to
the major parties' electoral platforms. The public rights theory's
recognition of a public-private convergence would allow for government assistance in expanding speakers' access to the infrastructure
of debate through such means as media access regulations.
Conversely, the public rights theory would show little patience with
the responsible party government idea of the voting cue.' Given
the public rights theory's faith in republican deliberation, the idea
of designing the political system to lead voters by the hand in a
carefully structured choice between A and B reduces to a
patronizing notion that too much political debate is undesirable.2 7

note 76, at 835.
295. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (discussing the public rights theory's
categorical methodology).
296. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (describing the idea of the voting cue).
297. One might object that my argument proves too much to sustain the relationship I posit
between the public rights theory of expressive freedom and dynamic party politics. If
increasing political dynamism would bring the benefits I suggest, then surely political
dynamism would advance the self-interest of many, perhaps most, individuals. Accordingly,
a "private rights" conception of expressive freedom should be able to take into account the
failings of the major party duopoly. Assuming this objection rests on an empirically sound
base, I think it confuses the pluralist notion of private rights that undergirds the dominant
First Amendment jurisprudence with a utilitarian notion of enlightened self-interest.
Pluralism posits that unchecked individuals will engage in destructive conflicts over their
clashing self-interests, and it accordingly generates First Amendment precepts-balancing
expressive rights against collective interests, ignoring social power differentials-that
preserve social stability. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the
pluralist underpinnings of the private rights theory). This is why the private rights First
Amendment aligns so neatly with the responsible party government theory's stability-focused
defense of the major party duopoly. In order for an assessment of individuals' interests to
change First Amendment doctrine in a way that would undermine the duopoly, the Court
would need to accept the republican premise that political organization can lead individuals
to interact more through discourse than through conflict-the foundational premise of the
public rights theory.
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Nathaniel Persily argues that courts should understand the First
Amendment to guarantee substantial party autonomy because of
the essential role the major parties play in aggregating interest
group preferences.298 In his account, autonomous parties counteract
the forces of government and the median voter, which seek, respectively, to entrench incumbents and to disenfranchise minorities.2 99
Persily treats every regulation that limits party autonomy either as
an attempt by one major party to disadvantage the other or as
median voter tyranny against minorities.3" Thus, he ignores two
crucial possibilities: first, that the electorate may require more and
better electoral debate than two autonomous major parties have
motivation to offer; second, that regulations designed to promote the
role of minor parties, which have the effect of limiting major party
autonomy, may improve on the level of electoral debate major party
autonomy provides. These holes in Persily's analysis betray its
curious lack of any concern with debate-speech-as a matter of
First Amendment concern.3"' Although Persily understands the
doctrinal necessity of making the case for party autonomy
constitutional, he admits his argument is really functional, and he
reasons backward to shoehorn it into the First Amendment. °2
In contrast, I advocate an organic understanding of the First
Amendment as focused on political self-determination. That
understanding, in turn, generates a First Amendment justification
298. Persily drapes the major parties' function of aggregating interest groups in the mantel
of representation-reinforcing review, claiming that the parties' role of building coalitions

protects "discrete and insular minorities." Persily, supra note 78, at 809. Where Persily sees
the major parties as a bulwark against the tyranny of the people, I see the courts as
guarantors of popular access to a political discourse that the major parties, left to their own
devices, close off to a broad range of ideas and participants. See supra notes 251-58 and
accompanying text (discussing the dynamic party politics theory's approach to expanding
electoral participation).
299. See Persily, supra note 78, at 819.
300. "Party autonomy stands as a bulwark against state attempts to skew electoral
probabilities toward certain favored outcomes. Those doing the skewing (i.e., the 'state') could
be a party in control of the government, a bipartisan initiative or legislative majority, or the
party organizations themselves acting through their governmental arm." Id. at 793 (footnote
omitted).
301. See id. at 818 (noting that a First Amendment argument for party autonomy cannot
draw support from a "conceptualization of the First Amendment as limited to expression").
302. See id. at 815-20. Persily's refreshingly candid claim for his First Amendment "hook"
is that, in justifying a functional analysis, "the First Amendment requires less torturing than
other clauses in the Constitution." Id. at 816.
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for a political theory-dynamic party politics-that emphasizes
robust debate, broad participation, and open competition.
The first two Parts of this Article have developed the descriptive
hypothesis that the Court's understanding of the First Amendment,
as applied to electoral regulations of political parties, corresponds
strongly with the political implications of its results in such cases.
Thus, judicial adherence in this area to the private rights theory of
expressive freedom can be expected to lend remarkably consistent
support to the responsible party government defense of the major
party duopoly, whereas judicial embrace of the alternative public
rights theory can be expected to advance the dynamic party politics
vision of multiparty electoral competition. My normative thesis
is that we should care more about the values of openness and
dynamism, reflected in the dynamic party politics theory, than
about the hidebound commitment to stability that is the alpha and
omega of responsible party government; accordingly, we should
prefer that courts apply the public rights theory of expressive
freedom to electoral regulations. The next Part demonstrates how
the posited relationships between the constitutional and political
theories have played out in the Supreme Court's recent line of
decisions about regulations of political parties' electoral activities,
and I critique the cases accordingly.

III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ABOUT ELECTORAL REGULATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The Supreme Court in recent Terms has decided four important
First Amendment cases involving challenges to regulations of
political parties' electoral activities."0 3 The cases fall into two sets:
two claims raised by major political parties and two by minor
parties, one of which, as to each class of claimants, dealt with
303. I have critiqued some of these cases in the context of assessing the "political
safeguards of federalism" theory, which holds that features of the national political system
obviate the need for courts to protect states' interests in the federal system. See Gregory P.
Magarian, Toward PoliticalSafeguardsof Self-Determination,46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1250-57

(2001). One sophisticated strand of that theory gives pride of place to political parties as
bulwarks of federalism. I contend that the Court's recent solicitude for the major parties,
although consistent with the political safeguards theory, undermines federalism by
undercutting the best reasons why states' prerogatives deserve protection, which I group
under the principle of "political self-determination." See id.
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political association and the other with access to the means of
political expression. In every one of these cases, the Court has
vindicated the expressive and associational interests of the major
parties or denied those of the minor parties. Contrary to prior
scholarship that has denied theoretical consistency in the Supreme
Court's review of electoral regulations,3 ' this Part demonstrates
that the Court, in its recent adjudication of political parties'
challenges to regulations of their electoral activities, has reached
results consistent with the responsible party government view of
political parties by adhering to the private rights theory of
expressive freedom. This Part also shows as to each case that
adherence to the public rights theory of expressive freedom would
have led the Court to a result consistent with the dynamic party
politics theory of the political process, which I contend would have
done more to foster healthy democracy.
A. The Court Sustains MajorParties'FirstAmendment
Challenges to ElectoralRegulations
1. Vindicating FreeAssociation in CandidateSelection
Procedures:California Democratic Party v. Jones
In CaliforniaDemocraticParty v. Jones, °5 the two major political
parties, along with two minor parties,3 ° challenged California's
system of "blanket" primary elections. Under the blanket primary,
which California voters had adopted by initiative, a primary voter
could vote for any party's candidate for any office on the ballot,
304. See Fitts, Back to the Future, supra note 82, at 100 (arguing that the countermajoritarian difficulty leads the Court to avoid theoretically grounded rulings in cases dealing
with electoral regulations); Lowenstein, No Theory, supra note 120, at 258 (arguing that the
Court has not articulated a theoretically consistent basis for its election law decisions).
305. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
306. Of the two minor party plaintiffs, one, the Peace and Freedom Party, was marginal
enough to have lost its "qualified status" under California law by the time of the Jones
decision. See id. at 571 n.3. The other minor party plaintiff was the Libertarian Party,
probably the single minor party most likely to favor party autonomy on ideological as opposed
to self-interested grounds. Indeed, in California's 1998 primary election, minor party
candidates other than Libertarians supported the blanket primary system by a ratio of eight
to one. See Christian Collett, Openness Begets Opportunity:Minor Partiesand California's
Blanket Primary,in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE: CALIFoRNIA's EXPERIMENT WITH
THE BLANT'r PRIMARY 214, 227 (Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber eds., 2002).

2012

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

regardless of the voter's party registration or lack thereof.03 7 For
example, a registered Democrat could express his or her preference
on the same primary ballot for a Republican presidential candidate,
a Democratic senatorial candidate, and a Libertarian gubernatorial
candidate. The parties challenged the blanket primary as an infringement on their First Amendment freedom of association. The
blanket primary, the parties argued, forced them to allow nonmembers to participate in selecting their nominees. Nonmember
participation diluted a party's message and allowed willful mischief
by members of rival parties. Only by excluding nonmembers, the
parties claimed, could they sustain their distinct identities. 0 8
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, took for granted the parties'
position as private claimants while casting the state as regulator
and putative infringer of rights. °9 He then turned to the first
legal issue raised under the Court's First Amendment balancing
methodology: whether the parties suffered a violation of their
rights that required the government to satisfy strict scrutiny. To
dissenting Justice Stevens' contention that "an election, unlike a
convention or caucus, is a public affair,"3 10 Justice Scalia responded,
"Of course it is, but when the election determines the party's
the constitutional rights
nominee it is a party affair as well, and ...
of those composing the party cannot be disregarded."3 1 ' Those rights,
307. See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 2001 (2000), invalidatedby Cal. Democratic Partyv. Jones, 530

U.S. 567 (2000).
308. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
309. See id. at 586 (describing the case as a conflict between "(California's) legitimate state
interests and (the parties') First Amendment rights"); see also Cain, supra note 78, at 804
(rejecting expressly a characterization of the dispute in Jones as "one between the party

bosses and the people"); Pildes, Democracy, supra note 226, at 703-04 (noting the Jones
Court's insistence on treating the interest behind an open primary as a state regulatory
interest rather than a public interest in voter participation). Gary Allison portrays the
litigants in Jones as having implicitly agreed to characterize political parties as private
entities with First Amendment rights based on their common understanding of Supreme
Court precedents. See Gary D. Allison, ProtectingParty Purity in the Selection of Nominees
for PublicOffice: The Supremes Strike Down California'sBlanket PrimariesandEndangerthe
Open Primariesof Many States, 36 TULSA L.J. 59, 76 (2000).
310. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 573 n.4. The Jones Court hedged its bets somewhat in this regard by declaring
without further explanation that "a State may require parties to use the primary format for
selecting their nominees, in order to assure that intraparty competition is resolved in a
democratic fashion." See id. at 572 (citing Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781
(1974)). The view that primary elections are private, intraparty affairs enjoys some support
among commentators. See Cain, supra note 78, at 795 (arguing that "the central question in
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according to Justice Scalia, prominently included "the right not to
associate" with nonmembers.3 2 That right deserved not merely
protection but "special protection,"3 13 because of the importance of
party nominating procedures for democracy. 314 After reviewing
record evidence that confirmed California's blanket primary forced
concluded that
voters to associate with nonmembers, Justice Scalia
315
scrutiny.
strict
to
subject
was
primary
the blanket
Justice Scalia proceeded to reject all seven grounds for the blanket primary that California submitted as sufficiently "compelling"
to satisfy strict scrutiny. He dismissed the state's first two asserted
interests-"producing elected officials who better represent the
electorate" and "expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of
partisan concerns"--as "simply circumlocution for producing
nominees and nominee positions other than those the parties would
choose if left to their own devices. " 316 Similarly, he disqualified the
state's third asserted interest, enfranchising independent voters and
minority party residents of 'safe' districts" dominated by one party,
as a mere proxy for "nonparty members' keen desire to participate
in selection of the party's nominee. "317 Such outsiders, Justice Scalia
declared, "should simply join the [dominant] party."31 8 Justice Scalia
Jones concerns the party organization's right to establish the process and criteria by which
it officially confers its party label upon candidates"); Robert C. Wigton, American Political
Parties Under the First Amendment, 7 J.L. & POLY 411, 435 (1999) (arguing that parties
deserve categorically greater protection in matters relating to primary rather than general
elections because "the primary phase can certainly be seen as implicating greater party
interests of association and free speech than the general election process, since it is
essentially an intra-party affair").
312. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 574. This same notion of a right not to associate figured
prominently in another important First Amendment case from the Court's 1999 Term, Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, which upheld the Boy Scouts' right to exclude gays from
membership. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
313. Jones, 530 U.S. at 575.
314. In asserting the importance for democracy of political parties' right to maintain strong
identities, Justice Scalia did not expressly limit himself to the two major parties. He even
emphasized the concern that "[siome Iminorl political parties ... are virtually inseparable from
their nominees." Id. His view of minor parties' significance, however, is clear from the
parenthetical jibe that closes that sentence: "(and tend not to outlast them)." Id.
315. See id. at 577-83.
316. Id. at 582.
317. Id. at 583.
318. Id. Terry Smith has put the point even more harshly, arguing that the blanket
primary benefited "voters who had 'disenfranchised' themselves of their own volition." Terry
Smith, Partiesand TransformativePolitics, 100 CoLuM. L. REV. 845, 862 (2000) [hereinafter
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deemed California's four other asserted interests-"promoting
fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy"-generically legitimate but not
"compelling" as to the blanket primary. In particular, he rejected
the "choice" and "participation" interests as sops to the political
majority, surmising that the blanket primary would only serve those
two interests by producing more centrist candidates.31 9
Although Jones featured token minor party plaintiffs, the major
parties were its big winners. 320 By allowing the major parties to
maintain tight control over their nominating procedures, the Court
prioritized party autonomy above competing interests 321' and
advanced all the interests prized by the responsible party government theory of the electoral process.322 Nonmember participation in
the major parties' primaries undermined preelectoral construction
of broad-based coalitions, first, by limiting the parties' ability to
control intraparty debate and, second, by allowing voters to support
minor party candidates for particular offices without forfeiting their
role in selecting major party nominees for other offices.323 The
blanket primary encouraged what responsible party government
theorists would view as factionalism by increasing voters' opportunities to vote their interests across party lines and by
complicating candidates' abilities to identify and address their
constituencies. Each of those effects likely would have undermined
the utility of the voting cue by fragmenting candidates' messages.
Based on the hypothesis that the responsible party government
theory gains reinforcement and support from the private rights
Smith, TransformativePolitics].
319. Jones, 530 U.S. at 583-85. For a discussion of objections to the blanket primary on the
ground that it tends to produce more moderate candidates, see infra notes 349-60 and
accompanying text.
320. I contend below that salient differences between major and minor parties justify the
minor party plaintiffs' victory in Jones under the public rights theory. See infra notes 475-81
and accompanying text.
321. See Persily, supra note 78, at 785 (calling Jones "the most emphatic defense yet of a
robust First Amendment right of party autonomy").
322. See supra Part I.B (describing responsible party government theory).
323. By undermining the major parties' preelectoral coalition building, the blanket primary
also undermined the responsible party government tenet that minority voters are best served
by the opportunity to assert their interests within the major parties. See, e.g., Smith,
Transformative Politics,supranote 318, at 863 (arguing that "the closed primary election is
perhaps the best chance that voters of color have to influence the political process").
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theory of expressive freedom, the Jones opinion should reflect
a private rights analysis.324 Likewise, a public rights First
Amendment analysis of the decision should produce a result more
favorable to the dynamic party politics theory of the political
process.325
In fact, Justice Scalia's opinion in Jones exemplifies the private
rights theory. 326 First, the opinion is built on a rigid public-private
distinction, uncritically accepting the "private" status of the parties
and viewing the countervailing interests as purely governmental
and regulatory. That characterization ignores the possibility that
California might have been defending First Amendment interests
in the case. Indeed, Justice Scalia expressly denied that his
prescription for independent voters and safe-district minorities-if
you want a voice, go join a political party with power-raised any
First Amendment concern, because the predicament resulted merely
from the parties' (private) dictates, not from any state directive.327
The Court's use of strict scrutiny similarly turned on Justice Scalia's
characterization of primary elections as substantially private
affairs. Second, the Jones analysis focused entirely on the parties'
autonomy interest in maintaining control of candidate selection
procedures3 28 while ignoring the public's interests in access to
political information, opportunities for meaningful participation
in politics, and a more competitive electoral process. 329 Finally,
the Court treated First Amendment rights as strictly negative
and formal, ignoring the power differential between the strong,
324. See supra Part I.C (describing symbiosis between the private rights theory of
expressive freedom and the responsible party government theory of the political process).
325. See supra Part II.C (describing symbiosis between the public rights theory of
expressive freedom and the dynamic party politics theory of the political process).
326. See supra Part I.A (describing the private rights theory).
327. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (characterizing a
disenfranchised voter's option of joining a viable party as "not a state-imposed restriction
upon his freedom of association, whereas compelling party members to accept his selection
of their nominee is a state-imposed restriction upon theirs").
328. In fact, the Court should have pronounced the parties' autonomy argument in Jones
quite weak in light of its prior development of the First Amendment right to free association.
See Issacharoff, Parties, supra note 214, at 282-93 (critiquing the Jones Court's free
association analysis).
329. Justice Scalia expressed the Court's priorities most succinctly when, at the Jones oral
argument, he reportedly attacked the blanket primary as "democracy carried to an extreme."
Allison, supra note 309, at 99 (citation omitted).
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centralized parties and the politically impotent votersindependents and safe-district supporters of minority parties
-whose interests the blanket primary principally served. Indeed,
Justice Scalia all but declared involving disenfranchised voters in
the political process an impermissible state objective.3 0
In contrast, analysis of California's blanket primary under the
public rights theory of expressive freedom 3 ' would have led the
Jones Court to uphold the system. 3 2 At the outset, the public rights
theory's recognition of a public-private convergence would have
caused the Court to consider the possibility that the major parties
were undermining First Amendment values that California
sought to protect. 3 3 With its central emphasis on collective selfdetermination, the public rights theory would have compelled the
Court to characterize primary elections as public proceedings,
rather than as private meetings that happen to involve (in
California's case) millions of people." 4 That characterization would
have drawn support from the fact that voters' tendency to identify
as "members" of a political party has weakened dramatically. 35 In
330. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 583 (describing California's asserted interest in enfranchising
voters as "nothing more than reformulation of a state interest we have already
rejected-recharacterizing nonparty members' keen desire to participate in selection of the
party's nominee as 'disenfranchisement' if that desire is not fulfilled").
331. See supra Part II.A (describing the public rights theory).
332. Jones falls into a line of cases over the past three decades that have vindicated parties'
claims of autonomy in conducting nominating procedures. See Eu v. S.F. County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (striking down a state statute that barred parties from
endorsing candidates in primary elections); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208 (1986) (striking down a state bar on opening major party primaries to independent
voters); Democratic Party v. Wisonsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (upholding a
national party's refusal to seat national convention delegates selected through a procedure
disapproved by the party); Nader v. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (summarily affirming a
judgment upholding a state statute that required primary voters to be members of the party
in whose primary they voted). However, I would not uniformly tar the earlier cases with the
public rights brush. See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text (favorably analyzing
Tashjian).
333. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Jones, suggested that possibility when he characterized
the blanket primary as manifesting "the State's right to define the obligations of citizens and
organizations performing public functions."Jones, 530 U.S. at 591-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334. See id. at 593-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing primary elections as public
proceedings).
335. See generally Hasen, Entrenching, supra note 99, at 351-55 (discussing the recent
decline of the party-in-the-electorate); see also Amy, supra note 251, at 145 (describing
decreased public identification with the major parties, increased public enthusiasm for minor
parties, and an increase in minor party candidacies during the 1980s and 1990s); Smith,
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a major party duopoly, the two parties' candidate selection processes
are private matters only in the most formalistic sense. Candidate
selection-narrowing a potentially expansive field to two candidates
-- often does more than general elections to determine the identities
of elected officials, especially in the many states and districts that
are "safe" for one major party. Judicial protection of a party's
autonomy in primary elections simply allows the parties to control
the people.3 36
Treating primary elections as public affairs would have effectively
ended the case. If the Court had occasion to consider the "regulatory
interests" submitted by California, the public rights theory would
have led it to view some of them favorably. For example, the Court
would have validated the state's asserted interest in increasing
voter participation, because maximizing participation is critical to
the process of collective self-determination. 3 7 A study estimated
that the blanket primary format increased primary turnout by
about nine percent of the expected turnout in a closed primary.3 38
Black Party, supra note 99, at 65 (suggesting that "the continued dealignment of the
electorate ... poses a risk to two-party stability").
336. See Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry,supra note 89, at 1766-70 (expressing doubts about
the democratic and representative character of the major party organizations).
337. Justice Stevens' dissent strongly emphasized the state's interest in political
inclusiveness, criticizing the Court's disregard for "the distinction between laws that abridge
participation in the political process and those that encourage such participation." Jones, 530
U.S. at 592 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In an era of
dramatically declining voter participation, States should be free to experiment with reforms
designed to make the democratic process more robust by involving the entire electorate in the
process of selecting those who will serve as government officials.").
338. See Wendy K Tam Cho & Brian J. Gaines, Candidates, Donors, and Voters in
California'sFirstBlanket PrimaryElections, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra
note 306, at 171, 175 (noting that California's 1998 primary election turnout increased to 29.8
percent, compared to a 27.4 percent average for recent midterm primary elections prior to the
establishment of the blanket primary system). Professor Cain dismisses this increase in
participation, calling it "very modest in size," noting that it was limited to the primary
election, and stressing that it consisted almost entirely of independent voters rather than
crossover major party voters. Cain, supra note 78, at 798; see also Persily, supra note 78, at
777 (downplaying the significance of increased turnout under the California blanket primary
system). Anyone who, unlike Cain, seriously values electoral participation by independent
voters and believes primary elections are important democratic processes should find the
increase in turnout more encouraging. Moreover, Cain ignores specific instances in which
major party crossover voting apparently contributed to heightened turnout, notably in
districts with competitive Latino Republican candidates. See Gary M. Segura & Nathan D.
Woods, Targets of Opportunity: California'sBlanket Primaryand the PoliticalRepresentation
of Latinos, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra note 306, at 248, 254-56
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Bearing in mind the public rights theory's emphasis on the voters'
right to hear the broadest and most inclusive array of political
arguments, the Court also would have approved the state's interest
in expanding electoral debate beyond the narrow concerns of the
targeted voters in a controlled, partisan primary.
The blanket primary's survival under a public rights analysis in
Jones would have advanced all three goals of the dynamic party
politics theory of the electoral process.3 39 First, two of the interests
California advanced in support of the blanket primary-increasing
voter participation and enhancing minority involvement in the
electoral process-define the dynamic party politics goal of inclusive
elections. The blanket primary appears to have encouraged fluidity
in party identification, thereby limiting the preelectoral coalescence
of voters under the two major parties' banners. Second, upholding
the blanket primary would have undermined the major parties'
efforts to foreclose competition and entrench their elected officials,
because it would have enhanced minor parties' electoral role. 3"
Minor parties often succeed in running viable candidates for only
one or a few offices on the primary ballot, a circumstance that leads
many voters who support the minor party not to vote in the party's
primary because doing so would mean giving up the right to choose
candidates for other offices. The blanket primary, by permitting
ticket splitting, eliminates that cost of casting a primary vote for
a minor party candidate.34 ' Finally, allowing primary voters to consider candidates across party lines would have broadened electoral
(contending that crossover voting by Latino Democrats contributed to substantially increased
turnout in such races).
339. See supra Part ILB (describing the dynamic party politics theory).
340. A thorough study of minor parties' experience with California's blanket primary
system concluded that the system aided minor parties' strategic positions against the major
parties, and enhanced minor parties' ability to affect electoral debate, by encouraging minor
party candidates to run more vigorous primary campaigns; giving minor parties opportunities,
and thus incentives, to broaden their bases of support; and attracting the early media
attention accorded to candidates who win competitive primaries. See Collett, supra note 306,
at 224-27.
341. Under California's blanket primary system in 1998, minor party candidates received
nearly identical percentages of the total votes cast in the primary and general elections, a
phenomenon that "may have been a function of general election supporters being able to cast
an earlier ballot for their preferred minor-party candidate." Id. at 222. Of course, a minor
party would lose this benefit if it did not participate in the blanket primary. See infra notes
475-81 and accompanying text (explaining that the public rights theory might have led the
Jones Court to strike down mandatory blanket primary for minor parties).
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debate by giving candidates incentives to address more voters and
giving voters opportunities to consider more candidates.
My conclusion that upholding the blanket primary would have
advanced the dynamic party politics theory implicates three
concerns, but none of them alters the analysis. First, political
parties-most prominently, at present, the major partiescontribute- -to the -electoral- -process -by-providing voters with
information.342 To the extent the blanket primary, or any electoral
reform, hampered parties in communicating their messages, it
would undermine rather than advance the dynamic party politics
goal of robust political debate. Political parties' campaign activities,
however, contribute to meaningful debate only insofar as the parties
have incentives to provide information and the information is
sufficiently reliable to assist in electoral decisionmaking. If a party
perceives its base of support as predictable, it has a relatively small
incentive to provide information, and the information it does provide
will be aimed at the concerns of a narrow group of targeted voters.343
Moreover, if only two parties are effectively competing in the
election, then only one directly opposing voice is present to
challenge the reliability of each party's statements. The blanket
primary's scrambling of the electoral landscape and its benefits for
minor parties likely would increase, not diminish, the quantity and
quality of available political information.
Second, my assessment of the blanket primary does not imply
that all regulations of party membership controls should be upheld
under the First Amendment or that all such regulations serve the
goals of the dynamic party politics theory. An important precursor
of the Jones case, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,3 4
involved a Connecticut regulation that barred political parties from
342. "[Bly making contributions to candidates or independent expenditures on their behalf,
engaging in issue advocacy, or holding a party rally (snippets of which appear on the evening
news programs), parties can provide information to voters for free that they would not invest
in obtaining themselves." Ortiz, Duopoly, supra note 227, at 758 (footnotes omitted); see also
Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 308 (positing that the blanket primary "threaten[s] ...
the [parties'] incentive to undertake voter education and mobilization in the political
process"); Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 823 (discussing various ways in which parties
contribute to public understanding ofpolitics); Smith, TransformativePolitics,supra note 318,
at 863 (emphasizing parties' capacity for changing voters' preconceptions).
343. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing informational losses associated
with the major party duopoly).
344. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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allowing independent voters to participate in their primary
elections. The Court overturned the regulation, citing political
parties' First Amendment right to political association. 45 Although
the Jones Court cited Tashjian as support for its party autonomy
argument against the blanket primary,'" the cases could not be
more different from the standpoint of the dynamic party politics
theory. In Tashjian,a major political party sought to expand voters'
opportunities for political participation, and the state sought to limit
them. In Jones, conversely, the major parties sought to limit voters'
opportunities, and the state sought to expand them. Had the
Tashjian Court embraced the public rights theory, it would have
reached the same result the Court actually did reach, although its
analysis would have emphasized the public interests at stake more
than the party's asserted right of association.3 47 Under the public
rights First Amendment, the major political parties would be free to
include but not to exclude.'"
Finally, the Jones Court charged that the blanket primary system
impermissibly reduced the power of political outsiders by producing
more ideologically uniform candidates." 9 The Court based this
345. See id. at 214 ("The Party's attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and
support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of
association.").

346. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-76 (2000).
347. The Republican Party's move in Tashian might appear to have reflected a strategy
of co-opting independent voters and eliding political differences in order to strengthen the two
major parties. On a practical level, however, the regulation struck down in Tashjian appears

to have served the dominant Democratic Party's effort to maintain its competitive advantage
over the Republican Party. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212-13 (describing the political

background of the Connecticut bar on independent voters' participation in major party
primaries). On a theoretical level, the public rights theory mandates an open, inclusive

electoral process, and the dynamic party politics theory assumes such openness helps electoral
competition.
348. The Jones Court maintained that upholding the blanket primary while prohibiting the

Tashjian regulation would "guarantee a party's right to lose its identity, but not to preserve
it." Jones, 530 U.S. at 577 n.7. That objection captures the difference between the private

rights theory's overriding concern with the party's autonomy to define its identity and the
public rights theory's overriding concern with the political community's interest in open

democratic discourse. Cf Baker, Expenditures, supra note 209, at 28-29 n.111 ("Regulation
of electoral speech should be invalidated if it narrows rather than opens electoral processes.*).
349. As the Jones Court stated:

[Tihe net effect of [the blanket primary]-indeed, its avowed purpose-is to
reduce the scope of choice, by assuring a range of candidates who are all more

'centrist.' This may well be described as broadening the range of choices favored
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charge on the rhetoric of the California blanket primary advocates,
who proclaimed that allowing independents to vote in primaries and
letting partisan voters "cross over" would yield more "moderate"
representatives."' 0 The term "moderate" in this context may
simply refer to more broadly representative electoral outcomes that
necessarily result from the participation of more speakers and
voters in the electoral process. In other words, the results of an
electoral arrangement that engages more participants may disappoint those whose strong political views have already led them to
participate faithfully.35 ' Any constitutional argument against the
blanket primary based on this sense of "moderation" would have to
make the absurd claim that the First Amendment bars efforts to
encourage electoral participation. Functionalist critics sympathetic
to the Jones analysis, however, have argued that the blanket
primary produces excessive moderation in a different way. In their
view, opening a party's primary to nonmembers destroys the
35 2
capacity of party activists to press for ideologically bold positions.
Without the activists' efforts, voters with minority preferences never
by the majority-but that is hardly a compelling state interest, if indeed it is
even a legitimate one.
Jones, 530 U.S. at 584.
350. See id. at 580 (concluding that "[it is unnecessary to cumulate evidence of this
[moderating] phenomenon, since, after all, the whole purpose of [the blanket primary] was to
favor nominees with 'moderate' positions"). Coming from Justice Scalia, the Court's leading
textualist, such wholesale reliance on the rhetoric of a measure's architects to assess its
constitutionality is surprising, especially given that the measure was enacted by initiative in
perhaps the nation's most heterogeneous state.
351. Different notions of "moderation" are evident in rhetoric advanced in support of the
blanket primary, which spoke variously in terms of ending partisan gridlock, improving the
effectiveness of government, and making government more representative of the people. For
a summary of the "moderation" arguments advanced in support of the blanket primary, see
Allison, supra note 309, at 67-68, 84-85.
352. See Cain, supra note 78, at 809-10 (arguing that increasing parties' legal autonomy
allows party activists to combat median voter pressure); Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214,
at 300-08 (discussing the importance of pressure from party activists in counteracting median
voter pressure); Persily, supranote 78, at 802 (arguing that "(t]he blanket primary targets the
cohesiveness of strong minority factions or parties and attempts to diminish their power
relative to the group occupying the ideological middle ground") (footnote omitted); Smith,
TransformativePolitics, supra note 318, at 866 (claiming that opening major party primaries
to independent voters inhibits the ability of party activists to "support a candidate whose
views diverge from the median voter's ... with the intention of reshaping median preferences");
see also Allison, supra note 309, at 104-08 (making the related objection that a blanket
primary allows "apathetic" and "individualist" voters to free ride on the efforts of"partisans,"
who do the organizational dirty work of democracy).

2022

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

353
have the chance to consider electoral options that appeal to them.
According to these critics, Jones averted a scenario in which the
major parties would lack sufficient autonomy in selecting their
candidates to offer minority voters ideologically distinct electoral
alternatives and thus meaningful opportunities for participation.
If the Jones Court and its apologists were correct that the blanket
primary system deprived voters of distinct electoral choices, then
that system would stand in great tension with the dynamic party
politics theory. However, evidence that the blanket primary system
decreases ideological distinctions among candidates is scanty.35 '
This empirical uncertainty underscores the dubious nature of
the assumptions on which the "excessive moderation" argument
depends. The argument assumes that the closed primary system
provides voters with meaningfully distinct choices. Ideological
distinction lies, to some extent, in the eye of the beholder, but the
prevailing system's success in providing it is highly questionable.
On a wide range of issues, including significant economic and
homeland security matters, Democratic and Republican candidates
routinely converge, despite having been selected through closed

primary procedures.
The argument also turns on an overly simplistic assumption that
the electorate is "centrist." The substantive preferences of the
electorate-which consists of numerous constituencies with complex
353. See Cain, supra note 78, at 801 (arguing that, under a blanket primary, "Imledian
voter logic would drive the candidates to nearly identical spots in the center, reducing the
selection to a difference in labels, not policies"); Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 307-10
(arguing that a fully open primary would produce "two centrist candidates with overlapping
electoral bases" but proceeding to question the tendency of a blanket primary to produce the
same effect); Persily, supra note 78, at 804 n.206 (equating a blanket primary with minority
vote dilution); Smith, Transformative Politics, supra note 318, at 862-63 (arguing that
imposing a blanket primary on the Democratic Party diminishes "black voters' ability to select
a nominee who will best embody their aspirations for transformative politics").
354. Professor Issacharoff, who takes very seriously the concern that the blanket primary
would eliminate partisan activists' counterweight to the median voter pressure of the twoparty system, concludes that the minimal empirical evidence regarding the California blanket
primary's moderating effect provided insufficient grounds for a constitutional challenge. See
Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 308-10; see also Allison, supra note 309, at 112-14
(questioning the asserted moderating effect of blanket primary systems based on results of
nonpartisan blanket primaries in Louisiana). But see Cain, supra note 78, at 800 & n.20
(citing studies reporting increased election of "moderate" candidates in blanket primary
states); Persily, supranote 78, at 776 (concluding from California data that "[a]ll other things
being equal, the blanket primary aided in the election of slightly more moderate candidates").
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and changing characteristics--emerge through an ongoing discourse
among people, interest groups, parties, policymakers, and courts.
Perhaps if our system placed greater trust in the electorate and less
reliance on party insiders, ideologically marginal candidates would
find new ways to connect with voters.36' Similarly, the argument
assumes a complete or substantial discontinuity between the
majority that enacted the California blanket primary initiative and
strongly ideological voters. In fact, many minor party members
favored the initiative,5a6 which suggests that many people with
substantively marginal views embraced the procedural values of the
blanket primary. Finally, the argument presupposes the continued
dominance of the major party duopoly.357 Although the major party
duopoly benefits from a formidable legal trellis,358 the major parties'
public support is increasingly rotting on the vine.35 9 To the extent a
355. This aspect of the "moderation" dispute reflects a clash between the pluralist and
republican conceptions of democracy that animate, respectively, the private and public rights
theories of expressive freedom. Pluralism views policy preferences as prepolitical and selfinterested; thus, unimpeded pre-electoral coalition building enables the major parties to
perform a valuable service by taking minority preferences into account prior to the election.
See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing the pluralist symbiosis between
the private rights theory and the responsible party government preference for pre-electoral
coalition building). "Minority" and "moderate" are static categories that precede and define
the electoral process. In contrast, because republicanism treats preferences as subject to
change in the political process and informed by a sense of the public interest, a competitive
electoral process in which voters may choose freely among diverse perspectives is essential
to protect minority interests. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
symbiosis between the republican underpinnings of the public rights theory and the dynamic
party politics preference for multiparty electoral competition). "Minority" and "moderate" are
dynamic categories that take on meaning in the crucible of electoral debate.
356. See supra note 306.
357. See Issacharoff, Parties,supranote 214, at 305-12 (noting that"[tlhe argument against
the fully open primary must begin with the propensity of a first-past-the-post system to yield
two and only two relatively centrist parties" and tracing the implications of that premise for
arguments against the blanket primary); Persily, supra note 78, at 819 (tying the asserted
importance of two autonomous major parties as checks against median voter tyranny in the
primary election context to the use of a plurality electoral system rather than proportional
representation); see also Hasen, Comment, supra note 217, at 728-30 (suggesting that the
structural legal supports of the major party duopoly preclude courts from meaningfully
advancing multiparty political competition); Lowenstein, No Theory, supra note 120, at 263
(charging Issacharoff and Pildes' political markets theory with irrelevance because it fails to
account for structural supports underpinning the two-party system).
358. See infra Part IV.C (discussing electoral structures that help to perpetuate the major
party duopoly and proposing a legal basis for reviewing them under the public rights theory).
359. See supra note 335 and accompanying text (discussing the decline in popular support
for the major parties).

2024

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1939

constraint on major party autonomy like the blanket primary
strengthened minor parties3 6°-especially if such a constraint was
part of a reform agenda designed to encourage minor parties-the
blanket primary could greatly enhance ideological diversity in
elections.
2. Vindicating Free Speech Rights of Access to the Means of
ElectoralDebate: The Colorado Republican Decisions
The Court considered another major party challenge to a federal
regulation of electoral practices in Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado ).3"1 The Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA). 2 places limits on the amounts of contributions various people and entities can make to campaigns for
federal office. The Act, however, exempts political parties from those
limits and instead contains a special provision that allows parties
to make larger contributions to their candidates.3" When the FEC
sued the Colorado Republican Party for exceeding even these more
generous limits, the party challenged the constitutionality of the
limits under the First Amendment. The party argued that what the
FEC treated as party "contributions" to candidates were really
"independent expenditures" that the party was making on its
own. In Buckley v. Valeo3 64 the Court had upheld various FECA
restrictions on contributions on the theory that those restrictions
served a compelling government interest in preventing actual or
apparent corruption, but had struck down expenditure limits as
violating the First Amendment." 5 Thus, if the Court viewed the
Colorado Republican Party's challenged campaign activities as
expenditures rather than contributions, the First Amendment would
force the FEC to drop its complaint.

360. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of a blanket
primary for minor parties).
361. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
362. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000).
363. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(dX3) (2000) (limiting party expenditures to the greater of $20,000
or two cents for every state voter, indexed for inflation from 1974).
364. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
365. See id. at 19-59. For a discussion of the public rights theory's broader implications for
the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures, see infra Part IV.B.
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In a splintered decision, the ColoradoI Court accepted much of
the party's reasoning and struck down the FECA limits as applied
to the party's expenditures.' Justice Breyer, writing for a threeJustice plurality," 7 first distinguished between two types of party
expenditures. "Coordinated" expenditures were made in cooperation
with the candidates, and thus closely resembled contributions.
In contrast, a party's expenditures made without consulting the
candidate were "independent" expenditures, a category as to which
Buckley had barred regulation.' Reviewing the record evidence
of the Colorado Republican Party's expenditures, Justice Breyer
concluded they had been independent.369 As such, the First
Amendment shielded the expenditures from regulation, just as it
would protect the independent expenditures "of individuals,
candidates, or other political committees."370 Justice Breyer rejected
the government's argument that parties were so closely and
inherently tied to candidates that their "independent" expenditures
presented a special, inexorable risk of corruption that justified
regulation.37 ' "If anything," he wrote, "an independent expenditure
... controlled and directed by a party rather than [a] donor ... would

seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger)
independent expenditure made directly by that donor."372 He
similarly rejected the related argument that the Court should deem
all party expenditures to be "coordinated" as a matter of law.373 At
the same time, he rejected the party's converse argument that all

366. Colorado1, 518 U.S. at 608.
367. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion that expressed agreement with much of
Justice Breyer's reasoning but found his analysis "beside the point" because, in Justice
Kennedy's view, the First Amendment precluded the government from restricting even
"coordinated" party expenditures. See id. at 626-27 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas also wrote separately to express a similar view. See
id. at 631 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined both separate opinions, making a seven-Justice majority
for the holding Justice Breyer announced.
368. See id. at 613.
369. See id. at 613-14.
370. Id. at 616.
371. Id. at 617.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 619-23.
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party expenditures should be deemed independent and thus protected from regulation. 7 4
The Colorado Republican litigation focused completely on the
interests of the major political parties. A major party-the
Democrats-filed the FEC challenge that triggered the case, 75 but
that was a challenge of convenience: both major parties subsequently have availed themselves of the increased space Colorado
I gave them to influence the electoral process. 3 76 Even more directly
than the issue of the parties' control over their nominating
procedures in Jones, the question of their autonomy to spend freely
in campaigns implicated the core values of the responsible party
government theory. Sustaining the federal government's broad
limits on party expenditures would have confounded the major
parties' efforts both to pull voters into preelectoral coalitions and to
establish the party "brand names" for purposes of the voting cue. In
addition, as Justice Breyer's opinion suggested, the limits may have
increased factionalism by making candidates relatively less
beholden to their parties and relatively more beholden to interested
individuals and groups.37 7 Thus, we would expect the opinion in
ColoradoI to reflect a private rights First Amendment analysis.
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion bears out that expectation.
First, adhering to the public-private distinction, the Colorado I
plurality treated political parties just like individuals who want to
express their private views in the political process, declaring that
"[t]he independent expression of a political party's views is 'core'
First Amendment activity."3 78 The Court expressly rejected the
government's efforts to distinguish the major parties as uniquely
proximate to candidates and lawmakers.3 79 Second, the plurality
374. See id. at 623-25. When the case returned to the Supreme Court in 2000, a majority
held that the First Amendment did not bar the government from regulating demonstrably
coordinated party expenditures as contributions. See Colorado I, 533 U.S. 431, 464-65 (2001).
375. See Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 612.
376. See Briffault, supra note 3, at 628 (noting that, in the months immediately following
the Colorado I decision, both the Republican and Democratic parties developed large
independent expenditure programs).
377. See ColoradoI, 518 U.S. at 617 (basing the suggestion that party expenditures might
reduce corruption on the premise that candidates, in the absence of party financial support,
would depend on other donors).
378. Id. at 616.
379. See id. ("We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with
political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a different direction.").
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gave almost all of its attention to the parties' interest in speaking
and very little to any special positive or negative effects their
expression might have on the quantity and quality of political
information available to voters.3 8 Justice Breyer hewed uncritically
to the Buckley Court's categorical rejection of the interests in
expanding the range of electoral debate, equalizing the influence of
poorer voters on the political process, and restoring voters' faith in
3 81
the political system as grounds for regulating money in politics.
All of those interests, which could have been asserted to defend the
party spending limits at issue in ColoradoI, embody core values of
the public rights First Amendment-informing the public, engaging
marginalized members of the political community in collective selfdetermination, and ensuring the widest possible range of speakers
and ideas in public discourse. None of those interests, however,
carries any weight under the private rights conception of expressive
freedom, which aims only to prevent government interference
with private speakers. The Court in Colorado I, as it has in other
campaign finance cases,3 82 saw no occasion to revisit this pivotal
aspect of Buckley, instead restricting its analysis of viable grounds
for regulation to the government's interest in preventing actual or
apparent corruption. 3
The majority Justices' opinions in Colorado I superficially employ public rights rhetoric to buttress their defenses of party
organizations' prerogatives. Justice Breyer emphasized that a
party's expression "not only reflects its members' views about the
philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together
[but] also seeks to convince others to join those members in a
practical democratic task, the task of creating a government."3 4
Even more pointedly, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
380. See id. at 618 ("We do not see how a Constitution that grants to individuals,
candidates, and ordinary political committees the right to make unlimited independent
expenditures could deny the same right to political parties.").
381. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 56-57 (1976).
382. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (reaffirming the basic
reasoning of Buckley).
383. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616-19 (considering and rejecting the anti-corruption
interest as a justification for the challenged limits on "independent" party spending); cf id.
at 609 (noting without comment the government interest, asserted in Buckley, in "levelling]
the electoral playing field by reducing campaign costs").
384. Id. at 615-16.
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celebrated political parties for advancing the "'profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'" embodied in the First
Amendment.15 Parties serve this principle, according to Justice
Kennedy, "in part, by 'identify[ing] the people who constitute the
association, and... limit [ing] the association to those people only.'"3 6
On close examination, however, even these statements reflect the
tenets of the private rights theory. Justice Breyer's telltale "not
only" formulation makes clear that the "practical" business of
creating a stable political order matters more than formulating and
considering "views about philosophical and governmental matters"
in the abstract. Justice Kennedy's paean to parties boils down to a
call for limiting democratic discourse in order to broaden it.
A true public rights analysis in Colorado I would have led the
Court to uphold the challenged regulations. First, the Court would
have looked past the public-private distinction and recognized that
the major political parties are not ordinary private speakers.
Rather, they and their leaders seek and hold governmental power,
and their means of obtaining power is to support candidates." 7 On
this premise, treating a major party's campaign expenditures as
distinct from its candidate's campaign is an implausible formalism.
Next, rather than treating the regulations in ColoradoI as a mere
governmental invasion of formal private autonomy, the Court would
have examined the substantive effects of unchecked party spending
on the quality and quantity of political information available to the
public. 3" In addition, the public rights theory's special concern for
385. Id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
386. Id. at 629 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122

(1981)).
387. "The major political parties [are] quite different from other politically active groups.
Party committee spending aims almost exclusively at promoting the election of party
candidates to office and thereby securing or maintaining party political power." Briffault,
supra note 3, at 640. For a general discussion of the major parties' governmental power and
its implications for constitutional analysis under the public rights theory, see infra Part IV.A.
388. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Colorado I, suggested this countervailing First
Amendment interest. See Colorado1, 518 U.S. at 649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is quite
will be
wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures ...

adverse to the interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment."); see also
Smith, Transformative Politics, supra note 318, at 864-65 (noting that present campaign
finance law deters participation by "working class and poor candidates who might champion
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disempowered speakers would have led the Court to consider the
political engagement of minority groups 89 and the electoral
competitiveness of minor political parties,3" both of which can
dissolve in the flood of unregulated campaign spending. Given the
limited expressive value of much major party spendings9' and
contributors' use of liberal party spending rules to perpetuate
political exclusion and inequality,392 these inquiries would have led
the Court to allow extensive regulation of party campaign
expenditures.
Such a public rights analysis in ColoradoI would have delighted
adherents of the dynamic party politics theory. The high success
rate of incumbents in national elections39 3 indicates that party
spending achieves its greatest success in entrenching incumbents
rather than promoting challengers. In addition, unregulated party
expenditures make elections less competitive by precluding minor
party competition, thereby diminishing major party officeholders'
incentives to be responsive to their constituents. Thus, greater
judicial tolerance for regulation of party expenditures would directly
advance the anti-entrenchment aspiration of the dynamic party
politics theory. Unchecked party expenditures, a luxury only the
major parties can afford, allow the major parties to drown out other
voices, notably those of minor parties, thereby constricting outlets
interests that well-heeled candidates do not").
389. One critical disempowering effect of unchecked major party spending in particular and
campaign finance law in general is racial. "[A] campaign finance system that treats money as
protected speech simply privileges those with such a resource over those who lack it. That this
divide falls along the color line is indisputable." Smith, Transformative Politics,supra note
318, at 858.
390. See id. at 865 ("The [campaign financel system ... discriminates against third parties,
which cannot meaningfully compete in financial terms with the incumbent parties, thus again
depriving the electorate of alternative political viewpoints.").
391. See Briffault, supra note 3, at 641 ("Party issue ad spending is, in practice, not a
means for politically active, independent citizens to increase the discussion of issues in public
life, but rather an integral part of candidate-election strategies.").
392. See id. at 647 (discussing corrupting effects of "the ability of private donors to use the
parties as a means of evading the limits on donors' contributions to candidates").
393. See, e.g., Common Cause Reporter's Guide to Money in Politics Campaign 2000:
IncumbentAdvantage(2000), at http'/www.commoncause.org/pressroonicongress-advantage.
html (noting that 98 percent of House incumbents and nearly 90 percent of Senate
incumbents prevailed in the 1998 election). No less than 88 percent of House incumbents and
75 percent of Senate incumbents have won in any campaign over the past two decades.
Richard Semiatin, The Context of the 1998 Midterm Elections(1998), at httpJ/www.mhke.con
soscience/polisci/patterson/olc/stu/context22.htm.
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for political participation and narrowing electoral debate. Moreover,
to the extent the capacity for unchecked spending drives parties'
obsession with fundraising, it can contribute to the disproportionate
influence of the wealthy few, which foments a popular cynicism
poisonous to the dynamic party politics vision of a robust deliberative democracy.
Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder argue that allowing
regulations of major party electoral spending might undermine the
participation value associated with the dynamic party politics
theory.39 4 Writing about another aspect of major party electoral
spending, soft money,395 they maintain that a decrease in party
spending would depress voter turnout by diminishing the resources
state parties use to get out the vote. 396 They estimate that eliminating "soft money" would decrease voter turnout by about two
percentage points.3 97 Ansolabehere and Snyder's argument suffers
from one of the same logical flaws present in the argument that a
blanket primary system diminishes political information because it
complicates major party campaigning: 398 they rely on an unwarranted assumption that major party autonomy substantially
helps matters. First, Ansolabehere and Snyder appear to assume
that if funding cuts curtailed parties' grassroots efforts, the voters
those efforts target simply would not vote. Presumably, however,
some of those voters would get to the polls on their own;
organizations such as unions and religious groups, which already
have developed substantial capacities to get voters to the polls,
would deliver others; and minor parties, empowered by more
394. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong
Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598, 613-17 (2000).
395. For an explanation of "soft money," see supra note 3.
396. Professors Ansolabehere and Snyder first consider, and dismiss, the argument that
party spending is essential to electoral competition because challengers benefit more from
party largesse than from other sources of funds. See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 394,
at 609-11. In doing so, they properly emphasize that the boost party money provides
challengers is too small to increase their slim prospects for election appreciably. See id. at 611.
Other problems with the argument include its presumption that two-party competition is the
best our system can do and its ignorance of the countervailing harmful effects of party money.
397. See id. at 616-17; see also Persily, supra note 78, at 797-98 (emphasizing "the
fundamental, indeed irreplaceable, role that strong party organizations have played as the
primary institutions fostering participation in American democracy").
398. See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text (refuting the argument that blanket
primaries cause informational losses).
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favorable financial rules, would deliver still more. Second, critiques
of the major party duopoly provide strong reason to doubt whether
the self-interested whims of the major parties meaningfully enhance
democratic participation.3 99
B. The Court Rejects Minor Parties'FirstAmendment Challenges.
to Electoral Regulations
1. Denying FreeAssociation in Candidate Selection Procedures:
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,4 the Court's
attention turned from the First Amendment concerns of the major
political parties to those of minor parties. An upstart left-wing
party, the New Party, challenged Minnesota's statutory ban on
"fusion" candidacies. A fusion candidacy occurs when two parties
nominate the same person as their candidate in a general
election.4 ° 1 Fusion, a political legacy of the Progressive Era, has at
various times served as an important vehicle for new, small parties
to advance their agendas and develop their identities. 2 In some
jurisdictions, most notably New York State, fusion remains an
important feature of the electoral system.4°3 Most states, in contrast,
ban fusion, through statutes enacted almost entirely by lawmakers
of the two major parties.40 4 The New Party's challenge contended
that the First Amendment's principle of free association-the
same principle the Court would invoke in striking down California's
blanket primary4 05-compelled
the state to accept fusion
399. See, e.g., Ortiz, Duopoly, supra note 227, at 760-61 (explaining that the major parties
focus only on delivering the voters they believe they need in order to win).
400. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
401. Id. at 353 n.1.
402. See Peter H. Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot":FusionPoliticsandAntifusion Laws,
85 AM. HIsT. REV. 287, 288-89 (1980) (discussing the importance of fusion candidacies to
minor parties during the Progressive Era).
403. See Pope, supra note 270, at 493-99 (assessing the history and persistence of fusion
candidacies in New York).
404. See Argersinger, supra note 402, at 290-92 (describing the origins of fusion bans as
dominant major parties' attempts to prevent their rivals from allying with minor parties);
Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 685 (describing fusion bans as efforts by the
major parties to exclude minor party competition).
405. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
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candidacies. Without fusion, the party maintained, it could not
select the candidate
of its choice and increase public support for its
positions.' °
The Supreme Court rejected the New Party's First Amendment
argument and upheld Minnesota's fusion ban. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first assessed the gravity of the
party's First Amendment interest. He acknowledged "[tihe New
Party's ... right to select its own candidate" but noted that a party's
candidate of choice might be unavailable for any number of
reasons. 7 Thus, the fusion ban was not a "regulation of political
parties' internal affairs and core associational activities" but only an
ordinary electoral regulation. 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
the ban left "up to the party" the choice whether "to endorse a
candidate who, because of the fusion ban, will not appear on the
ballot as the party's candidate." 9 He suggested that the fusion ban
was not the proximate cause of any uphill struggle faced by the New
Party:
Many features of our political system-e.g., single-member
districts, "first past the post" elections, and the high costs of
campaigning-make it difficult for third parties to succeed in
American politics. But the Constitution does not require States
to permit fusion any more than it requires them to move to
proportional-representation elections or public financing of
campaigns.4 10
Accordingly, the Court would uphold the ban upon a showing of any
state regulatory interest "'sufficiently weighty to justify the
limitation' imposed on the party's rights."41 Moreover, the Court

(2000)).
406. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
407. Id. at 359 ("A particular candidate might be ineligible for office, unwilling to serve, or,
as here, another party's candidate. That a particular individual may not appear on the ballot
as a particular party's candidate does not severely burden that party's associational rights.")
(footnote omitted).
408. Id. at 360.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 362.
411. Id. at 364 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
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would not require "elaborate, empirical verification of the
weightiness of the State's asserted justifications."412
Minnesota asserted four interests in support of the ban: avoiding
voter confusion, promoting competition by reserving ballot space
for opposing candidates, preventing "electoral distortions and
ballot manipulations," and "discouraging party splintering" and
factionalism.413 The Court accepted all four interests. First, the
Court sympathetically noted that "a candidate or party could
easily exploit fusion as a way of associating his or its name with
popular slogans and catchphrases." 14 Such a gambit, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded, "would undermine the ballot's purpose by
transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a billboard
for political advertising." 15 Expressing a related concern, the Court
vindicated Minnesota's interest in not letting minor parties
"bootstrap their way to major-party status in the next election and
circumvent the State's nominating-petition requirement for minor
parties."416 Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized states'
"strong interest in the stability of their political systems."4 7 He
elaborated:
This interest does not permit a State to completely insulate the
two-party system from minor parties' or independent candidates'
competition and influence .... That said, the States' interest

permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may,
in practice, favor the traditional two-party system, and that
temper the destabilizing effects of party splintering and
excessive factionalism. The Constitutionpermits the Minnesota
Legislatureto decide thatpolitical
stabilityis best served through
418
a healthy two-party system.

412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 365.

415.
416.
417.
418.

Id.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
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Because Minnesota justified its 'fusion ban by reference to multiple
"sufficiently weighty" interests, the ban easily survived the minimal
4 19
scrutiny to which the Court subjected it.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist declared, Minnesota's fusion ban
formally "applies to major and minor parties alike."4 20 Timmons,
however, was "another skirmish in an ongoing battle between minor
and major parties,"42 ' and in no other case has the Court so strongly
and openly endorsed the responsible party government theory or
validated its overriding concern with political stability.4 22 Noted one
commentator: "[Tihe bald purposes and effects of the [fusion] ban
are to support major parties, hurt third parties, and force
compromise-moving nominees and party voters to the two major
parties, reducing the leverage of third parties, and presumably
supporting the middle."423 The interests Minnesota asserted, and
the Court embraced, in support of the fusion ban-avoiding voter
confusion, preventing minor parties from complicating the
electoral process by "manipulating" the ballot, and avoiding "party
splintering"-simply use different language to describe, respectively, the three benefits the responsible party government theory
claims for the major party duopoly: the voting cue, fostering

419. Another interest that might be asserted for maintaining a two-party system, related
to but distinct from concerns about factionalism, is the desire to prevent minor party "spoiler"
candidacies that can lead to the election of candidates opposed by a majority of the electorate.
See Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 780-81 & n.22 (discussing the risk that a field of more
than two candidates in a plurality voting system can lead to uncertain electoral mandates).
Validating that interest, however, would justify states' banning minor party candidacies
altogether, a step not even the Timmons Court was willing to take and a violation of even the
most formalist conception of expressive freedom. Moreover, the argument invites the question
of how seriously we should take the "mandate" of the victor in a two-candidate election, given
the assumption that he attained majority support only because many voters considered him
the lesser of two evils.
420. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 360.
421. Amy, supra note 251, at 146.
422. See id. at 150 (noting the novelty of the Timmons Court's advocacy of the two-party
system and contending that "Rehnquist was clearly going out of his way to make this
argument"); Hasen, Entrenching,supra note 99, at 333 ("Until Timmons, the Court had never
squarely addressed whether it was permissible for a state to favor the two-party system in
crafting its election laws.").
423. Fitts, Back to the Future,supra note 82, at 102-03.
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duopolistic coalition building, 24 and discouraging factionalism in
politics and government.
As the Timmons Court's outright endorsement of the responsible
party government theory would lead us to expect, the decision
faithfully adheres to the private rights theory of expressive freedom.
The Court once again built its analysis on a rigid public-private
distinction. Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized Minnesota as
advancing neutral, public-minded regulatory interests, never
acknowledging that virtually all of the political decisionmakers
responsible for enacting and maintaining the fusion ban belonged
to the two major parties. Conversely, he treated the New Party
as nothing more than a self-interested speaker in the political
marketplace, never considering the possibility that the party might
be litigating values of broader interest to society. Chief Justice
Rehnquist proceeded to manipulate the private rights balancing
methodology--of which his circular "sufficiently weighty" balancing
test stands as a Kafkaesque parody-to subordinate a "fringe"
speaker's expressive interests to a weighty collection of state
interests centered on the value of "stability."" 5 The Court ignored
the power relationships at stake in the case, favoring the powerful
major parties over politically vulnerable minor parties. 26 The Court
also showed no patience for the idea that the New Party's electoral
activity had independent expressive value,427 instead vindicating
Minnesota's interest in preventing minor parties from using the
ballot to express ideas.
A public rights First Amendment analysis in Timmons would
4 28
have led the Court to strike down Minnesota's fusion ban.

424. Justice Stevens noted the irony that "the activity banned by Minnesota's law is the
formation ofcoalitions" between major and minor parties. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
425. See Pildes, Democracy, supra note 226, at 708 (discussing the Timmons majority's

emphatic concern with political stability).
426. See Smith, Black Party,supra note 99, at 20 (suggesting that Timmons reflected the
Court's favoritism toward entrenched interests). The Timmons Court's disregard for power

relationships is especially stark given the plaintiff New Party's disproportionate appeal to
people of color. See id. at 21-22 (reporting that approximately forty percent of the New Party's
national membership, executive committee, and candidates were people of color).
427. See Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 835 (emphasizing the Timmons Court's rejection of

the expressive value of fusion candidacies, and calling fusion "the chief means of minor party
expression and influence").
428. The best public rights argument in support of the result in Timmons is that upholding
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Although the New Party had a substantial associational interest of
its own, the more important consideration on the party's side of the
case would have been the public's interest in an open, competitive
electoral process.429 The Court would not have dismissed, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist blithely did, the communicative value of a ballot
4 30
line, because the public rights theory extols political expression.
A public rights analysis would have emphasized that facilitating
minor parties' survival and growth through fusion candidacies
expands political debate and enhances opportunities for disenfranchised voters to participate in the process. Minor parties'
relative weakness and vulnerability in the political process would
have lent urgency to the Court's contemplation of their value to the
process.""' On the other side of the case, Minnesota's political
domination by the major parties would have compelled a more
critical analysis of its "political stability" rationale for the fusion
ban. 32 The state's "voter confusion" and "ballot manipulation"
Minnesota's fusion ban vindicated the voters' interest in a coherent electoral process against
the self-interested autonomy claim of the New Party. This argument fails, however: it
assumes, contrary to the public rights theory, that voters cannot process information; and its
indictment of the New Party's motive for challenging the ban obscures any consideration of
the ban's actual effects on the electoral system.
429. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 374 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe burden of a statute of
this kind is imposed upon the members of a minor party, but its potential impact is much
broader.").
430.
Our conclusion that the ballot is not principally a forum for the individual
expression of political sentiment through the casting of a vote does not justify
the conclusion that the ballot serves no expressive purpose for the parties who
place candidates on the ballot. Indeed, the long-recognized right to choose a
"standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences" is
inescapably an expressive right.
Id. at 373 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)).
431. Justice Stevens took this factor into account in responding to the Court's statement
that the fusion ban still allowed a minor party to endorse another party's candidates if the
minor party gave up its ballot line. "Given the limited resources available to most minor
parties, and the less-than-universal interest in the messages of third parties ...
the Party's
message will, in this manner, reach a much smaller audience than that composed of all voters
who can read the ballot in the polling booth." Timmons, 520 U.S. at 373 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
432. Justice Stevens, again, emphasized the partisan character of laws that ban fusion
candidacies. "In most States, perhaps in all, there are two and only two major political parties.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most States have enacted election laws that impose
burdens on the development and growth of third parties." Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also criticized the Court for elevating the competitive advantage of the major
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rationales would have been anathema to a theory of expressive
freedom focused on fostering the broadest possible debate: under the
public rights theory, a candidate's running for office under the
banner of the "God, Mom, and Antiterrorism Party," or courting
attention by attaching its label to a popular incumbent, would
simply contribute information to the electoral debate. 3 The public
rights theory might recognize an extreme point at which such
manipulations interfered with the free flow of useful information,'3 '
but the theory places a great deal of trust in voters' intelligence.
The result of a public rights analysis in Timmons would have
strongly advanced the goals of the dynamic party politics theory.
That theory places great importance on minor parties' capacity to
involve disaffected voters, particularly those with minority political
preferences, in the electoral process." 5 Thus, the most direct benefit
of a contrary result in Timmons, from a dynamic party politics
standpoint, would have resulted from the continued availability to
minor parties of an electoral strategy that many parties have found
useful in broadening their appeal and making their messages heard.
In addition, strengthening minor parties' electoral options by
striking down the fusion ban would have enhanced their ability to
challenge entrenchment of major party officeholders, thereby
serving the dynamic party politics goal of enhancing elected officials'
responsiveness. More competitive minor parties, with a greater
range of strategic options, greatly expand the breadth and depth
of electoral debate, whether or not they manage to compete
successfully with the major parties.3 "
parties to the level of a legitimate state interest. "[L]egislation that would otherwise be
unconstitutional because it burdens First Amendment interests and discriminates against
minor political parties cannot survive simply because it benefits the two major parties." Id.
at 382 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
433. "ITIhe argument that the [fusion ban's] burden on First Amendment interests is
justified by this [voter confusioni concern is meritless and severely underestimates the
intelligence of the typical voter." Id. at 375-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
434. The public rights theory would allow the state to bar a party from listing a candidate's
name on its ballot line when the candidate had refused the party's nomination. For similar
reasons, a state would be justified in restricting practices intended and likely to confuse
reasonably intelligent voters, such as a minor party's calling itself the "Democratik" party or
the placement of a single candidate's name on fifty distinct ballot lines. See supra notes 13443 and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn's "town meeting" paradigm).
435. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
436. James Pope questions the value of fusion candidacies for minor parties' actual chances
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2. Denying Free Speech Rights of Access to the Means of
Electoral Debate: Arkansas Area Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes
The Court again considered a minor party candidate's First
Amendment challenge to a state electoral regulation in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes.43 7 Independent
candidate Ralph Forbes, who had qualified for the ballot in the
general election for an Arkansas U.S. House seat, sought inclusion
in a candidate debate organized and broadcast by a state-run
television station. The station management had decided to limit the
debate "'to the major party candidates or any other candidate who
had strong popular support." 8 The station rejected Forbes' request
to participate in the debate, claiming in subsequent testimony that
neither the electorate nor the press had considered him a serious
candidate and that he had little in the way of financial support or
a campaign organization." 9 Forbes challenged the station's decision,
claiming, among other things, that the First Amendment required
the station to include him in the debate and that his exclusion had
improperly turned on his political views. " °
The Supreme Court, reversing a decision of the Fifth Circuit,
rejected Forbes' contentions and absolved the station of any First
Amendment violation. Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-Justice
majority, first emphasized that the station was a broadcaster, whose
journalistic responsibilities required it to make editorial judgments
about the content of its programming. "When a public broadcaster
at electoral success, arguing that, while fusion enhances minor parties' role as advocates of
new political messages, it diminishes their role as electoral competitors. See Pope, supra note
270, at 491-501. If Pope were correct, fusion would be a mixed blessing for the dynamic party

politics theory. But even if the numerous minor parties that have employed fusion candidacies
and/or challenged fusion bans considered raising new issues their central goal, the idea that

they would employ a strategy that sabotaged their competitive prospects seems unlikely.
Fusion appears to serve minor parties as an incremental step toward the eventual ability to
compete seriously in elections. In any event, given minor parties' consistent electoral failures
under the predominant national regime of fusion bans, they would have little competitive
ground to lose in regaining the fusion option.

437. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
438. Id. at 670 (quoting record).
439. See id. at 682.
440. See id. at 671-72.
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exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its
programming," he wrote, "it engages in speech activity."' Having
thus characterized the station as a private speaker, the Court
nonetheless recognized a very limited First Amendment constraint
on the station's conduct of a candidate debate. Because "the debate
was by design a forum for political speech by the candidates" and "in
our tradition, candidate debates are of exceptional significance in
the electoral process,"" 2 the debate was appropriately analyzed
under the public forum doctrine.4 s Having invoked that doctrine,
however, Justice Kennedy adjudged the debate a nonpublic forum,
rather than a designated public forum, because the station had
provided only "selective," rather than "general," access to the
debate. 4 The government's only obligation in a nonpublic forum is
to avoid viewpoint-based discrimination, and Justice Kennedy found
nothing in the record to support Forbes' claim that his views caused
the station to exclude him from the debate. 4' Accordingly, Forbes'
First Amendment claim failed.
Forbes, like Timmons, was a major setback for minor party
candidates' efforts to make inroads into the electoral process. Under
the responsible party government theory, minor parties' participation in a key informational forum like a televised debate
undesirably complicates the electoral process. Accordingly, Forbes
advanced the values of that theory in ways that should by now be
familiar. Keeping minor party candidates out of public view
maintains the utility of the major parties' voting cue. Keeping minor
parties noncompetitive prevents them from diverting voters out of
the two major parties' broad preelectoral coalitions. Keeping minor
441. Id. at 674.
442. Id. at 675.
443. See id. at 675-76.
444. Id. at 679. Justice Kennedy believed the situation in Forbes closely paralleled
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & EducationalFund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). In that

case, the Court upheld the federal government's exclusion of political groups from the list of
beneficiaries of the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a fundraising effort directed at
federal employees. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 804. Justice Kennedy viewed that exclusion as
equivalent to the station's limitation of the debate in Forbes to candidates for the House seat

in question. "At that point, just as the Government in Cornelius made agency-by-agency
determinations as to which of the eligible agencies would participate in the CFC, [the station]

made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which of the eligible candidates would
participate in the debate." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680.
445. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682-83.
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parties out of government promotes stability by limiting factions.
Because Forbes achieved these ends, we would expect the Court's
decision to follow the private rights theory of expressive freedom.
Parsing the First Amendment analysis in Forbes is more
complicated than in the other decisions I have discussed. The
Court's reasoning, even more than in Colorado I, seems on the
surface to reflect elements of the public rights approach. A public
broadcasting station, as a government instrumentality that behaves
almost exactly like a private broadcaster, confounds the publicprivate distinction. The ForbesCourt seemed to see both sides of the
story: it emphasized the Arkansas station's editorial prerogatives,
but it ultimately subjected the station to First Amendment scrutiny.
In addition, the Forbes Court acknowledged the First Amendment
significance of receiving information, especially in the context of
elections. Justice Kennedy could have been channeling Professor
Meiklejohn when he declared that "[dieliberation on the positions
and qualifications of candidates is integral to our system of
government, and electoral speech may have its most profound and
widespread impact when it is disseminated through televised
debates."" His concern that mandating inclusion of minor party
candidates "would result in less speech, not more"" 7 appears to
provide a powerful public rights justification for the Court's
decision.
The private rights theory, however, drives the Forbes Court's
underlying reasoning. Despite the Court's awareness of public
broadcasters' ambiguous governmental character, the public-private
distinction pulled Justice Kennedy inexorably toward a choice. In
his ultimate analysis, public broadcasters are private speakers, save
for the tiny proviso that they may not discriminate based on
viewpoint in the specialized context of candidate debates."' The
more apparent "private speaker" in the case-Forbes-was thus
perversely cast as the vessel of the speech-threatening regulatory
interest. To the extent the Court recognized Forbes as a speaker at
446. Id. at 676.
447. Id. at 680.
448. Justice Stevens' Forbes dissent, which nowhere denied the "private" side of public
broadcasters' identity, chided the majority for losing sight of the "public" side of public
broadcasters, specifically "the risk of government censorship and propaganda." Id. at 689

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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all, it refused, as in Timmons, to acknowledge any public value to
vindicating his expressive interest. Justice Kennedy's concern that
public broadcasters would forego debates rather than include minor
party candidates cast such candidates as "dangerous" speakers
whose interests must fall before weightier regulatory priorities. He
rejected the possibility that the First Amendment might compel
public broadcasters to run debates, apparently out of a concern
about judicial overreaching." 9 The Court thus elevated the interest
of the station as private speaker over the public's interest in
receiving political information.
A true public rights analysis in Forbes, as in Timmons, would
have considered the value of minor party candidates for expanding
electoral debate and encouraging disaffected voters to participate in
the process. The Court would have emphasized the substantive
importance of mass media exposure in allowing minor parties to
serve those functions. The fact that Forbes had little money and no
campaign organization-which the broadcaster offered as a post-hoc
rationalization for excluding him from the debate-would have
strengthened rather than weakened his case, given the public rights
theory's cognizance of power differentials among speakers. The
station's other post-hoc justification for excluding Forbes-his lack
of public support-seems to recall Professor Meiklejohn's "town
meeting" justification for restricting speech. If Forbes' lack of
support reflected a considered public judgment that he had nothing
useful to contribute, then the station's decision might have served
the public interest. Justice Kennedy, however, failed to answer the
concern that control over debates effectively confers "the power to
eliminate a political candidate from all consideration by the
voters."4" Allowing the station to exclude Forbes based on its bare
assertion of his unpopularity turned that assertion into a selffulfilling prophecy."" A public rights analysis would have compelled
some constraint on public broadcasters' discretion to limit debates
to candidates of the two major parties.
449. Cf id. at 674 (expressing concern that extending the reach of the public forum doctrine
into public broadcasting would lead to undue judicial oversight of broadcasters' editorial
decisions).
450. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
451. See id. at 684 (criticizing the majority for ignoring "the standardless character of the
decision to exclude Forbes from the debate").
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The possibility of minor party participation in televised debates
would elate dynamic party politics theorists. Expanded televised
debates would broaden electoral debate, encourage political participation by exposing people to more varied political ideas, and erode
governmental entrenchment by increasing minor party challengers'
competitive prospects.'5 2 A mechanistic First Amendment mandate
that broadcasters open debates to all declared candidates might
produce chaos and voter confusion, but any number of intermediate
outcomes in Forbes would have diversified debates without
rendering them unmanageable. Perhaps, as Justice Stevens urged
in dissent, the Court simply could have required public broadcasters to apply "preestablished, objective criteria" in considering
candidates' requests to debate."53 Alternatively, the Court might
have developed rough objective criteria for inclusion, based on
factors such as a modicum of public support or a party's having
qualified for the ballot in a certain number of elections. If such
criteria produced an unmanageable number of candidates, stations
might employ a lottery to winnow the roster. Any of these
approaches would have offered hope of giving some minor party
candidates a forum to submit their ideas for public consideration.
This Part has critically examined how the private rights theory
of expressive freedom has led the Supreme Court to analyze cases
that present First Amendment challenges to electoral regulations
of political parties. In every such recent case, the Court has reached
a decision that validates the pro-duopoly assumptions of the
responsible party government theory. Just as consistently, the
Court's rejection of the private rights theory in favor of the public
rights theory would have led it to opposite results, consistent with
the dynamic party politics theory. Examining the cases makes
undeniable what the theoretical premises indicate: If we believe
that the dynamic party politics theory, with its aspirations for an
engaged electorate, competitive elections, and robust electoral
debate, resonates more deeply than the responsible party government theory with our vision of a vibrant democratic culture, then we
452. On the other hand, mass media exposure may not always benefit political dissidents.
See Balkin, supra note 48, at 411 n.80 (criticizing market-driven mass media for "generally
offer[ing] radical ideas on the left and right only as the intellectual equivalent of a freak show,
thereby strengthening our faith in mainstream thought").
453. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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should strongly desire a change in the Supreme Court's understanding of the First Amendment. When considering regulations of
political parties' electoral activities, the Court should embrace the
public rights theory of expressive freedom.
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS THEORY FOR
REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The preceding critique of the Supreme Court's recent First
Amendment decisions about regulations of political parties' electoral
activities leaves no doubt that moving from a private rights to a
public rights theory of the First Amendment would work major
changes in the law. A Court committed to the public rights theory
would largely desert the political theory of responsible party
government, with its emphasis on maintaining political stability
through a strong two-party system. Instead, the Court would resolve
disputes about party regulations in ways that advance the dynamic
party politics theory, which encourages an informed, engaged
electorate, spurred on by a larger number of competitive political
parties, to sustain a robust political debate. This final Part briefly
examines broader implications of the public rights theory, suggested
by but extending beyond the Court's recent decisions, for the ways
the Constitution governs regulation of political parties.
A. State Action DistinctionBetween Major and Minor Political
Parties
A threshold question in any constitutional suit not directed at an
avowed governmental entity is whether the defendant, at least for
purposes of the suit, is a state actor or a private entity. The
Supreme Court generally uses a nexus test to ascertain the presence
of state action, asking "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority."4" An important aspect of the state action
analysis is that it determines the propriety of constitutional
plaintiffs as well as defendants."" Just as only state actors are
454. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
455. See Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry, supra note 89, at 1748 n.31 (discussing the dual
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bound to honor constitutional guarantees, only private actors are
entitled to those guarantees. The duality has significant implications for disputes over regulations of political parties' electoral
activities, because the state action issue dictates both when parties
may claim First Amendment protection and when they may be held
to violate the expressive freedom of voters.
The determination whether or not political parties are state
actors has proven analytically difficult. In some circumstancesmost obviously matters of purely internal party governance-no one
seriously disputes that parties are private entities entitled to raise
First Amendment claims that trigger strict scrutiny.4 56 In certain
other contexts, however, the Court has deviated from the norm and
identified partisan practices with government. The classic example
is Terry v. Adams,457 in which the Court actually ascribed state
action to a political party that unilaterally controlled the state
government.4 5 8 The most familiar current instance is the line of
cases involving partisan patronage hiring or contracting practices,
where the defendants typically include governmental entities .459 The
state action analysis becomes uncertain when parties' electoral
activities are at issue. Commentators have proposed two solutions
to this uncertainty, neither one satisfactory for the public rights
theory of expressive freedom. First, scholars who take a functional
rather than a rights-based approach to party regulations argue that
courts need not consider state action analysis in cases that involve
nature of the state action inquiry as applied to political parties).
456. See Hasen, Parties,supra note 238, at 826-27 (recognizing that "party organizations
should have First Amendment rights of speech and association when they are conducting
their own internal affairs"); Wigton, supra note 311, at 421-32 (arguing that courts should
treat matters of internal party governance as primarily private activities).
457. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
458. See id. at 469-70 (finding state action because the primary election of Texas' Jaybird
Democrats had "become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective
process"). Terry was the culmination of a series of decisions collectively known as the White
Primary Cases. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). For an interesting recent descendent of those
decisions, see Morse v. Republican PartyofVa., 517 U.S. 186,214-16 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(subjecting a state political party's imposition of a fee for participation in its nominating
convention to the preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
459. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (holding that
requiring partisan allegiance as a condition of government employment violates the First
Amendment); see also Wigton, supra note 311, at 443-50 (arguing that courts should generally
treat acts of the "party in government" as state actions).
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political parties.6 0 Because I remain committed to a rights-based
doctrinal analysis, I reject that solution.46 ' Second, some scholars
have argued that some or all of the parties' electoral activities,
particularly those related to primary elections and other aspects of
the candidate selection process, are intraparty affairs and thus
quintessentially private.4 2 That position is untenable under the
public rights theory, which focuses on electoral politics as a key
object of First Amendment protection precisely because elections
are quintessentially public." 3
Adoption of the public rights theory would require the Court to
characterize major and minor parties differently in evaluating
regulations of partisan electoral activities. The Court tends to treat
all political parties alike, regardless of differences in size and power;
if anything, the Court shows lesser regard for minor parties' First
Amendment claims. 4" Such treatment makes sense under the
460. See Cain, supranote 78, at 807 (stating that parties "exist in a no-man's land between
the public and private sectors" and advocating substantial legal autonomy for party
organizations); Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 280 (arguing that political parties
"occupy[] a contested rights terrain falling between the high level of protection owed to
individuals ... and the limited protection offered to de facto agents of the state"); Persily, supra
note 78, at 792 (asserting the "futility of an approach to party rights that depends on a
threshold determination of state action"); Pildes, Theory, supra note 213, at 1623-24
(criticizing the use of conventional state action analysis in political regulation cases); see also
Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry, supranote 89, at 1752-53 (criticizing application of the publicprivate distinction to the major political parties and suggesting "that parties bear
constitutional rights and that they act unconstitutionally when they deprive any group of
citizens of the opportunity for political participation").
461. See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text (defending a rights-based analysis of
regulations of political parties' electoral activities). Whether the public-private distinction
that undergirds the state action analysis is coherent is a question fora future article. See
supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (discussing the public rights theory's rejection of
a rigid public-private distinction).
462. See Cain, supra note 78, at 806-10 (advocating substantial freedom for parties from
regulatory interference); Persily, supra note 78, at 755 (arguing that, despite the conclusion
that parties have characteristics of state actors, courts should treat parties' electoral activities
as private under the First Amendment in order to protect the major parties' functional role
in electoral politics); Wigton, supra note 311, at 435-39 (arguing that parties' electoral
activities should generally be classified as private).
463. See supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text (discussing the public character of
primary elections under the public rights theory).
464. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text (noting the major parties' recent
success in First Amendment cases and minor parties' recent failure in similar cases); see also
Persily, supranote 78, at 767-69 (discussing the Court's demonstrated hostility toward minor
parties' free association claims). One notable departure was the Court's exemption of certain
minor parties from the disclosure provisions of campaign finance laws by virtue of the parties'
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private rights theory of the First Amendment, which treats every
formally nongovernmental entity as an individual with a claim to
expressive freedom. Such an indistinct analysis, however, fails to
satisfy the public rights theory, which requires careful attention to
a given entity's actual effects on the quality of political discourse.
Viewed in terms of their effects on electoral debate, the electoral
activities of major parties differ dramatically from those of minor
parties.46 5
The two major parties are large, powerful institutions with
massive treasuries. They claim the membership and presumed
loyalty of virtually every elected official in the federal government and the vast majority of state elected officials. 6 As Daniel
unpopular ideas. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02
(1982); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing a balancing
test that must be applied when determining whether disclosure requirements survive judicial
scrutiny). In addition, the Court, at times, has acknowledged the distinct character of minor
parties when evaluating ballot access restrictions designed to disqualify minor party
candidates from elections. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,806 (1983) (holding
that an Ohio law that required independent presidential candidates to file statements of
candidacy in March in order to appear on the ballot in November unconstitutionally burdened
the voting and associational rights of independent candidates' supporters). Even in those rare
contexts, however, the Court's aim has been nothing more than formal equality: giving minor
party candidates the same operational autonomy as major party candidates. See id. at 793-94
("A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates
impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment.").
465. Others have suggested or defended differential treatment of major and minor parties
without fully parsing the state action problem or developing a basis in First Amendment
theory for the distinction. See Hasen, Parties, supra note 238, at 837-41 (arguing that
government seldom has a strong interest in burdening minor parties and that minor parties
are more vulnerable to regulation); Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 287-88 (reading
prior cases as "recogniz[ing] a claim that certain regulations, when applied to minor political
parties, effectively chill any capacity for these parties to express their political viewpoint");
Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 802 n.103 (suggesting, without explanation, a need for
differential legal analyses for major and minor parties); Geoffrey R. Stone & William P.
Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment,
1983 SuP. CT. REV. 583, 610 (defending exemption of a minor party from a federal campaign
finance disclosure requirement on the ground that subjecting the party to the requirement
could have adversely affected electoral debate); Wigton, supra note 311, at 443 (arguing that
courts should strictly scrutinize ballot access regulations only when they disproportionately
affect minor parties).
466. For criticisms of the Court's reflexive treatment of the major parties as private
entities, see supra notes 326-27,387 and accompanying text. Characterizing the major parties
as private actors would be more plausible if the parties were defined primarily by their
members. See Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 818-23 (arguing that parties can be viewed as
membership groups). However, voters' allegiance to the major parties has dropped
dramatically over the past several decades, even as the major parties' electoral dominance has
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Lowenstein notes, "[the major parties'] major interactions with the
government are not as objects of government actions. To the
contrary, it is the parties that operate upon and actually constitute
the government."467 Both skeptics and advocates of the duopoly
acknowledge the major parties' distinctive governmental power, 41'
which aids those parties' electoral efforts in numerous ways. When
candidates seek access to the ballot, major party officials almost
always review their eligibility. When a major party makes a legally
questionable decision about how or when to spend its money, the
Federal Election Commission, constituted by major party elected
officials, assesses the decision's propriety. When electoral disputes
lead to litigation, judges appointed and approved by major party
officials-or, as in some states, elected on major party ballot
lines-decide the cases.46 9 The major parties sometimes use these
processes to gain advantages over one another, v° but they maintain a shared interest in disadvantaging potential minor party
competitors. The public rights emphasis on an entity's actual role
in shaping public debate, together with the principle of representation-reinforcing judicial review,47 ' would compel courts to treat
the major parties' electoral activities as state action.472
continued. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
467. Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry, supra note 89, at 1756.
468. See Hasen, Parties, supra note 238, at 835 (noting that "[t]he [major] parties have the
political means to protect themselves"); Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 784 ("The
Democratic and Republican parties enjoy far more state resources than most minor parties
by virtue of the fact that they hold office.").
469. See, e.g., BIBBY & MAISEL, supra note 270, at 43 (discussing the importance of the
major parties' control of "national patronage" appointments for inhibition of minor parties at
state level).
470. See Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 670-74 (discussing monopolistic
lockups of the political process); Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 782, 803 (discussing the
danger that the major party in power will use regulatory authority to undermine its major
party opponent). My state action analysis fully accommodates the view that courts should
intervene in appropriate circumstances to protect either major party from attempts by the
other major party to use governmental power to undermine its rival. In such cases, the
weaker major party stands in the position vis-k-vis state power that minor parties almost
always occupy.
471. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(introducing the idea that a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny may be necessary to correct
structural defects in the political process); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-104
(1980) (discussing, and advancing three arguments for, representation-reinforcing judicial
review).
472. The public rights theory would not, of course, require treating the Democratic Party
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Minor parties are different. By virtue of both their weaknesses
and their strengths, they resemble, for most purposes relating to the
First Amendment, private individuals much more than state actors.
As to their weaknesses, no minor party claims the allegiance of
more than one federal elected official or state governor. Whereas
any harm government regulations do to the major parties is
essentially self-inflicted,473 minor parties always lie at the mercy of
their powerful adversaries. In addition, minor parties are often
unpopular or even despised, making them easy targets for harmful
regulation by major party governments. Many have difficulty
surviving from one election cycle to another. As to their strengths,
minor parties contribute greatly to robust democracy by expanding
and enriching electoral debate, providing ballot alternatives that
offer voters unmoved by the necessarily centrist pull of the twoparty system a vehicle for dissent, and encouraging disaffected
voters to participate in politics.47 ' Even in their present, weak state,
minor parties offer an essential ingredient for the vibrant electoral
process envisioned by the public rights theory of expressive freedom.
As a result of these features of minor parties, the public rights
theory would require courts to subject electoral regulations, as they
apply to minor parties' electoral activities, to strict First
Amendment scrutiny. Consequently, cases often would come out
differently for major and minor parties. For example, in California
Democratic Party v. Jones,75 both major and minor parties
and Republican Party per se differently from other political parties. That would amount to
impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination against particular speakers in violation of the
First Amendment. Rather, if our system continues as a major party duopoly, the two major
parties-which have been the Democrats and Republicans for most of the nation's
history-must be treated differently than other parties. If the Libertarian Party, for example,
were to displace the Republicans as a major party, then it, and not the Republican Party,
would become subject to the distinctive treatment described here. Should our political system
change significantly-with, say, a third party picking up several congressional seats-the
Court would need to reexamine this analytical framework.
473. See, e.g., Lowenstein, Skeptical Inquiry, supra note 89, at 1758-59 & n.64 (discussing
the paradoxical identity between government regulators and the major parties as objects of
regulation).
474. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits that minor
parties provide to the electoral system).
475. 530 U.S. 567 (2000); see also supra Part III.A.1 (discussing and critiquing the Court's
analysis in Jones).
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challenged California's blanket primary system. 476 Advocates and
opponents alike of the Jones Court's decision striking down that
system have emphasized the potentially devastating effects of a
blanket primary on minor parties. 4v7 While crossover voting in a
blanket primary may hinder the major parties' efforts to orchestrate their nominating processes, it can completely undermine
the identity of a minor party. Under the public rights theory of
expressive freedom, as I have argued, the blanket primary's
advantages in increasing electoral participation and broadening
political discourse renders the major parties' autonomy-based
objections to the system trivial. 478 In contrast, if the blanket primary
prevented minor parties from advocating distinctive positions, it
would directly undercut those very advantages. Accordingly, if
minor parties in Jones had made a persuasive showing of their
distinctive vulnerability under the blanket primary system,4 79 they
properly would have won exemption from the mandatory blanket
primary under a public rights analysis, even though the major
parties would have lost.48 0 This allowance for some differential
resolutions comports with the principle of equal treatment of
similarly situated entities under the Constitution, because it reflects
the reality that major and minor parties are not similarly

476. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
477. See Hasen, Parties,supra note 238, at 840 (stating that, in California, crossover voting
swamped" some minor party candidates); Persily & Cain, supra note 79, at 800 (describing
the danger that a blanket primary will allow major party voters to choose minor party
candidates).
478. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
479. The empirical viability of the argument that blanket primaries are likely to swamp
minor parties is open to question. A study of minor parties' experiences under California's
1998 open primary concluded that the available evidence "undercuts, to some degree, the
assertion that candidate selection under a blanket system is made by outsiders with no
familiarity with the party or its candidates." Collett, supra note 306, at 222. Moreover, minor
parties might well conclude that the benefits of opening their primaries to nonparty voters
outweigh any risks. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (discussing strategic
advantages of the blanket primary system for minor parties). In any event, every party
remains free not to endorse the winner of its primary. Hasen, Parties,supra note 238, at 82930.
480. Professor Hasen advocates the same differential result in Jones because of the danger
that crossover voting might lead minor parties to moderate their positions, which would
"lessen[] the chance that minor parties will raise additional issues to be put on the table for
consideration by the major party candidates." Hasen, Parties,supra note 238, at 841.
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situated. 481 That same reality would lead a court that adopted the
public rights theory to give serious consideration to First
Amendment claims specific to minor parties. 82
Minor parties are capable of actions that undermine First
Amendment values on a public rights account, and a court applying
the public rights theory would need to take care not to let the
distinctive features of minor parties obscure that fact. For example,
had the Court in Jones upheld the blanket primary, a minor party
might have brought a new claim challenging California's allowance
for the minor party's members to cross over into one of the major
parties' primaries." 3 Such a case, on the public rights account,
would differ greatly from Jones. In the actual case, minor parties
had reason to fear that nonmembers could swamp their primaries
and drown out the voices of their members. In my hypothetical case,
the minor party would be seeking only to constrain the electoral
options of its own members. Whereas such a constraint might help
the minor party cohere and grow, it would seriously limit the choices
of the minor party's members and would shield the minor party
from competitive pressures to an extent not justifiable in terms of
the minor party's duopoly-imposed disadvantages. The hypothetical
claim, accordingly, would not be entitled to strict scrutiny under the
public rights theory.
B. ContributionLimits, Expenditure Limits, and PoliticalParties
The public rights theory of expressive freedom has broad, if
arguably ambiguous, implications for the First Amendment status
of campaign finance regulation. Reformers frequently contend that
481. Dean Stone and Professor Marshall pose, and consider several answers to, the
question why, if a regulation cannot constitutionally be applied to minor parties, the correct
remedy is not to strike down the regulation on its face, rather than to apply it differentially.
See Stone & Marshall, supra note 465, at 619-24. They do not consider the answer proposed
here: that a given regulation may advance First Amendment interests when applied to major
parties while undermining First Amendment interests when applied to minor parties, making
facial invalidation a less than optimal remedy.
482. See supra Part III.B (discussing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351 (1997), and Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)).
483. See Allison, supranote 309, at 81 (considering the argument that the blanket primary
harmed minor parties by encouraging their members to vote in the major parties' primaries).
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the interest in robust electoral debate justifies or even compels
regulation to combat political money's corrosive effects on political
participation and the quality of political discourse.484 Conversely,
although constitutional arguments against campaign finance reform
depend to a great extent on the autonomy principle that the
government may not stop individuals from spending their money to
express themselves," 5 opponents also maintain that the central
importance of democracy in a system of free expression counsels
against state interference in the electoral process through campaign
finance regulations.486 The broader debate involves issues beyond
the scope of this Article. I only mean to note one especially
prominent consequence for campaign finance laws of applying the
public rights theory to regulation of political parties' electoral
activities.
Buckley v. Valeo" 7 created a familiar dichotomy in the constitutional law of campaign finance. According to the Buckley Court,
the First Amendment permits states and the federal government to
impose reasonable restrictions on campaign contributions." 8 Such
restrictions are permissible because contributions, although they
express political ideas, do so indirectly through the filter of the
candidate and/or party organization." 9 The government's compelling
interest in avoiding actual or apparent corruption outweighs the
484. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 93-101

(1993) (advancing a democracy-centered argument that the First Amendment permits
campaign finance regulations).
485. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, PoliticalMoney andFreedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 663, 667 (1997) (characterizing "[t]he norm in political speech [as) negative liberty:
freedom of exchange, against a backdrop of unequal distribution of resources").
486. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:A Perspectiveon the FirstAmendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1053-54 (1985) (emphasizing, in
arguing against campaign finance regulation, that "[fireedom of speech helps citizens to
become informed so that they can vote intelligently for those who will represent them").
487. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
488. See id. at 29 (holding that "the weighty interests served by restricting the size of
financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon
First Amendment freedoms caused by the [congressionally imposed] $1,000 contribution
ceiling").
489. See id. at 28-29 ("Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not
undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of
candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties.").
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importance to the speaker of his or her indirect political
expression. 40 In contrast, the First Amendment prohibits
governments from regulating campaign expenditures.4 9 When
candidates spend money in political campaigns, they engage in core,
direct political speech. 492 The state's interest in preventing actual or
apparent corruption, according to the Buckley Court, is not salient
in the context of campaign expenditures. 493 That interest provides
the only justification the Buckley Court accepted for campaign
finance regulations.49 4 The Court considered and flatly rejected the
contentions that public interests in equalizing electoral voices or
improving the quality of political dialogue might justify expenditure regulations.4 95 As discussed above, the Buckley ban on
regulating expenditures extends to the independent expenditures of
political parties. 4' The Court recently reaffirmed the contribution-

490. See id. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions--in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.").
491. See, e.g., id. at 47-48 (holding that a limitation on independent expenditures "fails to
serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of
corruption in the electoral process [and) heavily burdens core First Amendment expression").
492. See id. at 14 ("The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area
of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate
on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution.").
493. See id. at 45 (holding that the governmental interests in preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption are inadequate to justify ceiling on independent expenditures).
494. The Court has not explicitly broadened the permissible grounds for campaign finance
regulations, although it has at times given a fairly broad account of what "preventing
corruption [or] the appearance of corruption" may entail. Id. at 45; see also Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (characterizing as corruption "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas").
495. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections
serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of
candidates imposed by § 608 (e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling. But the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
Id.
496. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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expenditure dichotomy in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
497

PAC.

The contribution-expenditure dichotomy of Buckley and Nixon
reflects a blend of public rights and private rights impulses about
expressive freedom. On one hand, the Court in both Buckley and
Nixon emphasized the centrality of political speech to the First
Amendment 98 and invoked the public's interest in vigorous and
unfettered political discourse as a reason to limit government
regulation of expenditures.499 On the other hand, the dichotomy is
deeply rooted in a private rights conception of the First Amendment.
As described above, the Buckley Court began its analysis by describing and evaluating the importance of political expenditures
to candidates and the relatively lesser importance of political
contributions to contributors. Essential to the Court's divergent
conclusions about the two types of speech was the distinction it drew
between their degrees of importance to the respective groups of
speakers. The Nixon Court uncritically reaffirmed that analysis.'
Neither Buckley nor Nixon focused intently on the First Amendment
status of political parties, but the Court implicitly adopted the
private rights approach to parties by treating them as private
speakers. In addition, neither decision considered the distinct
implications of the contribution-expenditure dichotomy for major
and minor political parties.
497. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). The Nixon Court's vindication of the contribution-expenditure
dichotomy surprised many observers who believed not only that the distinction was
incoherent but also that the Court had, in intervening decisions, recognized the incoherence.
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 25, at 249-51 (detailing, almost a decade prior to Nixon, the
apparent decline and fall of the contribution-expenditure distinction in the Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence).
498. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 386 (stating that "'the constitutional guarantee has its fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office'")
(quotingBuckley, 424 U.S. at 15); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (characterizing "political expression"
as standing "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms'")
(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
499. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387 (stating that "an expenditure limit 'precludes most
associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents,'... thus interfering with
the freedom of the adherents as well as the association") (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 ("A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached.").
500. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 386-87 (discussing the Buckley analysis).
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A judicial embrace of the public rights theory of expressive
freedom would entail, among other things, heightened concern for
the electoral role of minor parties. As it happens, the Court's
contribution-expenditure dichotomy has dramatically exacerbated
federal campaign finance law's bias in favor of incumbents and the
major parties, thereby devastating minor parties.50' The ban on
expenditure limits means that the major parties, with their broad
support and well-developed fundraising capacities, can spend any
minor party challenger into the ground. In addition, the Court's
allowance for unlimited independent expenditures benefits the
major parties disproportionately, because individuals who seek to
influence the political process financially are more likely to direct
their resources toward candidates whom they believe have good
chances at winning elections. 2 Conversely, the allowance for
contribution limits denies some minor parties' best hope of financial
parity with the major parties: identifying a small number of
"patrons" able to fund substantial campaign activity despite the
party's narrow base of pre-existing support.0 3 In short, a regime of
sharply limited contributions combined with unlimited expenditures

501. See Geddis, supra note 251, at 590 ("It is widely accepted that the impact of the FECA
rules, as amended by the Supreme Court's review, has been to create a pro-incumbent system
of campaign financing."); Klarman, supra note 115, at 522-23 (discussing Buckley as an
attempt to prevent congressional incumbents from entrenching their own power and stating
that the decision "arguably has had a greater entrenching effect than the campaign finance
restrictions it invalidated"); Rosenblum, supra note 76, at 836 ("FECA and state campaign
finance laws are overtly designed to advantage major parties and disadvantage minor parties
and independent candidates.").
502. This is true for the same reasons that voters in our electoral system are prone to
support the candidates of the two major parties, which I discuss below. See infra notes 506-08
and accompanying text.
503. The Buckley Court's rejection of limits on self-financed campaigns, see Buckley, 424
U.S. at 51-54, simply means that campaigns by wealthy individuals tend to displace true
minor party candidacies as "maverick" alternatives to established major party candidates.
Recent candidacies by wealthy individuals both within (Steve Forbes, Sen. Jon Corzine) and
outside (Ross Perot) the major parties suggest that prohibiting limits on independent
expenditures may help broaden electoral debate. A public rights analysis, however, could cast
doubt on (1) whether indulging the hope that wealthy individuals will spend their fortunes
introducing new ideas into political discourse is an effective long-term strategy for expanding
that discourse, and (2) whether facilitating wealthy individuals' use of their financial
advantages to advocate policies of interest to wealthy individuals, as Forbes clearly and Perot
arguably did, truly expands electoral debate.
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gives the two major parties an enormous advantage over minor
party challengers.
The Court could apply the public rights First Amendment to the
problem Buckley created for minor parties as part of a larger effort
to recast the constitutional law of campaign finance along public
rights lines. Thus, the public rights theory would lead the Court to
eliminate the distinction between contributions and expenditures
based on the differing interests of individual speakers and instead
consider what overall regime of First Amendment limits (if any)
would best advance the public's interest in opening political
discourse to a broad range of viewpoints. That analysis might entail
overruling the Buckley prohibition on expenditure regulations;
conversely, it could lead the Court to overrule the Buckley-Nixon
allowance for contribution regulations. An alternative, less
disruptive approach would be for the Court to weigh the effects of
the Buckley dichotomy as a significant factor in determining
whether any given campaign finance regulation contravened First
Amendment values. That sort of analysis might, for example, guide
the present Court in its consideration of the McCain-Feingold law:
part of the First Amendment inquiry would be whether that
statute's elimination of soft money and restrictions on issue
advertising exacerbated or ameliorated the Buckley dichotomy's
damage to electoral competition."0 4 The widespread belief that
McCain-Feingold distinctly disadvantages the major parties
suggests that such an approach would give the statute a strong
chance of survival.
C. FirstAmendment Challenges to StructuralElements of the
Electoral System
A challenging question presented by the law of political parties is
how vigorously, and under what standard, courts should review
regulations that adversely impact the political process. Many
decisions of the political branches that undermine political
dynamism are deliberate. A court applying the public rights theory
of expressive freedom would subject such actions to the most
504. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing the McCain-Feingold law and
its implications for political parties).
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skeptical constitutional review."0 5 Some legislative actions, however,
akin to the Court's decision in Buckley, may genuinely be directed
toward broader social policy concerns and only incidentally undermine electoral debate. How, if at all, should the Court apply the
First Amendment in reviewing such actions?
The most important objects of this inquiry are the subconstitutional rules about the conduct of elections that define our
political order and perpetuate the major party duopoly. Political
scientists have posited that two interrelated features of our electoral
system-plurality voting and single-member legislative districts
-strongly support the duopolys "° A regime of plurality or "winner
take all" voting allocates all benefits of the election to the candidate
who finishes first. Maurice Duverger, in an insight that has become
known as "Duverger's Law," explains that this arrangement tends
to give each party behind the strongest party an increasingly
smaller percentage of legislative seats than its aggregate share of
the vote, thus giving voters inclined to support the third most
popular candidate a strong strategic incentive to shift their votes to
one of the top two candidates in order to maximize the perceived
likelihood that their votes will affect the outcome.5 0 7 Single-member
legislative districts, as distinct from multimember districts,
similarly create a gravitational pull toward a two-party system by
giving all the election's spoils to first-place finishers.0 8 In contrast,
505. See supra notes 428-36, 450-53 and accompanying text (advocating aggressive judicial
review of laws that bar minor parties from mounting fusion candidacies and rules that
exclude minor parties from televised candidate debates).
506. See BmBY &MAISEL, supranote 270, at 56-57 (identifying plurality voting and singlemember districts as important determinants of duopoly); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 268,
at 16-18 (contending that plurality voting and single-member districts account for the major
party duopoly in the United States); Herrnson, supra note 268, at 24 (emphasizing the
difficulties plurality voting and single-member districts present for minor parties).
507. See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN

THE MODERN STATE 224-26 (Barbara & Robert North trans., John Wiley & Sons 2d Eng. ed.,
rev. 1963) (1951). For a useful gloss on subsequent critiques of Duverger's analysis, see
Hasen, Entrenching,supra note 99, at 367-71.
508. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA 303 n.24 (1995) (stating that "having single-member districts instead of
at-large elections or multimember districts accentuates the pressures plurality elections
impose toward two-party systems"); Issacharoff& Pildes, Lockups, supra note 102, at 674-75
(explaining the tendency of a single-member district electoral system to produce a two-party
political system). Federal law requires that members of Congress be elected from singlemember districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2000).
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consider a voting system in which the top two (or more) finishers
proceed to a runoff, or a multimember district arrangement in which
the top two (or more) finishers in a district are elected. In either of
those scenarios, finishing worse than first has value, giving
strategic voters a reason to consider three (or more) candidates.
Only political fiat sustains these two principal structural
protections of the major party duopoly.5" Perhaps exclusion of minor
parties partially motivated some jurisdictions' decisions to employ
plurality voting and single-member districts, but numerous other
justifications for those features of the political system are plausible,
and both plurality voting and single-member districts have become
ingrained elements of our national political culture.1 0 Does the
Constitution have anything to say about those structures? Some
scholars have suggested it does, focusing on situations in which
plurality voting and/or single-member districts disadvantage
voters of color, thereby implicating the Equal Protection Clause.5 '
Nonetheless, even judges and commentators skeptical of legal
favoritism toward the duopoly have treated plurality voting and
single-member districts as legally sacrosanct aspects of our political
system.5 12 Indeed, these features are sometimes even advanced as
509. See BIBBY & MAISEL, supra note 270, at 53-68 (cataloguing a wide range of legal and
structural impediments to the development of competitive minor parties in the United States);
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 268, at 15-47 (detailing constraints to minor party
participation in the political process); Issacharoff, Parties,supra note 214, at 292 (criticizing
the major parties' claims for autonomy under the First Amendment because major parties
enjoy the "state-conferred privilege" of strongly favorable electoral rules); Winger, supra note
268, at 159 (arguing that unfavorable election laws in most states prevent minor parties from
winning elections).
510. Professors Issacharoff and Pildes make a persuasive case that the federal government
and early states could not have had anticompetitive motives for adopting single-member
districts and plurality voting, because the contemporary party structure had not coalesced at
the time those jurisdictions fashioned their electoral structures. See Issacharoff & Pildes,
Lockups, supra note 102, at 677. That argument does not foreclose the possibility that the
federal and/or state governments have perpetuated the structures in part to protect the
duopoly, although testing such a hypothesis would be extremely difficult. Examination of
later-admitted states' affirmative decisions to adopt plurality voting and single-member
districts might prove interesting, but those decisions might owe more to simple conformity
than to any deliberate purpose.
511. Most notably, Lani Guinier has contended that single-member district systems
constitute illegal voting discrimination when those systems have the effect of frustrating
African-American voters' attempts to achieve meaningful political representation. See
GUINIER, supra note 256, at 71-118.
512. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 379-80 (1997)
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evidence that our system is so steeped in two-party politics that
judicial interference with that structure would be improper. 13
By emphasizing the bottom-line effects of electoral rules on the
quality of electoral discourse, the public rights theory of expressive
freedom offers a basis for judicial review of plurality voting systems
and single-member legislative districts. Under the public rights
theory, the fairest characterization of such electoral structures
would be as neutral laws that, by perpetuating the major party
duopoly, cause incidental but potentially serious harm to First
Amendment interests. Accordingly, a court that applied the public
rights theory would subject these elements of the electoral system
to First Amendment review under the familiar standard for judging
neutral regulations with incidental effects on speech articulated in
United States v. O'Brien." Under that test, a regulation is justified
when (1) it is within the constitutional power of government; (2) it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on speech is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.515
The O'Brien approach would allow the Court to vindicate legitimate
regulatory interests while aggressively protecting the public's interest in collective self-determination under the First Amendment. 16
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the inability of minor parties to compete in a singlemember district system does not implicate the First Amendment and that "the establishment
of single-member districts correlates directly with the States' interests in political stability");
Hasen, Entrenching, supra note 99, at 344-45 n.77 (acknowledging that single-member
districts and plurality voting "more than any other [laws] tend to dictate the number of viable
political parties," but advocating only rational basis review of those electoral structures
because "they do not explicitly restrict the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment"); Pildes, Theory, supra note 213, at 1615-16 (suggesting several reasons why
judicial overturning of plurality voting and single-member districts would be untenable).
513. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 78, at 806 (proceeding, in arguing for party autonomy, from
the observation that state laws encourage electoral coalescence around two parties to the
conclusion that "[p]olitical parties are part of the informal constitution-institutions that fill
in the implied functions that arise out of the formal electoral structure"). For a discussion and
persuasive refutation of this sort of argument, see Issacharoff & Pildes, Lockups, supra note
102, at 676-80.
514. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
515. Id. at 377.
516. A tension exists between the public rights theory of expressive freedom and the
application of any form of means-ends scrutiny, including O'Brien scrutiny, to political speech.
Where the government regulates political speech, the public rights theory all but forbids
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How any challenge to plurality voting or single-member districts
would arise, let alone how such a challenge might play out, would
depend on historical and political nuances of the jurisdiction at
issue.5 17 Nonetheless, a court applying the public rights theory in
the manner I propose would have to identify a substantial nonspeech-related benefit of the challenged practice before it could
countenance any negative effects the practice carried for robust
electoral competition and debate.
Under this approach, the Court in appropriate circumstances
could impose a remedy that required fundamental changes in a
jurisdiction's electoral system. Such a remedy would undoubtedly
represent a sweeping exercise ofjudicial power in a quintessentially
political area. The Court, however, long ago vindicated judicial
interference in electoral processes where core constitutional rights
are at issue.1 ' Adoption of the public rights theory of expressive
freedom in the context of electoral regulations would compel a
similar degree of constitutional concern regarding electoral
structures that undermined partisan competition to the detriment
of electoral discourse. The major parties' combination of self-interest
consideration of countervailing government interests. See supra notes 204-08 and
accompanying text (discussing the public rights theory's categorical methodology). The
O'Brien test, however, weighs not the government's interest in purposeful suppression of
speech but rather its interest in some regulatory purpose entirely unrelated to speech. The
test thus does not depend on the premise, essential to other forms of means-ends scrutiny,
that the value of protected speech is limited in ways that can justify its purposeful regulation.
O'Brien imposes a procedural constraint on courts' constitutional authority to question
legislative decisions, rather than giving censors a substantive trump over expressive freedom.
Even so, the Court's use of O'Brien scrutiny to review "time, place, and manner" regulations
too often has resulted in cavalier disregard for the value of political dissent. See supra note
70 and accompanying text. Thus, practical experience would have to determine whether
O'Brien scrutiny of electoral regulations that incidentally diminish electoral discourse would
prove compatible with the public rights theory.
517. One important consequence of the public rights theory is that it would require
recalibration in First Amendment cases of the present Court's standing doctrine, which rigidly
requires an individualized injury before a case may proceed. This requirement precludes legal
relief for injuries shared by the public generally. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
Under the public rights theory, any voter or coalition of voters would stand in an appropriate
position to challenge a given policy's negative effects on political discourse.
518. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (striking down a districting scheme
because it diluted the effect of African-Americans' votes); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10
(1962) (holding that adjudicating a claim that apportionment of state legislative districts
violated African-Americans' voting rights did not transgress the bar against judicial
consideration of "political questions").
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and power to effectuate it makes electoral structures that favor the
major parties distinctly appropriate objects for aggressive representation-reinforcing review. 19 If we take seriously the idea that
impediments to electoral competition and vibrant political discourse
strike at the heart of the First Amendment, as I have contended we
should, then we must accept-indeed, welcome-a substantial
judicial role in eliminating such impediments.

CONCLUSION

The public rights theory of expressive freedom set forth in this
Article embodies an affirmative commitment to sustaining the
conditions for effective self-government. In contrast, the private
rights theory embraced by the present Supreme Court does nothing
more than protect individual autonomy against governmental
tyranny. That approach offers little to enhance the quality of
political discourse or to ensure a robust, dynamic electoral process.
The Court's application of the private rights theory to cases
involving regulations of political parties' electoral activities, which
has effectively ratified the "responsible party government" defense
of the major party duopoly, bears out this failing. As long as the
private rights theory governs constitutional adjudication in the
electoral context, the First Amendment will afford the two entrenched political parties formidable protection against government
regulation while doing nothing to protect, let alone advance, the
electoral role of minor parties. This state of affairs has become
familiar, even comfortable. It does not, however, provide the levels
of popular engagement, governmental responsiveness, and open
debate necessary to a vital democratic culture. We should not
understand the Constitution to countenance such an order, much
less to require it. The public rights theory of expressive freedom,
which would lead the Court to decisions that enhanced electoral
competition, stimulated political participation, and broadened
519. See supra notes 466-72 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the major
parties to use public sector power to promote their private interests).
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democratic discourse-the central aspirations of a "dynamic party
politics" theory of our electoral system-offers a far better basis for
adjudication in this critical area.

